South Africa in BRICS: prospects and constraints by Chiyemura, Frangton
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
Name:   Frangton Chiyemura 
Contact Details:  frangtonchiyemura@gmail.com      
+27838719011/0749275361  
Student No:  830691 
Course:   Master of Arts (International Relations) Dissertation 
Title:   South Africa in BRICS: Prospects and Constraints 
Supervisor  Dr Christopher J. Lee 
Co-Supervisor Dr Amy Niang  
 
A Dissertation submitted to the School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, University 
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in the fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Masters of Arts in International Relations by research.  
 
 
Johannesburg, October 2014 
i 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I, Frangton Chiyemura declare that SOUTH AFRICA IN BRICS: PROSPECTS AND 
CONSTRAINTS submitted for the Master of Arts Degree in International Relations at the 
Department of International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, is my original work and has not been 
submitted before, at this or any other institution of higher education. I further declare that I 
am the owner of the copyright thereof, and all used materials in the dissertation have been 
duly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………….     ………………………………..  
Student’s Signature         Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) and the inclusion and integration of 
South Africa to form BRICS has sparked debates on the revival and significance of Global 
South/South-South Cooperation. No other subject has arguably contributed to the Global 
South debates and questions as much as BRICS. The elucidation and debate about BRICS 
and the Global South had seemed incomplete until the inclusion of South Africa in the forum. 
With this, some accounts and projections have been given about why South Africa was 
included. Such accounts by-passed the main question of the benefits and risks for South 
Africa. Therefore, this study was driven by the need to explore and establish the benefits, 
risks and uncertainties that befalls South Africa virtually by being a BRICS member. Based 
on a qualitative research approach in which interviews, extensive literature review and a 
historical analysis narrative, the study found that South Africa‘s participation in BRICS-
though junior member has more potential benefits than risks. Such an analysis was made 
possible specifically by the employment of international political economy, social 
constructivism and the political coalition approaches as key theoretical cornerstones that 
underpinned the study.  
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1.0 Chapter One: Introduction  
[…] then 2009 saw the end of what was known as the third world, we are now in a 
new, fast evolving multi-polar world economy-in which some developing countries 
are emerging as economic powers, others are moving towards becoming additional 
poles of growth, and some are struggling to attain the potential within this new 
system-where North and South, East and West are now points on a compass, not 
economic destinies (Zoellick, 2010:40). 
1. 1 Introduction 
The post-Cold War political dispensation has ushered in a new global order in which there is 
a fundamental shift in conceptions of geo-politics from the Global North to the Global 
South
1
. New powers and zones of influence have emerged in which countries such as China, 
India, South Africa, Indonesia and Brazil amongst others; command a measurable size of 
influence. These emerging power zones are contributing to development of a multi-polar 
system in the architecture of world politics. With the rise of the Global South, quite often, 
attention has been given to China and India and their potential role towards the re-balancing 
of the world order. Such a narrative does not only bypass the possibility of a balanced world 
order in which Latin America and Africa are included, rather it also reduces the Global North 
domination in international relations. Some contend that the emergence of BRICS-Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa tends to portray an emerging new world order that may 
pose a threat to the western nations, or at least destabilise their domination (Qobo, 2013; 
Carmody, 2013). This has emerged as an area of much debate in the post-global financial 
crisis of 2008.   
 
As a result of these shifts in the conceptions of geo-politics, much hype and hope (though too 
optimistic) is present particularly in South Africa about its participation in BRICS. With the 
integration of South Africa into this club of emerging economies on 27 December 2010, 
BRICS suggests the rise of multilateralism in international relations with southern 
characteristics (Prashad, 2013). Even though BRICS signals a new and important 
development in international relations, to understand it, we need to link it with Global South 
historical and present trajectories
2
. Broadly, this project explores the rise of BRICS and how 
                                                             
1 Developing (non-industrialised or in the process of industrialisation) nations which are in most cases located in 
the southern hemisphere 
2 Linking BRICS and Global South has always been an area of great debate in academic disciplines. This study 
as such joins the discussion by attempting to link BRICS with Global South perspective. As for South Africa, 
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this contributes to the configuration and re-orientation of international relations. Specifically, 
the introduction of South Africa in BRICS has more potential economic benefits and 
conversely brings Africa into play on global economic trajectories. As such, some contend 
that the integration of South Africa in BRICS resembles an era of great economic potential 
for Pretoria to influence policy making and alignment among the non-industrialised 
developing countries within economic considerations-in particular Africa (Dube, 2013). To 
date, it is not clear and has not been fully explored whether South Africa‘s entry in BRICS 
will provide much desired economic objectives and forging of new investment partners. 
Evidence of multilateralism seems to suggest that there are also constraints, risks and 
uncertainties of forum based frameworks (Dube, 2013). As for South Africa, some content 
that it is difficult to quantify the nature, level and possible opportunities in BRICS (Draper, 
2011). Some argues that regardless of South Africa‘s entry in BRICS, economic progress and 
infrastructural development had been on the rise prior to BRICS formation (Draper, 2013).  
 
South Africa is the smallest economy in BRICS. According to Besada, Tok and Winters 
(2013:2), South Africa‘s economy grew by 2.8 per cent in 2010, lower than China‘s 10.3 per 
cent, India‘s 9.7 per cent, Brazil‘s 7.5 per cent and Russia‘s 4.5 per cent. Additional to that, 
South Africa has an approximated population of 54 million (2014 estimates) far lesser than 
India‘s 1.2 billion (2011 Census), China‘s 1.4 billion (2013 estimations), Brazil‘s 190 million 
(2010 Census) and Russia‘s 142 million (2010 Census) (StatSA, 2014; World Population 
Review, 2014). Amongst other factors that can be used to measure the strength of South 
Africa‘s level of competency in comparison to other BRICS nations as shown above, Pretoria 
has less significant power. With this, there is little consensus on the implications of South 
Africa‘s participation in BRICS (Besada, Tok and Winters, 2013:2).   
 
Wooldridge (2011) claims that South Africa has less economic weight to influence policy 
decisions in BRICS, hence there is few economic gains and more risks. Yanshuo (2011) 
argues that South Africa‘s membership in BRICS is associated with more benefits towards its 
drive for economic growth. Bond (2013) contends this by noting that South Africa‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
India, Brazil and arguably China, such a status may be applied, but with Russia, the case is different. However, 
for the fact that Russia has often been identified with the interests and values of the developing world, this study 
as well-confers Russia a Global South status. Regardless of that, a greater detail and conceptual interrogation of 
BRICS-Global South argument is given on chapter 2.  
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participation in BRICS extends China and India‘s new imperialist agenda in Africa. From the 
above, there exist a lot of confusions, undetermined thoughts, projections and assumption 
about South Africa‘s participation in BRICS. This study attempts to clear such confusions 
and undetermined thoughts, projections and assumptions, by specifically looking at the 
prospects and constraints for South Africa in BRICS. The study contends that South Africa's 
participation in BRICS could be assessed through two possible ends: Prospects and 
Constraints. As such this study is driven by the research question below. 
1.2 Research Question 
South Africa‘s position in BRICS has not been fully explored (Schulz, 2013). This study 
attempts to explore the prospects and constraints of South Africa in BRICS. Though South 
Africa is small in economic outlook as compared to other countries in the BRICS alliance, it 
still has favourable characteristics that support its participation. This project is mainly 
concerned with the following question: 
(i) What are the economic, political and social prospects and constraints for South 
Africa‘s participation in BRICS? 
1.3 Aim of the study  
This study is informed by the need to explore the available political, economic and social 
prospects and constraints for South Africa in BRICS.  
1.4 Rationale of the study 
Available scholarship has neglected the broader political, economic and social prospects and 
constraints for South Africa in BRICS. Rather, a few studies have looked into South Africa in 
BRICS specifically on why it was invited to be the fifth member. This study is of uttermost 
importance as it explores further-not only the reasons for its invitation but specifically the 
prospects and constraints towards participation in such a group. Given that there is limited 
literature on South Africa in BRICS and BRICS-Africa relations, this study will add 
knowledge to this debate and probably open new debates specifically on how reform agenda 
of global governance can be realised in BRICS. The study also recognises that except from 
the motives that led to the invitation of South in BRICS, political, economic and social 
prospects and constraints are also important for Pretoria‘s policy considerations. This study 
does not simply reproduce available arguments presented elsewhere (maybe by politicians, 
statesman or heads of states) it attempts to separate rhetoric from reality through an attempt 
to offer a critical perspective of South Africa‘s –BRICS participation as a whole.  
4 
 
1.5 Literature review  
The inclusion of South Africa in BRICS since 2011 has attracted scholarly and academic 
interest in the wake of Global South politics in particular on why South Africa was invited 
and not other deserving nations
3
. In this regard, different academics, journalists, statesman, 
members of diplomatic corps, research and policy institutes present different and at times 
identical analysis on South Africa‘s membership in BRICS. The section of this chapter 
specifically explores, analyses and discusses different views on South Africa‘s membership 
in BRICS. The discussions shall be centred on a broad generic debate about BRICS, and the 
motives behind South Africa in BRICS, which culminates in unpacking the lacunae in the 
scholarship. This will present the entry point for the study by integrating all frameworks of 
analysis which often have been omitted in the scholarship of South Africa and BRICS. 
Therefore, as an entry point, South Africa‘s position in BRICS is primarily based on its 
national interest progression. As shown by Volchkova and Ryabtseva that 
the BRICS forum might play an important role in promoting South Africa‘s role on the 
continent. For example, Russia believes it is possible to increase South Africa‘s influence 
among its neighbours and in the overall global economic arena through the development of a 
national currency exchange within BRICS. If the BRICS countries manage to execute trade in 
national currencies, all remaining African countries might settle accounts with Russia, Brazil, 
India and China in South African Rands (Volchkova and Ryabtseva, 2013:8).  
This implies that BRICS platform act as an avenue through which South Africa may advance 
its national interest. Such a view raised by Volchkova and Ryabtseva is further supported by 
Vandemoortele, Bird, Du Toit, Liu, Sen and Soares (2013) who argues that BRICS offers an 
opportunity through which Global South elite nations can build better blocks enshrined 
within development trajectories of their national interest. Consequently, the BRICS forum is 
seen as a platform for South Africa to champion its economic development backlog 
(Vandemoortele, et al, 2013). Pretoria believes that by participating in BRICS, this will 
contribute to a national interest progression on trade and investment to and from other BRICS 
nations. However, Notshuwana (2012) believes that the alliance does not provide equal and 
mutual levels of benefit as China, India, and Brazil have seemingly benefited more than 
South Africa and Russia. Even though BRICS is seen as a platform through which South 
Africa will jointly do business in Africa and the world at large through a codified BRICS 
brand name, it is questionable whether this advantage is likely to assist the poor at home. 
                                                             
3 On this note, O‘Neil projections noted that South Africa was not a deserving member in BRICS, since it was 
way far on the N11 projections. 
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Khana (2013) argues that South Africa being the least developed nation in this group of 
emerging economies indicates that South Africa is being used as a face through which other 
BRICS nations will engage Africa via South Africa. For Khana, South Africa cannot match 
the level of competition-rather South Africa is being swallowed while unknowingly pushing 
the Chinese interest. As noted by Smith (2011), this raises a lot of questions on whether 
South Africa will cope with the pressure and competition exerted by China, India, Brazil and 
Russia. These are just claims which scholarship is making. Ultimately, this call for the need 
to fully explore what political, economic and social prospects and constraints befalls South 
Africa by being a BRICS member.  
 
South Africa‘s national interest in BRICS is premised on commercial interests amongst other 
factors. Already, South Africa is the second largest investor in Africa, something that calls 
for the maintenance of such economic stature (World Bank Report, 2013). In light of the 
above information, South Africa‘s membership in BRICS should then be seen as a move for 
South Africa to consolidate its position within the realm of commercialism (Fynn, 2012).  
 
South Africa realises the importance of promoting the development of African continent as a 
region. As such, it is one of South Africa foreign policy interest to promote African 
development. As defined elsewhere, Africa‘s Agenda is a position in which South Africa 
advances the interest of the continent at a global level (New Development Plan, 2013). This 
strategy includes supporting all the African Union‘s structures and its agencies in an effort to 
create conducive environment for sustainable socio-economic and political development. As 
such, it may be argued that a large pool of academics shares an identical position on South 
Africa‘s Africa First Agenda in BRICS (Dube, 2013; Landsberg and Moore, 2013). Fynn 
(2012) quotes Rob Davies, the minister of Trade and Industry in South Africa when he states 
that,  
We (South Africa) are very conscious of the fact that we are in there (BRICS) in part as an 
emerging economy in our own right but also in part because we are a presence in the African 
continent. 
Additionally Rob Davies quoted by Fynn (2012:8) notes that 
6 
 
The African continent faces a number of challenges in leveraging its combined economic 
strength and growing consumer market. Weak border operations and poor infrastructure – 
rail, road and power – are among the issues that hamper continental economic integration.  
South Africa‘s presence in BRICS acts as the gateway through which Africa‘s problem are 
brought to the table with other emerging nations, and there is optimism that such a platform 
will bring about a development trajectory for Africa. However, one should note that Rob 
Davies is being too optimistic since Africa‘s socio-economic and political problems require a 
holistic approach to mitigate and alleviate them. Therefore Africa‘s development failures 
come from a multi-faceted background in which the political condition is at the core.  
 
South Africa‘s Africa Agenda goal is enshrined within a greater need of economic integration 
that is cost effective in trade, capital investment and foreign direct investment parameters. 
Stuenkel (2013) note that South Africa‘s level of economic development coupled with its 
high infrastructure development capacity offers favourable and conducive climate and 
environment through which other BRICS members can engage with Africa via Pretoria. 
Kornegay and Bohler-Muller (2013) argues that the presence of South Africa in BRICS 
resembles one of the Mbeki‘s legacies. Such a legacy presents Africa with an opportunity to 
promote socio-economic development. Such a position as noted by Kornegay and Bohler-
Muller offers an explanation of Africa First in South Africa‘s foreign policy Agenda. 
Additionally, South Africa‘s road to independence from apartheid involved the entire 
continent of Africa; this may help to explain why South Africa‘s position in BRICS is 
important-a payback approach. The entire continent of Africa supported South Africa 
internationally, regional and globally to down-campaign apartheid.  
 
The Gauteng Province Report on BRICS (2013) claims that South Africa is the 
linkman/middle man between BRICS and Africa. However, South Africa‘s linkman‘s role 
seems too optimistic since some African countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Sudan 
have monolithically engaged with BRICS nations such as China, India and Russia. Essop 
Pahad (2014) argues that  
South Africa should be mindful of its respective interest in BRICS. The Good Samaritan role 
is inapplicable to international politics. The gateway or middleman role is much complicated 
than South Africa thinks…… 
7 
 
An address by former Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Mr 
Ebrahim I Ebrahim, on the occasion of a Public Lecture titled, Reflections on BRICS: 
Prospects for South Africa and Africa, at the University of Johannesburg, Soweto Campus, 
25 October 2012 reiterated that South Africa‘s position in BRICS should be seen as the most 
soluble opportunity through which the African Agenda can be internationalised and 
strengthened through increased relations with members of the Global South. This is seen as a 
diplomatic platform through which South Africa advances the African Agenda. Stuenkel 
(2013) argues that Africa requires a position in the architecture of global politics. For the fact 
that Africa has been side-lined from such activities by the legacies and institutions of 
colonialism, its voice has been silenced by the marauding might of the Global North nations. 
With the emergence of BRICS, Carmody (2012) believes that South Africa should lead the 
torch for Africa‘s recognition in the architecture of global politics. Such a view is also 
supported by Habib (2009) who argues that South Africa is Africa regional powerbase.  
 
At the 5
th
 BRICS summit, South Africa was able to advance such a move for the 
consolidation of the African Agenda. The summit held in Durban, from 26-27 March 2013, 
South Africa under the theme; BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration 
and Industrialisation, promoted South Africa‘s national interest and Africa‘s Agenda interest.  
As highlighted by constructivism approach, South Africa‘s membership in BRICS is to 
advance the African Agenda in which an Africa First form of identity and interest is 
important
4. Landsberg and Moore (2013) prominent scholars on South Africa‘s post-
apartheid foreign policy have always positioned a better Africa concept- which in turn 
provides a regional integration framework. South Africa is seen as a champion of economic 
development in Africa, and as such functionally integrates African economies in BRICS, a 
reason to explain the invitation of 15 African states during the 2013 BRICS summit in 
Durban (Kornegay and Bohler-Muller, 2013). The Africa First orientation premised on South 
Africa‘s foreign policy is further enhanced by South Africa‘s call for the establishment of a 
permanent member of an African nation representation at the UNSC (Kuzmin (2013). Kingah 
(2011) believes that South Africa calls for a balanced representation in the Bretton Woods 
institutions such as IMF, the WB and WTO. Kimenyi and Lewis (2011) argue that Africa 
should have a say and position in the architecture of global politics.  
                                                             
4 Constructivism approach is one of the theories that inform the study. Greater detail of this approach is made in 
chapter 2 
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Furthermore, other BRICS nations decided to invite South Africa because it understands the 
African continent realities and challenges on the ground. Carmody (2012) argues that South 
Africa acts as a gateway for other BRICS nations to Africa. However, South Africa like other 
BRICS nations has diverse and cosmopolitan populations with internal strife and challenges. 
Bond‘s (2013) and Gumede (2013) critique this by arguing that South Africa and the other 
BRICS members are destined to usurp Africa‘s resource using the soft power approach in the 
form of aid and investment. Given the fact that South Africa is the demographically, 
territorial and economically smallest nation in the group, little or nothing has been clearly 
spelled out as regards the implications that may arise for South Africa in this alliance. 
Additionally, Prashad (2013) believes that BRICS does not have respect for workers and the 
environment. If BRICS nations are profit driven, are they that different from the traditional 
imperialist such as US and Britain amongst others? In this regard, Ampiah and Naidu 
(2008:4) lament that China is in itself exploitative, extractive, and destructive and a platform 
through which Africa‘s underdevelopment may be perpetuated. Such claims of BRICS being 
of negative influence towards South Africa have not been fully explored. As such, this study 
attempts to fill in that knowledge gap by specifically exploring the political, economic and 
social prospects and constraints for South Africa in BRICS.  
  
In summation the literature review above traces various scholarly and academic standpoints 
presented by different scholarship on South Africa‘s membership in BRICS. This overview 
has identified that, South Africa‘s membership in BRICS is driven by its national interest. 
However, the literature as it stands fails to account for the ―How‖ and the ―To what extent‖ 
part for South Africa in BRICS. This might be caused by scarcity of scholarship on South 
Africa‘s participation in BRICS. Regardless of such scarcity, a few scholarships drawn from 
Stuenkel, Bond, Gumede, Carmody, Dube, Khana, Fynn amongst others have touched on the 
subject matter. Instead, their studies have largely concentrated on why South Africa was 
invited to BRICS, and do not explicitly address the political, economic and social 
ramifications that befalls South Africa by the virtue of being a BRICS member. Taking off 
from the existing scholarship, this study therefore seeks to explore the prospects and 
constraints of South Africa‘s membership in BRICS. In the absence of an institutional 
strategic framework, BRICS engagements has its own degree of co-variance and co-
operation, which at one point or the other; may be seen to be harmful or favourable to South 
Africa‘s economic development drive-and this has to be accounted for.  
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1.6 Research Methodology  
This study is primarily informed by qualitative research methods. A qualitative research 
method implies the use of analytical, descriptive and interpretative approach to sociality 
(Creswell, 2003). Gray (2009:229) adds that qualitative research emphasizes depth of 
understanding and deeper meaning of the human experience and generation of theoretically 
rich observations. Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2006:184) maintains that qualitative 
research is conducted using qualifying words and descriptions to record and investigate 
aspects of social reality. 
  
With the nature of the research question and aim, this study makes use of both primary and 
secondary sources of data. As part of primary sources of data, I conducted interviews 
between March and April 2014. Eight interviews were conducted with academics working on 
South Africa in BRICS. Of the eight interviews that were conducted, two were telephone and 
six were face to face interviews. I had to resort to telephone interviews because the two 
respondents were located far away from my Centre. Of those two telephone interviews, one 
of the respondents was so busy that it was just by grace that he gave me a telephone interview 
as an alternative. These eight interviews were given by members of South Africa‘s 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Human Science Research Council-South Africa, 
HSBC Bank employee, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, SAIIA and Chris 
Hani Institute. Some of the interviews were drawn from BRICS Think Tanks academics that 
had represented South Africa on the 6
th
 BRICS Academic Symposium in Brazil, 2014.  
 
I also had conversations with University of Johannesburg lecturers and Wits academics who 
provided some key pointers in unpacking South Africa‘s position in BRICS. The respondents 
were purposively selected on the basis of area of speciality, accessibility and availability. 
Moreover, these respondents‘ work is heavily centred on BRICS.  To supplement the primary 
data gathered from the interviews, I also consulted secondary sources of data gathered from 
the public domains and databases of IMF, WB, BRICS Information Centre, African 
Development Bank, GEGAfrica Portal, Goldman Sachs Group, WTO, UNECA, UNCTAD, 
ECA, SARB, SAIIA and BRICS governmental websites. Lastly, extensive analysis of 
literature drawn from mainly reports, books, articles, chapters, internet data and journalistic 
reports on South Africa and the BRICS was made. These sources of data were accessed from 
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the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), University of Johannesburg (UJ), South Africa 
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) 
libraries.  
1.7 Limitations of the study 
The study has few limitations, which were however minimised. Firstly, BRICS is still an 
emerging economic group that has many aims and objectives that are still in the pipeline, thus 
making it difficult to reach conclusions. However, this study is important since it attempts to 
explore the greatest number of prospects and constraints for South Africa in BRICS. This 
implies that as a field of study, BRICS has few classic and substantive literatures.  Very few 
scholarly studies have been made about BRICS with specific reference to South Africa. 
However, such limitations were alleviated by precisely employing a series of interviews with 
different academics, personnel in governmental departments that deal with BRICS.  
 
During the period of doing interviews, many academics were busy and arranging 
appointments was really a difficult task. This was because most these respondents were 
preparing for the 6
th
 BRICS academic symposium which was to be held in March 2014, 
Brazil. Some of the respondents denied me access to some of the information citing the 
confidentiality of the data. Some figures and statistics were difficult to access and even 
unavailable in some instances. However, all these limitations were minimized, as I had to 
exercise patience in making and arranging appointments. On data unavailability, I had to 
reduce my variables and time frames so as to obtain data that was available.  
1.8 Structure of the study 
Chapter 2 gives a background on South Africa, theory component and conceptual 
frameworks of the study. To a lesser extent, the study maps South Africa‘s history and 
current economic and international status.  In addition, the section explores the reason why 
South Africa was invited to be the fifth member in BRICS. To a greater extent, the section 
illuminates the theories that inform the study. Furthermore, the section unpacks some 
conceptual dynamics by interrogating terms like Global South, South-South Cooperation, 
BRICS-Global South status and the concept of ‗BRICS as an original Bandung‘.    
 
Chapter 3 historicises the relations between post-Apartheid South Africa and BRICS 
relations from as early as 1955 during the Bandung conference. As an attempt, the study does 
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not claim that relations between South Africa and BRICS countries started in 1955, but traces 
the relations that existed out of state-craft (in this instance relations between ANC, PAC and 
SACP with Brazil, Russia, India and China) and how they have continued or changed in this 
new political dispensation. As such, country level analysis is made.   
 
Chapter 4 discusses the prospects for South Africa‘s participation in BRICS. This is done by 
exploring and evaluating possible political, economic and social prospects for South Africa.  
Specifically, the chapter explores broad thematic sections of trade, FDI and global 
governance reform among others.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the political, economic and social constraints for South Africa‘s 
membership in BRICS. In this section, the study evaluates the possible risks and uncertainties 
for South Africa in BRICS.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes the study. Key research findings and summary are presented in this 
chapter. Concluding and future remarks are also made in this section.  
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2.0 Chapter 2: Background, Theory and Conceptual Frameworks of the study  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter gives a background, theory component and conceptual framework of the study. 
Though little attention is given to the political history of South Africa and its foreign policy 
issues, a greater detail of theory and conceptual components are discussed in this section. On 
theory component, international political economy, constructivism and political coalition 
approaches are discussed, which informs the study. This chapter also presents key important 
discussions on issues of BRICS Global South status, South-South Cooperation and the 
‗BRICS original Bandung moment‘ claims. This culminates by unpacking the ambiguities 
and complexities on BRICS and the Global South debates.   
2.2 South Africa: Mapping the present from a historical backdrop  
The end of apartheid in 1994 ushered in a new political dispensation of democracy in South 
Africa that contributed to the country gaining re-admission in the international community 
after 34 years (1960-1994) of political and economic isolation due to apartheid sanctions 
(Landsberg, 2010). To re-gain its international confidence, South Africa re-invigorated its 
foreign policy through transformation of diplomatic relations and re-establishment of 
relations with other nations (developed and developing) so as to attract increased trade, aid 
and investment flows. This in essence contributed to South Africa‘s participation in regional 
(Southern African Development Community-SADC), continental (African Union-AU) and 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements. South Africa‘s foreign policy targets an advance of 
domestic interests such as the promotion of economic development by opening joint 
investments, attracting foreign direct investment, promoting infrastructure development and 
trade within regional integration frameworks (Landsberg, 2010). Regional integration has 
been portrayed by South Africa as a way of promoting economic development in Africa. This 
led to Mbeki to advance the African Agenda/Africa First framework (Schoeman, 2003). The 
African agenda is a conception that is located within a broader framework of Africa first in 
development circles. Such a conception considers a peaceful and stable political system as a 
pre-requisite for sustainable socio-economic development for Africa. South Africa promotes 
this by strengthening the African Union and its structures in the development of an 
environment that positions Africa on the architecture of global politics after its years of 
marginalisation due to colonialism (Landsberg, 2013).  
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Historically, South Africa was under apartheid rule from 1948 to 1990. Apartheid was a 
government backed form of rule based on racialism. Blacks, coloureds and Asians were 
disenfranchised and they did not have the power to vote, and to that extent they were 
territorially segregated under the apartheid rule. Such segregation created separate 
development which favoured the minority whites. It was violence initiated by revolutionary 
parties such as the ANC, PAC amongst others and a condemnation from the international 
community that led to abolishing of apartheid. Such revolutionary parties received weapons 
and military training from countries such as China, Cuba and Russia, which led to the start of 
relationships with the respective countries. Post-apartheid government has strengthened ties 
with Russia, India, China and other African nations from a liberation struggle basis.  
 
South Africa‘s post-apartheid foreign policy is regarded as one of the achievements of the 
post 1994 period. In this post-apartheid dispensation, South Africa regained trust and 
influence in world politics (Landsberg, 2006). To date, South Africa‘s foreign policy has 
been complex and wide ranging. It has not been consistent and cohesive, due to 
contradictions in the principles set by Mandela and the presidencies that succeeded him 
(Landsberg, 2012). Mandela set a government that was built on promotion of human rights, 
and the current leadership sets its government on economic development priorities. With this 
in mind, some have claimed that South Africa is reflecting a pragmatic foreign policy identity 
(Landsberg, 2012).  
2.3 South Africa’s pragmatic foreign policy identity  
At present, president Zuma‘s foreign policy seems to be more concerned with processes 
rather than outcomes. Foreign policy processes are defined as the steps and stages that are 
taken, including the processes of consultations, formulations and implementations. In South 
Africa, the de facto one party state system in which the ANC heads the government enjoys 
greater monopoly over the day to day running of the government. This gives ultimate power 
and influence to president Zuma to preside over key foreign policy issues regardless of inputs 
from the general public. For example, Zuma recently deployed soldiers to the Central Africa 
Republic without proper consultations leading to unnecessary loss of life. Additionally 
president Zuma chooses to supress Taiwan Republic‘s call for independence from China by 
avoiding tabling such a dialogue at United Nations. Paul-Simon Handy a visiting 
distinguished scholar of international relations at Rhodes University lamented in October 
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2013, that South Africa‘s foreign policy is enshrined within broader horizons of advancing its 
economic development priorities at the expense of human rights (Handy, 2013). Handy 
further claims that president Zuma choses to pursue economic diplomacy as a means of 
capitalising returns on foreign direct investment and increased trade within his foreign policy 
ideals. In response to China‘s lobbying, Zuma‘s administration denied a visa to the Dalai 
Lama to visit South Africa for several times
5
.  
 
Internationally, South Africa assumes a self-attributed role of spokesperson in Africa by 
virtue of its regional hegemon status. Such a position is highly demanding and in most cases 
strains the national budget.  However, South Africa under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki saw 
the revitalisation of regional frameworks such as Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and Common Market for East and 
Southern Africa (COMESA); and the transformation of the Organisation of Africa Unity 
(OAU) to African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD), 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and many other frameworks of operations 
(Landsberg and van Wyk, 2012). Mbeki‘s term brought the so called African Renaissance 
which implied the need for Africa to be restored as the contributor and beneficiary of human 
civilizations in the era of globalization (Mbeki, 2000).  Since South Africa was the bearer of 
the idea, this positioned South Africa as a continental powerhouse. The African Renaissance 
idea materialised in bearing other institutional mechanisms such as New Partnership for 
Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) among others (Cossa, 2009). This neo-liberal approach 
enabled South Africa to assume a regional hegemon status which later positioned it to be the 
strong and certain candidate for BRICS membership. These regional frameworks promoted 
regional integration in which South Africa increased its regional hegemonic position. 
However, it should be noted that the success story behind the revitalisation of these regional 
frameworks came as a result of mutual cooperation with other countries of the region.  
 
Given such a rich foreign policy, South Africa has built strong bilateral and multilateral 
relations amounting to a total of 108 diplomatic missions worldwide at a country level 
[Department of International Relations and Cooperation-(DIRCO, 2O13)]. Additionally, 
                                                             
5
 For example it is claimed that the government's squeamishness has nothing to do with Dalai Lama, but it is 
everything to do with not wanting to annoy China, the new economic powerhouse and a potential source of 
growth for South Africa's flagging economy.   
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South Africa has diplomatic representation at international organisations such as European 
Union, United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, African Union and United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (DIRCO, 2013). Since South Africa is a 
hegemonic force among other factors, it was invited to become the fifth BRICS member in 
2010 (Carmody, 2012). Availability of foreign diplomatic missions for South Africa is very 
critical as they ensure mutual political, social and economic relations so as to promote 
interdependence. Such interdependence acts as an incentive for increased forms of 
cooperation rather than conflict.  
 
Economically, South Africa constitutes the largest Gross Domestic Product share of Sub-
Sahara Africa, making it the largest economy in the continent (World Bank Report, 2013)
6
. 
South Africa has a vibrant economy that is supported by a large base of mineral and natural 
resources wealth such as gold, diamond, platinum, huge energy base production and other 
resources. Coupled with the above, South Africa has an excellent and functional 
infrastructure system which promotes business development. Additionally, South Africa has a 
modern banking and financial system which is friendly for business. Availability of modern 
banking sector has enhanced the development of a stable macro and micro financial climate 
that favours the establishment of corporates which promotes business. Given the above 
footprints in South Africa, the culture of innovation and flexible yet stable regulatory 
frameworks has contributed to South Africa attracting a measurable size of foreign direct 
investments (World Bank Report, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, South Africa has attracted considerable volumes of foreign direct investment. 
The peaceful transition from an authoritarian apartheid government to a democratic 
government through a negotiated settlement created less risk for the business environment. 
Such a peaceful transition gave hope and assurance to the investors. Additionally, the 
location of South Africa close to the sea makes it the large recipient of foreign direct 
investment as it acts as a gateway for the rest of the southern Africa region (Draper and 
Freytag, 2011; Scholvin and Draper, 2012). This implies easy trade facilitation with limited 
expense for the traders. The presence of Mandela and Mbeki was a further incentive that 
                                                             
6 By the time of writing this project, South Africa was the largest economy in Sub-Sahara Africa.  
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attracted foreign direct investment due to the free-market economic system the government 
pursued. This contributed to economic development in South Africa. 
 
As an economic hegemonic power in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa commands a 
considerable amount of influence in the sub-regional and the continental organisation such as 
SADC and AU among others. Such an influence has a potential to rise given its newly 
adopted membership in BRICS. At most, South Africa has the potential to advance its 
national interest while at the same time advance the African Agenda as espoused by Mbeki 
(Landsberg, 2010).   
 
Domestically, South Africa has a fair consumer base which equally promotes trade between 
and among other emerging nations such as China, India, Brazil and Russia. Already, (but not 
limited to) China and India have firmly invested in South Africa in particular in the banking 
sector, transport, renewable energy sector, mining sector and infrastructure development 
sector (Gauteng Province Report on BRICS, 2013). This contributes to South Africa having a 
huge return investment in Africa. As a middle power, South Africa assumes a regional 
powerbase which ultimately comes with responsibilities to champion and position Africa‘s 
agenda in this complex and emerging multi-polar global system.  
2.4 South Africa’s inclusion in BRICS-An arranged marriage? 
South Africa‘s invitation to BRICS has been an area of much debate. I simply join the 
academic discussion and debate by adding different views as explained below. Upon a series 
of diplomatic and government to government negotiations, South Africa was admitted to 
BRICS. The diplomatic talks which started during the second BRICs summit in Brazil 
materialised positively for South Africa. But South Africa‘s inclusion in BRICS has been 
widely supported by China, to which some critics and cynics argue that South Africa‘s 
position in BRICS is an arranged marriage (Jung and Alden, 2013). In responding to the 
rationale behind South Africa‘s position in BRICS, I argue that there are two main reasons-
economic and political strategic considerations. South Africa was the largest economy in 
Africa and by that virtue qualified it to be a regional power house on the continent. South 
Africa‘s political stability offers little risk to other BRICS nation, and for that matter it was 
the best candidate. Draper (2011:209) argues that by the virtue of South Africa‘s  
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[…] relative economic weight in Africa and the soft power bequeathed by its peaceful 
transition to democracy, it has assumed the role of the go-to partner in Sub-Sahara Africa.  
In reaching such conclusions, Draper believed in South Africa‘s strategic economic 
importance to BRICS through the gateway concept. Draper and Freytag (2011) also argue 
that private institutions use South Africa as a hub and regional headquarters for its businesses 
in Africa. Additionally, Games (2012:1) argues that  
…for more than a decade international companies have chosen South Africa as the preferred 
entry point into Africa.  
As such foreign companies have opted to establish headquarters in South Africa. South 
African government has rather positioned itself as a gateway for Africa, a more business led 
approach than the political one. The current Minister of the Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation- Nkoana-Mashabane highlighted that South Africa‘s inclusion in 
BRICS comes from long standing tradition of relation based on similar and shared values in 
international relations. Minister of Trade and Industry Dr Rob Davies noted that,  
We [South Africa] continue to be a significant gateway into the African continent. We made a 
distinction between being a gateway and a gatekeeper. We do not try to say that all trade and 
investment relations from other BRICS countries must come through us. It would be a lost 
cause if we tried to do that. But we know that many companies from BRICS and from 
elsewhere find it convenient to work with South Africa and Southern African Institutions in 
terms of their broader continental programs. In one way or another, our fellow BRICS 
members realise that in choosing us. 
However, the gateway concept is a hugely contested terrain to validate. Domestically, South 
Africa is experiencing serous challenges to champion the African gateway claims (Matshiqi, 
2013). Such challenges within domestic frontiers include civil and social unrest coupled with 
high inequality between and among racial group; and failure of the government to meet and 
address electorate interest which causes a great fear to the investors. Regionally speaking, 
Africa is big, broad and very diverse. It is difficult for South Africa to consolidate such 
diversity and difference into commonality. Instead, South Africa‘s geographical location 
rather plays the gateway concept specifically for Southern Africa, for West/East/Central and 
North Africa it might be a different story altogether (Games, 2012).  
 
In spite of the above, South Africa‘s rationality in BRICS should not be entirely understood 
within a broader conception of economics only-a political perspective should also be 
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considered. As noted by Stuenkel (2013) South Africa‘s inclusion in BRICS is rather seen as 
a political move that is legitimate in the eyes of Global South. Additionally, Pheko noted that  
South Africa maybe the smallest economy and population in the grouping but it comes with a 
great deal of political influence and economic potential both domestically, in SADC and the 
African continent. It is after all the major investor and political player in the continent… 
(Pheko, 2011).
 
 
BRICS as such needs to be seen as a political bloc, a reason that led to South Africa‘s 
inclusion. Even though wide speculations might be presented in accounting for the rationale 
behind the inclusion of South Africa in BRICS, this study specifically locates it within 
economic and political reasons as highlighted above.    
2.5 Theoretical frameworks 
The current South Africa-BRICS relations in this context entail a mixture of political and 
economic relations specifically on trade, aid, investment, and global governance reform 
analysis. Additionally, BRICS as an alliance and a network of emerging economies resembles 
to a certain extent similar social values such as a rejection of North‘s domination in 
international politics amongst others. The existences of such similar social values help to 
explain the ‗social constructivist‘ approach of South Africa-BRICS relations. Recently, the 
idea of building coalitions (or multilateralism) as a means to respond to the threats of 
globalisation represents a theoretical underpinning of political coalitions. Therefore, to a 
certain extent, among other theoretical cornerstones, South Africa-BRICS relations are 
shaped by the political coalition theory. In this regard, to fully understand the prospects and 
constraints of South Africa‘s participation in BRICS, the study is informed by international 
political economy, social constructivism and political coalitions as key theoretical 
frameworks.    
2.5.1 International political economy approach  
The prospects and constraints for South Africa‘s participation in BRICS can be understood 
within the framework of international political economy. The international political economy 
has its origins in the 18th century when it was used as a technique of studying the inter-
relation between politics and economics. This included among other things a combined study 
of commercial activities and the study of politics. Karl Marx with his Marxian analysis 
redefined the concept of international political economy within a global perspective. 
International political economy as espoused by a Marxist school of thinking postulates that, 
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there is a direct if not mutual proportion between economics and politics in international 
relations. In this regard, it can be said, even though with reservations, the Marxists 
international political economy, entails the role of political entities in economic choices and 
how it determines power politics in the international system.  
 
Understanding political economy therefore requires one to analyse it with particular reference 
to the field in which the discourse emerged. Mercantilist approaches made some ground 
breaking attempts by integrating political economy with international relations. But such 
integration was specifically located within international economics. Marxism also employed 
political economics approach in analysing capitalism. Therefore, in this current dispensation 
where new power and avenues of influence are emerging, it is important to use international 
political economy to give a clear distinction in exploring the relations between the North and 
the South. In this regard, Gill and Law (1988) note that developing countries are more 
sensitive to economic interdependence than developed capitalist countries. At the centre of 
such sensitivity and resentment is the capitalist world side-lined Global South. This study 
therefore attempts to locate an emerging economic and political network or coalition between 
BRICS nations within a broader framework of international political economy. Subsequently 
the study will underscore how constructivism and political coalition theories help to account 
for the existence of the BRICS group.   
 
From a realist informed international political economy approach, the anarchical nature of the 
world compels states to pursue power in order to make themselves secure. The absence of an 
international unitary body that governs or acts as a watchdog over states‘ activities leaves the 
state with limited options but to act out of rationality against international anarchy. Within 
economic terms, states have the responsibility therefore to build solid, sustainable mutual 
economic alliance based on comparative gains. Within such thinking, Waltz brings to the fore 
that the state‘s increased unitary role is derived from the increased fear of dependency and 
fear of relative gains (Keohane and Nye, 1989). Realist informed international political 
economy approach indicates that the state is the primary actor in the global arena, whether on 
the basis of cooperation or conflict or cooperation on economic terms (Morgenthau, 1948). A 
realist international political economy approach also asserts that foreign powers in this 
instance other BRICS nations only intervene in some states for their own national interests 
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rather than to save the suffering humanity as they do not have an obligation to protect human 
dignity elsewhere. In this regard, BRICS nations may be seen as the primary actors in 
advancing the desired political and economic objectives. Therefore relations between South 
Africa and other BRICS nations may exist within the premises of economic and political 
engagements which are realist informed. In light of globalisation and power shifts, states 
pursue state-led alliances as a response to the threats of globalisation. Therefore South 
Africa‘s membership in BRICS may be seen as a move to respond to the threats of 
globalisation. Again the position of South Africa in BRICS gives room to advance national, 
regional, continental and global interest. As Gilpin (2001) indicates that there is need for 
cooperation in the world so as to balance economic alliances, amity and trade. 
 
From a neo-liberalist informed international political economy, Francis Fukuyama with his 
famous book ‗The End of History and the Last Man Standing‟ expanded the whole concept of 
neoliberalism enshrined within capitalism as the only ideal channel to follow economic 
development in the world. Neo-liberal political economists assume that there is need for 
transfer of economy from the state to the private sector (Wallerstein, 1979). However, China 
in BRICS seems to favour state owned enterprises which equally challenge the notion of a 
neo-liberal perspective. China, India, Russia and Brazil‘s growing influence in Africa is thus 
a mere extension of a neo-liberal perspective. Neo-liberal political economist thus notes that, 
there is a direct connection between liberalism and capitalism on the basis that the ownership 
and control of the economy by the private sector, promotes private interests at the expense of 
state development (Guy, 1978). Prashad (2013) argues that the BRICS initiative has arisen 
because of the exploitation of the workers and the environment. For example China‘s growth 
has been also attached to the poor working and living conditions of workers in particular 
within mining industry (Kotschwar, Moran and Muir, 2011; Prashad, 2013). But, for Prashad, 
BRICS elites are not replacing the North but joining them, driven by the concept of neo-
liberalism and capitalism. To this extent, BRICS may be argued to be employing (even 
though with modifications) the Washington Consensus (Ban and Blyth, 2013). Washington 
Consensus is a collection of recommendation and policy options for a favoured private sector 
ownership and control of the economy within a Western based approach to the economy. 
South Africa in BRICS under the current scenario, guided by a neo-liberal political economy 
approach tends to favour floating exchange rates, trade liberalization, and privatisation of 
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state enterprises, deregulation and above all existence of legal security policies that protects 
property rights.  
 
A closer analysis indicates that capitalism has always been the rule of the game regardless of 
geo-political location and identification-whether South or North. Emerging economies are 
following the same development path followed by the developed countries, which includes 
the exploitation of workers and the environment. This resembles an elite Global South form 
of cooperation in which one may argue that there is no difference between China and United 
States towards economic development trajectories. Thus, BRICS may be identified as an elite 
form of South-South Cooperation, but to get a more clear sense, there is need to employ a 
constructive approach as elaborated below.  
2.5.2 Constructivism approach  
This study amongst other theories is also informed by constructivism. Early adherents of 
constructivism theory include work done by among others Nicholus Onuf, John Ruggie, 
Richard K, Ashley and Friedrich Kratochwil. In 1992, Alexander Wendt brought 
constructivism within the field of international relations. In his article Anarchy is What States 
Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics, Wendt (1992) argues that power 
politics which has been widely understood from liberal and realist perspectives needed room 
to be understood in a socially constructed system. In fact in this theoretical configuration, 
Wendt notes that power politics is not given by nature but rather it is constructed and 
transformed by ideational human practise.  
 
As a theory, constructivists tend to focus on issues pertaining to the role of ideas, norms, 
knowledge, and culture in world politics. Hopf (1998:172) notes that ―the constructivist 
research program has its own puzzles that concentrate on issues of identity in world politics 
and the theorization of domestic politics and culture in international relations theory‖. Such a 
focus in this instance reproduces the collective role of ideas and understandings on social life-
a process constructivist terms ‗inter-subjective‘ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001).  As for Alder 
(1997), Price and Reus-Smith (1998), Ruggie (1998) and Wendt (1999), constructivism 
presents a social analysis based on human interactions which are governed and shaped by 
ideational factors-not simply material ones (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001).  In addition to the 
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above, this social analysis is also ―the most important ideational factor which is widely 
shared or an ‗inter-subjective‘ belief, which is not reducible to individuals. These shared 
beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors‖ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001:398). Thus, constructivism focuses on ‗social facts‘ such as things like ―money, 
sovereignty and rights-which altogether have no material reality but exists only because 
people collectively believe they exists and act accordingly‖ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001:398). As a result of this, constructivism believes in the notion that state identity 
fundamentally shapes state preferences and actions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:398). 
Driving the facts back home, South Africa‘s participation in BRICS in this regard is among 
other factors a socially constructed one. South Africa believes on the need to redress issues of 
global governance, a belief shared by India and Brazil respectively-and to a certain extent 
China. Thus, South Africa as a state understands BRICS grouping as a possible platform that 
has similar interests and values; in particular-issues pertaining to reform of global 
governance. This is a key component in constructivism theory as espoused by Hopf 
(1998:175) that ―a state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, 
while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice…‖  
 
As a challenge to realism and liberalism, constructivism coins that international relations is 
socially constructed (Finnemore, 1996). This history and social values that shapes 
international relations is therefore a direct reproduction of ideas that are historically and 
socially constructed. In this essence, South Africa and other BRICS nations have almost 
similar history
7
. BRICS represents an association of the like-minded nations which is 
primarily determined by ideas of a better and egalitarian world order in which developing 
countries have a say in the architecture of international relations. Among other factors, South 
Africa‘s participation in BRICS therefore represents non-materialistic based considerations, 
but beliefs. This helps to explain the possibility of synergies that may emerge for South 
Africa‘s membership in BRICS.  
 
                                                             
7 In this instance, South Africa, India, Brazil (and arguably China) have experienced the ills of colonisation. 
More so, BRICS nations experiences high poverty, underdevelopment, anti-colonialism, anti-western 
sentiments, and the need for a new world order that is balanced and representative-(though arguably to China 
and Russia) 
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In essentiality, issues of interest and identity are key components of constructivism. While 
constructivism by-passes a thorough discussion on what identity and interest is, this study 
does not at all cost try to define the two. Identity and interest are in themselves contested 
terrains; as such a referral point is driven straight to what I consider as the key identity and 
interest vantage points for South Africa and other BRICS nations. Though South Africa and 
BRICS nations have differences, a common compromise of having a similar anti-western 
rhetorical identity helps to explain the significance of ideas and beliefs-(one of the key 
principles of constructivism) in their engagements.   
 
Borrowing from functionalism, Haas (1964) argues that cooperation in one area leads to 
cooperation in another area within the framework of integration. This constitutes a major 
similarity in the context of South Africa-BRICS relations. Since South African liberation 
movements parties like ANC, PAC and SACP among others have a rich history of relations 
with Russia, India, China and Brazil, the current dispensation thus arguably is shaped by such 
a shared historical past-which altogether is socially constructed.   
 
Finnemore (1996) in ―National Interests in International Society” develops a systemic 
approach to understanding state interests and state behaviour by investigating an international 
structure, not of power, but of meaning and social value. Given the above, social values need 
thus to be developed and modified specifically according to societal settings in which they 
emerge. In this instance, any state‘s behaviour is therefore determined by identity and interest  
that governs them. As a matter of fact, this study is thus, informed by constructivism as a 
theory that helps to explain the participation of South Africa in BRICS. Since BRICS is seen 
as a coalition, a network or an alliance so to say, there is need to employ a political coalition 
approach and the next section explores the political coalition theory.   
2.5.3 Political coalition approach  
Apart from the international political economy and constructivism approaches, this study is 
also informed by the political coalition approach.  The political coalition theory has emerged 
as a result of states‘ increased coalition formations. States coalitions have increased due to a 
number of factors that might include among others the effects of globalisation (Cakmak, 
2007). First coined by Ricker William Harrison in 1962, the theory introduces the idea of size 
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principle and minimal winning. In this globalised world in which states are increasingly 
intertwined, coalitions therefore act as best alternatives to handle and subvert any negative 
crisis such as the 2008 global financial crisis. Political coalition theory as espoused by Riker 
(1962) and early adherents (Gamson, 1961) note that, coalitions are shaped by a common 
locus that involves the following principles. Firstly, coalitions contribute resources to be used 
for the sole purpose of the coalition. Secondly, coalitions exist within a win-win situation in 
which members experience positive-sum gains. Thirdly coalitions are built on non-utilitarian 
strategy basis and preferences.   
 
Based on a political coalition approach, there is solidarity and probability of effectively 
dealing with a global problem through a unified approach rather than through individualism. 
A common type of a political coalition, BRICS resembles the concept of political formation 
theory. Seemingly, political coalition theory notes that a coalition is an organisation of 
entities working together to achieve a common end. This implies that coalitions are outcomes 
of pragmatic approaches (Cakmak, 2007).  
 
Gamson (1961) highlights that a coalition may be defined as a social unit in which it might 
exist in the form of a group which follows the same coalition strategy. Such a coalition exists 
either as a state coalition, voting block or an association. A coalition from its date of 
formation frequently meets, and has a joint use of resources.  Therefore, coalitions are built to 
have a common voice. To concretise this, Bobo, Kendall and Max argue that,  
Coalitions are not built because it is good, moral, or nice to get everyone working together. 
The only reason to spend the time and energy building a coalition is to amass the power 
necessary to do something you cannot do through one organization (Bobo, Kendall and Max, 
1991:70).  
There is generally little value in consensus in a coalition, and the stability of a coalition 
requires tacit neutrality of the coalition on matters which go beyond the immediate 
prerogatives (Gamson, 1961). A political coalition maybe seen to be a joint venture of 
factions with overlapping interest and objectives, which members of the pact cannot solely 
achieve without the others. There is greater power and influence in a coalition than as an 
individual. In this theoretical configuration, Cakamak (2007) argues that within a political 
coalition, one should expect to meet diversity. Like BRICS which shows a cosmopolitan 
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composition, this helps to explain why this study in this instance contextualizes BRICS as a 
political coalition. Additionally, coalitions have objectives or orientations they set to achieve. 
Such orientations and objectives come from strategic planning. Veneklasen and Miller (2002) 
argue that by bringing together the strengths and resources of diverse, yet numerous and 
single minded groups, a coalition generally manages to create a determinative impact towards 
change. As explained in the paragraphs above, South Africa and other BRICS nations have 
common objectives, frequently meet, have joint use of resources, is an outcome of pragmatic 
ends and above all, are influenced by the idea of principal size and minimal winning. By this, 
I imply that South Africa and other BRICS nations believe that as a collective unit they yield 
more bargaining power in world politics. 
2.6 BRICS Overview   
In 2001, Jim O‘Neil an economist from Goldman Sachs coined the BRIC acronym in 
reference to Brazil, Russia, India and China to describe an economic group of nations 
(O‘Neil, 2001). Around December 2010, South Africa was invited to serve as the fifth 
member to the group. South Africa accepted the offer and became an active member from 
2011, leading to the BRICS acronym in 2011 (Carmody, 2012). Research carried by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2012 and the BRICS Report of 2012, concluded that 
BRICS constitutes 40% of the world economy and world population, 25% of the global Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), 15% of the World Trade, 25 % of the Foreign Currency Reserve 
(calculated from the percentage of the GDP), and 24% of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
The FDI Outflows were at 29.26% lower than the FDI Inflows which were at 44.3% (IMF, 
2012). Given the above economic statistical representations, one can conclude that BRICS 
nations are emerging players from the Global South destined to change the course of history, 
in particular on trade and global FDI distribution, flow and stock. The Economist (2010:68) 
points that, trade between developing countries and BRICS is rising twice as fast as world 
trade. Even more strikingly, while growth has headed south, debt has headed north, the 
opposite of what happened in the 1970s and 1980s when poor countries ran up vast debts 
(PWC Economies, 2013). Gross public debt in the rich countries is rising from about 75 
percent of GDP at the start of the 2007 to a forecast of 110 percent by 2015. Public debt in 
the emerging markets is below 40 percent of GDP.  
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Therefore, the rise of BRICS as articulated by Carmody (2012 is mirrored by the relative 
decline of the West. The West had a relative share of the world GDP at 72 percent in 2000 
now at 53 percent in 2011 (IMF, 2011). Such conclusions are drawn from the views that 
BRICS is articulating an economic led diplomacy enshrined within the soft-power approach. 
This drive for a new power shift may with time exert influence on the need to set new 
international norms that have Global South nations at heart (Dube, 2013). 
 
 
As an entity, BRICS went through different stages to reach its current stage. Therefore, 
understanding the establishment of BRICS, one has to look at the road travelled, factors and 
attributes that contributed to formalisation of the BRICS nations as an official economic 
group. Firstly, I analyse Jim O‘Neil‘s projections regarding BRICs as an investment/market 
led group. Secondly, I argue that the establishment of BRICS comes from the presidential 
diplomacy and coordination in G20 between China, Russia, India and Brazil. Thirdly, I argue 
that BRICs establishment was aided by the global economic crisis of 2007
8
. Lastly, I argue 
that the establishment of BRIC-(S) is located within the Global South-Third World Project 
revival-a process some will call the original Bandung moment (Dube, 2014; Moore, 2014; 
Carmody, 2012).  
  
 
Jim O‘Neil projected the strength and significance of BRICs within investment and market 
oriented approach. Such a projection was based on four different scenarios which were based 
on various nominal GDP assumptions for 11 countries (the G7 and BRICs) and different 
assumptions about exchange-rate conversion. The nominal GDP assumptions reflected his 
best guess about the likely trend rate of real GDP growth and inflation (O‘Neil, 2001). In the 
paper titled, Building Better Global Economic BRICs Jim O‘Neil further notes that Brazil, 
Russia, India and China heavily influenced the transmission of global monetary, fiscal and 
other economic policies, as well as the need for general international economic and political 
co-operation (O‘Neil, 2001). Jim O‘Neil‘s conclusions were thus reached on the basis of the 
emerging economies low-risk towards long term financial investment and how that could 
                                                             
8 As I argue, I do consider that of course, global economic crisis did not only affect global north nations rather, 
global south were affected too, but this gave an impetus for BRICS nations to want to form a coalition to 
respond to such threats in the future as a collective unit.  
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possibly shift market, trade and investment priorities to the BRICs nations. In the words of 
the paper, O‘Neil concludes by noting that,  
…maybe we need a better global economic forum to help implement this. It is time for better 
global economic BRICs (O‘Neil, 2001).  
Two years later, Jim O‘Neil released yet another paper concerning the BRICs nations titled 
Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050 in which he concludes that BRICs impact would 
come at an earlier stage than he had anticipated in his 2001 paper. As such, he notes that by 
2050 or earlier than that, the BRICs‘ economies together could be larger than the G6 in GDP 
terms. By 2025 they could account for over half the size of the G6. Currently they are worth 
less than 15% (O‘Neil, 2003). As quoted from the BRICS Report of 2012, O‘Neil notes that,  
by 2040, GDP for BRICs‘ economies collectively would be larger than the Group of Six 
(G6)
9
 in terms of United States (US$) dollars. By 2025, it is predicted that BRICs economies 
will account for over half the size of the G6.  
When it comes to the political led-BRICS, then credit is due to diplomatic efforts by the 
countries involved. In light of this, I discuss the diplomatic efforts that led to the 
establishment of BRICS in 2009. To gain further comprehension behind the establishment of 
BRICs, I argue that diplomatic efforts by the four countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
played a pivotal role. As noted by the BRICS Report of 2012, 
[…] a platform was created for dialogue, information sharing, identification of common 
interest and the coordination of actions. 
Diplomatic negotiations materialised in 2006 at the 64
th
 Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly Meeting in the USA in which the four BRICs Foreign Affairs Ministers 
held a meeting side by side with the UNGA. It is important to highlight the key concepts that 
contributed to these four emerging economies to want to form a political front. Firstly, in this 
age of globalisation, multilateralism proves to be the way of dealing with threats of 
globalization such as currency fluctuations and volatility, poverty, climate change, HIV and 
AIDS, terrorism, economic underdevelopment, peace and security among others. Secondly, 
the global economic crisis (to be discussed later) threatened the fabric of these countries and 
lastly the Global South solidarity course. The G20 as noted by the BRICS 2012 Report also 
played an equally important platform in bringing common solidarity and positions towards 
the need for a southern-led political front. Between 2007 and late 2008, a series of meeting 
                                                             
9 The G6 is made up of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. The G7 consists 
of the same members as the G6, with the addition of Canada. 
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between different government officials of the four countries were held. Such meetings 
materialised in bringing common positions such as building a more democratic international 
system founded on the rule of law and multilateral diplomacy
10
. Additionally, there was need 
for immediate action in responding to increasing global food prices. The BRIC countries also 
resolved to work together and with other countries in order to strengthen international 
security and stability (Anonymous, 2014). These meetings boasted confidence and partial 
mutual trust to an extent that there was need to formalise the relations through a political led 
front-thus leading to a summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009. Within these diplomatic 
actions and meetings, it is unclear which country took the lead towards the formal 
establishment of relations between the four initial nations. However, it is widely believed that 
China, India and Russia took the lead (Stuenkel, 2013).  
 
 
Lastly, the establishment of BRICS should be understood as the resurgence of the Third 
World Project located within a Global South revision/revival. Indeed many Global South 
scholars positions BRICS as a revised Global South project, most notably Vijay Prashad who 
is quick to point out that the defeat of Third World Project around late 1980s contributed to a 
fragmentation of Southern nations in  the architecture of international relations. Some 
however note that, even though seen as a Third World Project, BRICS is more of an elite 
group which is siphoning Global South resources under the cover of South-South 
Cooperation (Bond, 2013; Gumede, 2013).   
 
As I join the discussion, the rise of BRICS though arguably can be seen within lenses of 
Global South resembles an ‗unravelling era of the original Bandung spirit‘ (Christian and 
Papa, 2012). The resuscitation of the third world project after its demise has been a difficult 
task. In this regard, such a search for a position in the echelons of world politics by the third 
world has been a difficult trajectory. This has introduced a considerable amount of 
geopolitical ambiguity. Although the present BRICS formation is characterised by varying 
degrees and types of interdependence and dependence, the location of such a movement in 
the Global South conception is necessary. Individual states in BRICS may not have influence 
and may in fact be quite powerless in world politics, but the collective of five nations has 
                                                             
10 However this point creates a bone of contention if one has to look at the concept of rule of law and democracy 
with specificity to China and Russia‘s poor rule of law and human rights records.  
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definitely more status and influence as espoused by constructivism approach. In fact, BRICS 
has become an important instrument for conducting collective diplomacy in the world 
context. To be sure, the current global system is in a state of flux and transition, and the 
collective power of the BRICS yields a significant, less subordinate role in the emerging 
global order. The euphoria with which the rise of BRICS is associated, a possibility of a post-
Washington consensus is approaching; hence the expected analytical contribution of the so 
called Beijing Consensus
11
 and the Mumbai Consensus
12
. The value of this potential may 
perhaps be better understood when one views BRICS as a Global South Forum.  
2.7 Strengths and weaknesses of BRICS: Synergies and complementarity  
The BRICS countries have their strong and weak areas. The security and stability of each 
BRICS country is inseparably linked to the security of all BRICS. This explains the concept 
of synergy and complementarity. However, it should be noted that there are many variables 
that are used to determine the level of strength for a country. In explaining BRICS strengths 
and weaknesses, I purposefully chose to use the following variables which are easier to 
define and understand. There are political connotations which in most scenarios are 
determined by the so called ‗soft power‘ and ‗hard power‘ analysis. I arrived to this 
conclusion after critically analysing the BRICS Joint Statistical publication of 2013, BRICS 
Report of 2012, the Gauteng BRICS Report of 2013 and the Global Competitiveness Report 
of 2012-2013. On the later, Global Competitiveness Report is an economic outlook approach 
that looks at various attribute at a country level. Such a report is best explained by the Global 
Competitive Index. This is explained as   
a set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. 
The level of productivity, in turn, sets the level of prosperity that can be reached by an 
economy. The productivity level also determines the rates of return obtained by investments 
in an economy, which in turn are the fundamental drivers of its growth rates. In other words, a 
more competitive economy is one that is likely to grow faster over time… (Global 
Competitive Forum, 2012:4). 
                                                             
11 Beijing Consensus is a term that represents an alternative economic development model to the Washington 
Consensus of market-friendly policies promoted by the IMF, World Bank and United States of America 
Treasury, often for guiding reform in developing countries. 
12 The Mumbai Consensus is a term used to refer to India's particular model of economic development, with a 
―people-centric‖ approach to managing its economy which may be taken up by other developing nations in time. 
India's model of economic growth, which has relied on its domestic market more than exports, boosted domestic 
consumption rather than investment, pursued service-oriented industries rather than low-skilled manufacturing 
industries, has greatly differed from the typical Asian strategy of exporting labour-intensive, low-priced 
manufactured goods to the West. This model of economic development remains distinct from the Beijing 
Consensus with an export-led growth economy, and the Washington Consensus focused instead on encouraging 
the spread of democracy and free trade. 
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Table 1: BRICS Strengths and Weaknesses Analysis 
Country STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Brazil  -Abundant natural resources (iron ore, hydropower, timber, 
coffee, soya beans, sugar cane, iron and crude oil) 
-Political stable  
-Model Democracy  
-Lacking economic infrastructure 
-Poor investment in road, rail ports and energy) 
-Very high lending interest rate (@16.25% average ) 
-High socio-economic inequality  
Russia -Huge deposits of oil 
-Natural gas, coal and other minerals 
-A skilled labour force 
-Relative political stability 
-Permanent Member of the UNSC 
-Has the lowest investment rates compared to other emerging 
economies 
-Uncompetitive industries  
-Obsolete capital equipment 
-Not democratic 
India -Strong information and  technology and service sector 
-Has coal, manganese and natural gas 
-Huge Human Capital base 
- Model Democracy and Politically Stable  
-Moderate foreign investment  
-large market base  
-Very large public debt  
-Infrastructure development still poor 
China -Very strong manufacturing base 
-Industrially competitive 
-Strong foreign financial investment 
- large deposits of coal, iron ore, petroleum and natural gas 
-Environmental Insecurity 
-Increasing income inequality resulting in social tension 
-Currency Undervaluation  
-Undemocratic  
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Source: Author but computed from the (Global Competitive Index Report, 2012/13; BRICS Report 2012; Gauteng BRICS Report 2013; BRICS Joint Statistical 2013 
Publication) 
 
-Huge pool of labour supply  
-Large market base 
-Permanent Member of the UNSC  
-Largest Economy in BRICS 
South Africa -Abundant deposits of gold, platinum, coal and chromium 
-Fairly stable political environment 
-Model Democracy  
-Competitive financial and business service sector 
-Good Transport and Finance Infrastructure  
-Very high unemployment rate 
-Lowest Economy in BRICS 
-High labour cost 
-Declining manufacturing sub-sector to GDP 
-Increased Labour  upheavals 
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2.8 BRICS and the Global South Conundrums: Ambiguities and Complexities 
Quite often, BRICS is seen as a form of Global South powerhouse, but a closer analysis tends 
to portray a different picture altogether-a hybrid form of an institution. This section tries to 
unpack the term Global South, South-South Cooperation and the Global South status of 
BRICS as a whole. While the Global South status may convincingly be applied to South 
Africa, India, Brazil and arguably China, the matter is different with Russia. South-South 
Cooperation has emerged as a means for increased solidarity by countries defined as Global 
South. Central to the difficulty of unpacking South-South Cooperation is the absence of 
consensus around what exactly is the Global South. While a large pool of academics, 
statesman, economists, policy makers and politicians, both from the North or the South, 
provides different outlooks on the term Global South; it still remains a hugely contested 
terrain. The origins of the term go back to the idea of the ‗Third World‘ which emerged 
strongly in a post-1945, Cold war context, the term itself being coined by a French 
demographer, Alfred Sauvy in 1952
13
. The concept found popularity during and after the 
Second World as well as the Cold War era. Third World was then used to literally classify 
those countries that did not align themselves to the First and Second World countries during 
the Cold War era. Third World countries thus included those from Africa, Asia, East Europe 
and Latin America (Karpilo, 2010).  
 
With the demise of the Cold War, the term Third world lost its relevance both because of the 
changed geopolitical circumstances and mounting economic problems in the 1970s and 1980 
(Prashad, 2008). It was only after Brandt commission that the term ‗South‘ gained populace 
(Prashad, 2008). The evidence of increasingly unequally development between Euro-
American nations and the ‗Third World‘ led to the Brandt Commission which first 
popularized the terminology of North and South. This led to the development of the terms 
Global South/Global North. The concept of North–South is considered a multi-faceted divide 
enshrined within the socio-economic and political divide between the developed world and 
the developing world. The North is made up of the G8 members including the United States 
of America, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia and Japan
14
. In this 
                                                             
13 The term ―Third World‖ was initial coined by a French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952 in an article that 
he wrote for the French magazine, L'Observateur in 1952, after World War II and during the Cold War-era. 
14 Russia is a member of the G8 which resembles the North. This is an area of much debate since Russia is part 
of the BRICS-an often claimed Global South coalition.  
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regard, the concept of the North is mostly interchangeably used with the term ‗West‘, First 
World, Developed Nations.  
 
Given the changes and continuities in the use of the terms North or South, East or West the 
term Global South is understood as essentially covering those countries that are developing 
and are relatively less industrialised. Thomas and Wilkin (2004:242) argue that Global South 
should in this instance be understood as nations with relatively low per-capita income. Such 
low income per-capita differentiates less/non-industrialised nations including China from the 
industrialised nations of Western Europe, North America, Japan and Australasia.  These 
countries vary in size, structure of their economies, level of economic, social, political and 
technological development. This is furthered by difference in the cultural and political 
systems of governance. Vohra and Mathews (1997) note that the countries of the Global 
South have common histories and rich diversities which transcends their differences. This 
therefore gives them a similar identity and solidified agenda to want to cooperate and 
integrate
15
.   
 
With all these contestations in defining the Global South, Grovogui (2011) argues that the 
term Global South should therefore never be mistakenly used to refer to a geographical 
location, but to underdevelopment questions. As for Grovogui, the Global South implies a 
symbolic designation meant to capture the semblance of cohesion that emerged when former 
colonial entities engaged in political projects of decolonisation and moved towards the 
realization of a postcolonial international order (Grovogui, 2011:176). Mignolo (2013) in turn 
argues that the term Global South should be identified as nations that embrace liberalism, 
Marxism, post modernism and feminism in a different way than the Global North. As such, it 
is clear that Global South nations hail from diverse political, social, cultural and traditional 
setups. 
 
 
While it might be difficult to judge whether Global South should be identified as a 
formidable political and economic force to be reckon with, similar issues and causes are 
found across its nations. These include the need for a new political, economic, social and 
                                                             
15 But it should be noted that availability of similar identity does not loosely translate to identical interest 
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technological space that caters for all, regardless of geographical location, race, economic 
model, colour, identity and political governance system. To try and simplify the debate, 
Grovogui (2011) believes that Global South should be seen as an idea which is amplified by a 
common set of principles and practises, experiences and expectations of a reformed global 
governance system.  
 
Having attempted to unpack what Global South entail, this sections tries to define what 
South-South Cooperation means. In his report presented to the High Level Panel on the Post 
2015 Development Agenda of May 2013, Stuenkel defined South-South Cooperation as the 
relationship that exists within frontiers such as cultural, economic, social, political and 
developmental issues by nations that are less industrialised or of the Global South. As for 
Stuenkel, such relationships are based on a history and collective future that lies within 
broader horizons of the need for better and reformed world systems that do not necessarily 
represents the minority, rather an equitable world system that calls for a better, just and 
people oriented world.  
 
In 1971, the then President of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta made a projection noting that (quoted in 
Mawdsley, 2011:3) 
South-South Cooperation refers to the exchange of resources, personnel, technology and 
knowledge between developing countries-a loose definition that can cover almost any form of 
interaction from south-south foreign direct investment by Asian, African, and South 
American multinational firms, to diplomatic meetings and agreements, to the provision of 
technical experts.  
Kenyatta‘s definition is useful and represents modern day South-South Cooperation 
framework. What has evolved over the years is an institutional approach to South-South 
Cooperation. As seen by the emergence of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), G77+China, 
IBSA, BASIC and BRICS formations indicate and attest to how South-South Cooperation 
has been institutionalised. 
 
Armijo (2007) defined South-South Cooperation as an emerging world without the West, an 
idea that implies the world resting on the interactions and interconnectivity within Global 
South. Such interactions and interconnectivity lies in the flows of goods and services, money, 
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people, ideas, culture and political systems. Armijo further stresses that such rate and rise of 
interactions and interconnectivity within the developing nations is catching the Global North 
unaware.  
 
At the core of South-South relations is the need for voice or say in the architecture of global 
politics. Global South nations are so vulnerable to the external pressures exerted by Global 
North. The vulnerability of Global South nations occurs within a broader development 
trajectory with poverty levels, economic underdevelopment, social underdevelopment and 
physical insecurities that characterize them on a daily basis. Global North has influence in the 
world governing institutions such as the IMF, UN, WB and WTO.  Since the Global North 
has control over the flow and distribution of global capital, the Global South‘s position leaves 
them with little or no room to dictate the terms and conditions of international relations 
(Thomas and Wilkin, 2004).  
 
Understanding Global South and South-South Cooperation raises a lot of questions in 
particular when one looks at China and Russia‘s position in the world politics. The question 
is on what basis do we locate China and Russia as Global South? Pauwelyn (2013) argues 
that Russia and China cannot be treated as developing nations. They form part and parcel of 
the great nations. So, within which framework then do we identify them as developing 
nations? Such contestations arise from the economic, social and political power that China 
and Russia have in the global economy. To begin with, from a geographical point of view, 
Global South largely comprises nations located on the southern hemisphere of the globe. 
China, Russia and India are located in the northern hemisphere. Additionally, the level of 
economic development for China, India and Russia is higher as compared to South Africa 
and Brazil. Mimiko (2012:22) notes that  
The South lacks the right technology, it is politically unstable, their economies are divided, 
and their foreign exchange earning depends on primary product exports which come from the 
North, and the fluctuation of prices. The little control of imports and exports condemned the 
South to obey the imperialist system. The lack of the South and the development of the North 
further the inequality and end up putting the South as a source of raw material for the 
developed countries.  
Mimiko is correct to a certain extent, but is the situation the same with China, India and 
Russia? The Global South should not be understood primarily on the geographical location 
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but on socio-economic development considerations. Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, Watts and 
Whatmore (2009) in their book, The Dictionary of Human Geography qualify China, India 
and Russia to be Global South regardless of the level of economic development. China, India 
and Russia are Global South virtually by high inequality levels and low human development 
index.  This view is supported by Therien (1999) in Beyond the North–South Divide: the Two 
Tales of World Poverty, who identifies China, India and Russia as Global South nations based 
on the poverty levels experienced by the ordinary citizens of these nations.  
 
Even though countries like South Africa, Brazil, India and arguably China demonstrates a 
certain level of commitment to the interests of the developing world, it is still very 
problematic to directly align BRICS and the Global South identity and interest 
configurations. Availability of similar areas of interest does not loosely imply a shared 
identity between BRICS and the larger population of the Global South. Of course, larger 
populations of the Global South call for the reform of UNSC, IMF- as evidence in South 
Africa, India and Brazil foreign policy. This is however different with Russia and China. This 
actually presents a key problem and area of contention for the BRICS nations. Regardless of 
problems associated with BRICS Global South status, in this realm, BRICS offers a rhetorical 
South-South Cooperation logic that stresses the need to recognize a Global South driven 
development that reacts to historical and geographical inequities. Therefore, BRICS 
demonstrates a break away from colonial thinking to a decolonial mentality which shares 
ideas with the works of Fanon (1925-1961) and Biko (1946-1977) (Mignolo, 2013). Such 
thinking is socially constructed as espoused by the constructivism approach. At the centre of 
the decolonisation processes, is the need for socio-economic development and equity on basis 
of resources, power distribution and utilisation in world politics. Without the control of the 
intellectual space and the mind that Global South offers, colonial ideology replenishes itself 
(Mignolo, 2011). However, China, India, Brazil and Russia are ―stronger‖ Global South 
nations. 
2.9 Global South Institutional dynamics   
Various institutions use the concept South-South Cooperation/Global South identity. Such 
institutions are NAM, G77, G77 + China, IBSA, BASIC and now the BRICS among others. 
Precursor Global South forums such as NAM, G77+China and IBSA presents an entry point 
of analysis in order to examine the continuity and break, legitimacy and relevance of South-
South cooperation. Frameworks of South-South Cooperation have to a certain extent been 
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limited due to issues of membership diversity and incongruence. NAM and G77 was most 
affected by issues of membership diversity. IBSA broke this mould for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, IBSA represents nations that are regional hegemonies. Secondly, IBSA was created 
based on common aims and objectives-which in this instance was reform agenda of global 
governance among other factors. This gave IBSA the ability to speak with one voice in 
matters of global concern. However, IBSA had a common voice but without power, 
capability and credibility to influence the course of international relations. As a result, IBSA 
has moved from the call for ‗reform agenda‘ status to a socio-economic development driven 
forum.  
At the time of formation IBSA was widely regarded as representing a novel form of South-
South Cooperation, transcending older models rooted in the logic of North-South 
confrontation in the post-colonial, Cold War world…..now the forum seems to face a growing 
sense of irrelevance, perhaps an existential crisis…( Doyaili, Freytag and Draper, 2013:297) 
IBSA is another milestone achievement by the South-South Cooperation. The IBSA 
Cooperation was officialised in 2003 with an aim for promoting international cooperation 
among these countries. While the initiative plays a role on other fields, cooperation in 
agriculture, trade, culture, and defence has dominated their cooperation. The IBSA initiative 
is also playing an equally important role in raising the South‘s voice in the world governing 
institutions such as UN and its agencies, WB, IMF and WTO.  
 
Quite often, IBSA has been seen as a rivalry forum to the BRICS one (Stuenkel, 2012). Now 
that all IBSA members are part of BRICS, lots of debates have generated questions regarding 
the usefulness and relevancy of having IBSA. While these questions and debates may be 
relevant, this study actually notes that IBSA and BRICS are highly complementary and 
synergies certainly exist between BRICS and IBSA, in particular on global governance 
reform. To date, IBSA and BRICS have not clashed. However, there is a possibility of 
conflict emergence in the future. IBSA maintains the need for greater international 
responsibility in international institutions-UNSC. BRICS is silent on this note. IBSA are 
model democracies that resembles promotion of human rights and civil society participation, 
which is a subject of contention in BRICS. Despite that, Stuenkel (2012a) contends that 
China is likely to push for IBSA to be replaced by BRICS.  
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IBSA and BRICS are to a certain extent complementary, but China and Russia‘s absence 
is precisely what makes IBSA an interesting platform for debating global challenges in a 
different context- and also speaks frankly about challenges that cannot be addressed at BRICS 
Summits – including the question of how to deal with the rise of China (Stuenkel, 2012a).     
Supposedly, as for NAM, G77 etc. there is (was) more rhetoric than reality in responding to 
institutional aims and objectives due to membership differences that override the purpose of 
existence. This rhetoric as argued by Doyaili, Freytag and Draper (2013) has mainly been 
posed due to ‗absence of common values frameworks‘ within these Global South forums. 
Thus, Global South forums are to a certain extent challenged by ‗national interest‘ driven 
notions. Doyaili, Freytag and Draper (2013) questions the integrity of forums created on the 
basis of national interests. As such what happens to such a forum when national interest 
notion diverge? This can be used to explain why previous Global South forums have faced 
limitations. And, with this in mind, will BRICS not fall in the same trap? Specifically looking 
at BRICS and the human rights issues, China and Russia seems to be less likely to promote 
the human rights cause. This has been seen in reference to the Libyan, Syrian and now 
Ukraine crisis.  
 
However, the BRICS case in this instance provides a novel operational framework that may 
prove to be different from previous Global South forums. This might be the original Bandung 
spirit-as claimed by many commentators (Carmody, 2013; BRICS Report, 2012; Bohler-
Muller, 2014). Firstly, BRICS are elites with differences, but commonality and uniformity of 
interest is reached out of sacrifices and coordinated collective interests. This point has been 
proven when one looks at the BASIC nations‘ climate change position uniformity (Qi, 2011; 
Hallding, Jurisoo, Carson and Atteridge, 2013). Secondly, BRICS (in particular China and 
Russia which are powerhouses) rejects western domination. Though hybrid, this ideology to a 
certain extent acts as a common and unifying force behind BRICS. BRICS creation comes as 
a need to improve the socio-economic well-being of their respective nations. Hoff notes that 
institutions are created with special reasons and purposes to serve (Hoff, 2003). Thus, 
institutions have a role to play towards economic development, wealth creation and poverty 
reduction of nations (Hoff, 2003). This study posits that the establishment of institutions and 
forums came as a result of the need to challenge socio-economic and political insecurities. 
The rise of BRICS then can be seen as a hybrid idea, unravelling the original Bandung 
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moment. Thus, BRICS presents a sense of ‗local cosmologies‘ of development within a 
Global South history.  
2.10 BRICS Summits: From Yekaterinburg to Fortaleza 
Though not binding, loose in outlook-BRICS chooses to engage within a summit led 
platform. Since its inception, BRICS has held five (5) summits. In June 2009, the four 
emerging powers-BRICs held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia marking the 
formalisation of the relations as an entity. It should be noted that Russia‘s initiative to assume 
chairmanship of the first BRICS Summit raises a lot of question within spectrums and 
perspectives of Global South trajectories. Since Russia is a controversial nation to be defined 
as a Global South, however, Moscow chose to identify itself as a friend and partner of Global 
South from a decolonisation analysis spectrum. The summit went on with Brazil under the 
leadership of Lula da Silver; Russia under the leadership of Dmitry Medvedev; India under 
the leadership of Manmohan Singh and China under the leadership of Hu Jintao convened in 
Russia and came out with the Yekaterinburg declarations. As such, this first summit did not 
come up with solid or ground breaking testimonies except to present some common position 
with regard to the need for reform of world institutions such as IMF, WB, WTO and UNSC.  
 
The first summit was a platform of relation formalisation, and not a platform of tangible 
outputs in terms of world governance. In the subsequent year-April 2010, BRICs held their 
second Summit in Brazil in which there were representations of two non-BRICs, South 
Africa and Palestine Authority. On this summit, BRIC countries gave statements regarding 
the Iran Nuclear issue-but such statements were ―empty‖ since they did not bring tangible 
course of action. Additionally, BRIC nations maintained the same position regarding the 
reform of IMF, WB, WTO and UNSC. In December, upon serious consultations and 
diplomatic effort between the South African government and the other BRIC nations, South 
Africa was added to the group leading to BRICS. However the formal admission was done in 
2011 during the Sanya Summit in China.  
 
 
The 2011 BRICS summit was held in Sanya, China. This summit was more serious and 
visionary in outlook as China and Russia took the lead in outlying the hopes and aspirations 
for a better BRICS. Article 4 of the 2011 Sanya BRICS Declarations read as follows 
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The 21st century should be marked by peace, harmony, cooperation and scientific 
development. Under the theme ―Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity‖, we conducted candid and 
in-depth discussions and reached broad consensus on strengthening BRICS cooperation as 
well as on promoting coordination on international and regional issues of common interest 
(Article 4, 2011 of BRICS-Sanya Declarations).  
In 2012 BRICS held their fourth Summit in New Delhi, India under a broad theme of BRICS 
Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity. In this summit, BRICS 
continuously gave some position regarding the reform of IMF, UNSC, WB and WTO. This 
confirms some coalitional weakness of BRICS, as it is seen as rhetorical in dealing with 
pressing issues of global governance reform. As such, Prashad (2013:14) argues that,  
…this seems the style of the BRICS: a sort of shy entrance onto the world stage with no 
major policy alternatives and no major PR campaign. One of the reasons for this coyness is 
that the BRICS do not have a substantially new approach to world affairs, constraints as they 
are by the general adoption of neoliberal policies in their own countries and trapped as they 
are by a satanic cycle of low-cost production for the credit-fuelled enclaves of the Global 
North.  
In 2013, BRICS held their fifth Summit in Durban, South Africa. In this Summit the 
eThekwini Declaration was reached to which the following commitments were made (i) the 
need to establish the BRICS Development Bank (ii) Contingent Reserves Agreement. On this 
summit the (iii) BRICS Multilateral Infrastructure Co-Financing Agreement for Africa was 
reached (iv) BRICS Multilateral Cooperation and Co-Financing Agreement for Sustainable 
Development, and the launch of the Business Council of BRICS were reached. These 
agreements paved way for the establishment of co-financing arrangements for infrastructure 
projects across the African continent. This sets out and explores the establishment of bilateral 
agreements aimed at establishing cooperation and co-financing arrangements, specifically 
around sustainable development and green economy elements (eThekwini Declaration, 
2013).  
 
From the 5th BRICS Summit, one can see that, indeed BRICS is more concerned with 
regionalism and multi-polarity which in itself is more real and feasible than the need to 
replace the hegemony and dominance of the north. This positions South Africa to spearhead 
the African Agenda (Carmody 2012). In confirmation to the above, Prashad argues that  
41 
 
BRICS offers an aggressive move to transfer the surpluses of the South to their own 
populations alongside shifts in the growth model of the individual states that has an 
immediate impact (Prashad, 2013:16).  
BRICS has in reality a different set of aims and objectives it intends to achieve, but all are 
enshrined in the need to advance development and industrialisation and reform of the world 
institutions.  Regardless of the broader objectives of BRICS, it should be noted that (in 
particular-India and China) are interested in tapping Africa‘s natural resources to spearhead 
their industrialization drive (Alden and Alves, 2009). However, it is interesting to note that 
BRICS have resorted to summit politics as they do not want institutionally binding 
mechanisms. As noted by Candice Moore (2014),  
Well, I think (Russia) and (even China) are very old countries and they value their 
sovereignty and their autonomy, so they do not need to be bound by more international 
institutions and they would really cherish their freedom to decide on the case by case basis. A 
reason why we see BRICS summits and Declarations-they have long list of issues which they 
are making statements…   
The next BRICS Summit will be held in Fortaleza, Brazil in July 2014
16
. This summit is 
expected to materialise the issue of the BRICS Development Bank-being set and 
operationalized. Where will this bank be located, and when and what will be its code of 
conduct which in anyway might be different from the IMF and WB? Even though, BRICS 
have chosen to use summits as a platform of engagement, there still remain differences 
between the members. Such differences come up within realms of BRICS leadership. China 
by virtue of being the largest economy, it assumes such a position, which is heavily contested 
by Russia. Additionally, China and India have constant border problems. The other burning 
issues of currency undervaluation and BRICS institutionalisation are among areas of possible 
conflict in the future. Within BRICS, individual members have different interests. China uses 
BRICS as a platform to influence global change; Russia enjoys support and collaborations 
from emerging economies. India, South Africa and Brazil want to use this platform as a 
scapegoat to assume membership in UNSC of which Russia and China are not prepared to 
dilute their veto power. Despite these differences and individual interests, BRICS is 
legitimate in the eyes of Global South and has an opportunity to influence global governance 
reform (Jakuja, 2014). The next summit though will be held in Brazil, Fortaleza. What will 
the summit achieve which is not rhetorical, and this remains to be seen.  
                                                             
16 By the time of writing this project, the summit had not been held 
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2.11 Conclusion  
The chapter discusses three main issues. Firstly, a shallow history of South Africa‘s past 
aided by a current economic and international position analysis is given. As explained during 
the course of the discussion, post-Apartheid South Africa re-invigorated its foreign policy 
identity to meet both domestic and international interest considerations. Secondly, the chapter 
unpacked the theory component that informs the study. International political economy 
analysis within realms of realism, liberalism and to a limited extent Marxism was discussed. 
In this chapter, an illumination of political, economic and social cooperation driven by 
materialistic gains such as market and power explained South Africa‘s participation in 
BRICS within an international political economy basis. Moving on, the chapter also 
discussed the constructivism approach as a key theory that informs the study. Issues of 
interest and identity which are socially constructed based on ‗inter-subjective‘ ‗social facts‘ 
were discussed in this chapter. The chapter explored how constructivism approach helps to 
account for South Africa‘s participation in BRICS. Still on the theory component, the 
political coalition approach was also discussed. Due to effects of globalisation states are 
increasing forced into political coalitions. There is more power as a collective than as an 
individual. The chapter notes that South Africa‘s participation in BRICS is also informed by 
a political coalition approach. Lastly, the chapter discusses conceptual frameworks of the 
study through interrogation and contextualisation of terms such as BRICS, Global South, 
South-South Cooperation.   
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3.0 Chapter 3: Historicising South Africa-BRICS relations  
3.1 Introduction  
The chapter suggests that history provides useful pointers to explore the current relations 
between South Africa and BRICS. Yet modern scholarship has a tendency of distancing itself 
from a history that precedes this postcolonial political and economic dispensation
17
. For the 
fact that Brazil, India, China and Russia were connected to South Africa through ties with the 
ANC, PAC and the SACP: this suggests the possibility of a different form of diplomacy and 
multilateralism with southern characteristics. The birth of democracy in South Africa and 
ultimately the formation of BRICS saw the transformation of such diplomatic relations to a 
higher and more complex level. As such this chapter specifically looks at the historical ties 
changes and continuities.  
3.2 South Africa-Brazil relations: Changes and continuities 
South Africa and Brazil are regional hegemonic powers, South Africa in Africa and Brazil in 
South America. Brazil a former colony of Portugal had poor relations with South Africa 
between 1948 and 1994. South Africa was under apartheid rule during this time when forms 
of racial segregation and territorial separation were implemented that favoured whites. 
Understanding the relations between South Africa and Brazil needs to be placed in three 
broad angles of analysis which presents subsequently the changes and continuities of the 
relations. Such three angles of analysis includes (i) the relations between apartheid South 
African government and Brazil, (ii) the relationship between South African liberation 
movements in particular the ANC and Brazil and (iii) post-apartheid relations  between South 
Africa and Brazil, from 1996-2008.   
 
The relations between South Africa and Brazil during the apartheid were minimal. With the 
end of the first republic in Brazil (1889–1930 and 1930–1945), the second republic emerged 
and ruled Brazil from 1945–1964 (Bethell, 2008)18. Within this same period a socialist led 
                                                             
17 The relations between apartheid South Africa and other BRICS nations were poor.  This was evident as 
apartheid South Africa favoured the West in its foreign policy engagement, a reason that explains why apartheid 
South Africa fought against China in the Korean War of the 1950s. It should be noted that apartheid South 
African government did not attend the Bandung Conference of 1955, ANC and South African Indian Congress 
(SAIC) Moses Kotane and I.M Cachalia attended as observers 
18 One should note that Brazil underwent a transitional political eras in which from 1889-1930, an autocratic 
form of government established by military coups was in place. The second era from 1930 to 1945 was 
characterised by 15 years of Revolution in which there was transfer of power to a more democratic form of 
government under the leadership of Getullio Vargas (1945-1964). Lastly, another era was from 1985-2002 in 
which a model democracy is slowly being adopted as a regime type in Brazil. The peaceful transition was made 
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type of government evolved under the leadership of Esquerda Democrática. The period 
1964–1985 in Brazil marked a very important era commonly referred to as Military 
Dictatorship in which ‗Responsible Pragmatism‘ was in operation (Love, 2011). This era is 
of most importance in unpacking the apartheid South African relations with Brazil. As noted 
by Carmody (2012:118) 
[…] around 1964 to 1984, Brazil adopted a military dictatorship program under the 
Responsible Pragmatism doctrine which promoted Brazil to diversify its strategic military 
relations from United States.  
Consequently, Doelling (2008) argues that apartheid South African government entered into a 
military alliance with Brazil. Joint collaborations between apartheid South African companies 
and Brazilian companies in high-tech submarines under the Atlasur program were 
operationalized. During this period, it is interesting to that Brazil turned to South Africa for 
military needs because the second republic had choose to look for other alternatives for the 
supply of military equipment. It should be known that in essence, Cold War was at play, and 
Brazil did not want to be involved in the ideological conflict between USA and USSR. These 
codified joint collaborations were meant to increase the relations on training exercises, 
information and technology sharing on naval affairs (Bethell, 2008; Carmody, 2012).  Being 
driven by a liberal perspective which was anti-communism, South Africa became a strong 
ally, a considered communism bulwark in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular 
(Love, 2011).  
 
The second phase of relations between South Africa and Brazil is marked by the dwindling of 
connections due to a number of factors such as increased international community 
denouncement of the apartheid government. Except from international anti-apartheid 
campaign, the military dictatorship years in Brazil had elapsed with the evolution of a new 
democratic government from 1985 to present (Independent Media Centre, 2004). Changes in 
Brazilian internal political spectrums from a dictatorial to a liberal government meant a lot in 
changing the total foreign policy of Brazil (Love, 2011). As a result, there was abrupt 
disruption of military ties between apartheid South Africa and Brazil. A shift of focus 
between Brazil and apartheid South Africa started when Brazil supported (politically, 
economically and financially) the revolutionary ANC. It should be noted that Brazil‘s relation 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
possible by adoption of a democracy led development trajectory. For more details, see: Bethell, L (ed). 2008. 
The Cambridge History of Latin America Volume 9: Brazil since 1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press   
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with the ANC was strong, as also noted by its role towards the independence of Mozambique 
and Angola. Due to the establishment of the United Nations International Day for the 
elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1966, Brazil relations with apartheid South Africa 
assumed a different character. Brazil became increasingly connected with ANC due to racial 
reasons. This was because Brazil is home to quite a huge number of African origin 
populations. Like the black South African populations during the apartheid era, the Afro-
Brazilian citizens were also racially discriminated during the 1960s and 70s. This became a 
strong motive to jointly down-campaign racialism.  
 
The ANC struggle was thus considered a Brazilian cause. As one observe that  
These were the black and mulatto Brazilians who not only said racial discrimination was 
pervasive but also rejected outright the alleged white superiority that had underlain the 
assimilationist consensus. They argued implicitly that African traditions were as valuable as 
European traditions (Skidmore, 1992:13) 
Brazil‘s hosting of a seminar on the International Day for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination also led to an increase of relations between ANC and Brazil. Through this 
seminar, Brazil campaigned against the practise of racial discrimination (Bethell, 2008). As 
such Brazil identified itself with South Africa‘s liberation movement cause. Abritta, Faustino, 
Fontana, Hoffmann and Zambukaki, (2013) notes that Brazil demonstrated its anti-apartheid 
campaign when  
In 1985, the José Sarney government enacted a series of trade sanctions against the country 
that violated the human rights of the black population. 
This materialised when Nelson Mandela visited Brazil in 1991, and this is what he said, 
Even when I was in jail, the voice of the government and people of Brazil strongly and clearly 
overtook the bars of the prison, saying we are against apartheid and we are very grateful 
(Black Women of Brazil, 2013). 
In this regard, Brazilian government of President Fernando Collor de Mello kept sanctions on 
South Africa. This resembles a political solidary between Brazil and ANC (Abritta, et al, 
2013).  
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Cold War politics contributed to Brazil to attain a neutral position within the broader 
framework of NAM. During this time, Brazil had frost relations with USA as it rejected the 
influence of USA in the entire Latin America region. Regardless of the fact the Brazil had 
participated in the World War Two on Axis powers, the Cold War period showed a 
remarkable different mode of relations (Hilton, 1981). The third phase of the relations is 
between 1996 and 2008. It should be known that the transition to democracy in South Africa 
was aided by a culmination of events as witnessed elsewhere globally. This implied a time for 
change for South Africa in which the chains of apartheid were to be broken. This culminated 
in the release of Nelson Mandela from prison after having spent 27 years under apartheid 
prison. As such the relations between democratic South Africa and Brazil materialised from 
1996 through the formal establishment of embassies in the respective countries. In this 
contemporary era, South Africa‘s relation with Brazil has been shaped by promoting 
multilateralism and a foreign policy driven by South-South Cooperation. With the election of 
President Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2002, the relations between South Africa and Brazil have 
greatly increased and have further been reinforced by the establishment of the India-Brazil 
and South Africa Forum (IBSA) in 2003 and the BRICS in 2009. Placed within contours of 
HIV/ AIDS, fair trade, reform of the United Nations Security Council, land reform, and other 
socio-economic issues, relations between South Africa and Brazil have strengthened
19
. Brazil 
and South Africa have worked together to champion such problems identified above in 
various multilateral platforms.  
 
In addition to this, an increase of Brazilian Companies such as Petroleo Brasileiro Petrobras 
South Africa
20
 (PBR), Vale South Africa 
21
 and Odebrrcht South Africa
22
 in South Africa; and 
South African companies operating in Brazil, Banco Standard de Investimentos South Africa 
                                                             
19 Brazil-South Africa relations have strengthened due to their membership in various multilateral forum such as 
G77+China, IBSA, now BRICS etc. Through these platforms a wide range of cooperation has been put in place 
in which the major objectives are to attain socio-economic development in their respective areas.  
20 Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras (Petrobras) is a Brazilian integrated oil and gas company. It operates in five 
segments: exploration and production; refining, commercialization and transport of oil and natural gas; 
petrochemicals; distribution of derivatives, electrical energy, biofuels and other renewable energy sources.  
21 Vale South Africa is a Brazilian multinational diversified metal and Mining Corporation and one of the largest 
logistics operators in Brazil, For more details, please see http://www.bnamericas.com/company-
profile/en/Vale_S,A,-Vale 
22 Odebrecht Organization is a Brazilian conglomerate consisting of diversified businesses in the fields of 
engineering, construction, chemicals and petrochemicals, For more details, please see 
http://www.odebrecht.com.br/  
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(Standard Bank)
23
 and AngloGold Ashanti
24
-just to mention a few has led to a deepened 
relationship. The primary axis of these relations between South Africa and Brazil as 
explained above mainly materialises from natural resources extraction
25
, manufacturing 
industry
26
, finance and banking sector
27
, engineering and business sectors
28
. In the following 
chapters, a greater detail of the relations with specificity to the current BRICS forum will be 
unpacked. Therefore understanding these relations, the South Africa-Brazil relations are best 
explained within a multi-vector foreign policy in common with other BRICS nations 
(Carmody, 2012). At the core of these relations is the concept of ideas, beliefs and shared 
interest of how the world should look like. This in itself portrays the constructivism approach.  
3.3 South Africa-Russia relations: Changes and continuities  
Relations between South Africa and the USSR (now the Russian Federation) during the years 
of apartheid in South Africa were relatively minimal. However, Tikhomirov (1992) notes that 
there were a couple of similarities between South Africa and the USSR. South Africa-Russia 
historical circumstances of the 20
th
 century portrayed a big picture of similarity. But such 
similarity was different in character.  
Despite obvious difference in the historical environment, however, the new ruling elites that 
came to power in Russia in October 1917, and in South Africa in 1948, had very much the 
same set of objectives, and had used similar tactics and methods (Tikhomirov, 1992:3).  
From a historical backdrop, the relations between South Africa and Russia dates back to 18
th
 
century when the first Russian sailors visited Cape Colony (Tikhomirov, 1992:35). However, 
Tikhomirov argues that until late 19
th
 century, there are no historical memoirs to point the 
existence of relations between South Africa and Russia. During the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-
1902, the then Tsar, Nikolai II joined the war but supporting the Boers. This marked the 
establishment of formal relations. The anti-imperialist ideology of Russia during this time 
necessitated the Boer/Afrikaner government to support communists Russia on several 
occasions (Bunting, 1964). South Africa-Russia relations changed in the late 1930s. Russia‘s 
Communist International organisation in which the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) 
was a member contributed to rise of tensions. The Russian Communist International 
                                                             
23 For more details, please see: Financial and Banking Sector originally forms South Africa operating in Brazil. 
http://corporateandinvestment.standardbank.com/CIBGlobal/country-offices/americas/Brazil  
24 For more details, please see Mining Company. 
http://www.anglogold.co.za/subwebs/informationforinvestors/reports08/annualreport08/r/review_br.htm   
25 Vale South Africa Company, Anglo-Ashanti Gold 
26 Odebrecht Organization 
27 Standard Bank 
28 Odebrecht Organization, Vale South Africa Company etc.  
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Organisation aligned itself with revolutionary movements in colonies (Drew, 1996).  This 
contributed to conflict of interest between CPSA and the Russian Communist International 
Organisation and the CPSA withdrew its membership. Drew argues that  
Like the early socialists movements before the formation of the CPSA, South African Trotsky 
emerged as a regional and organisationally fragmented tendency. The first Trotsky grouplet to 
emerge on the Witwatersrand was the ephemeral Communist League of Africa, formed in 
1932 by veteran trade unionist T.W. Thibedi, who had been expelled from the CPSA (Drew, 
1996:24).  
Relations between South Africa and Russia became increasingly fraught as the South African 
National Party found itself in confrontation with the CPSA (Tikhomirov, 1992:36). Post-
World War Two witnessed a transitional phase of South Africa-Russia relations. During this 
period, a precise account is given by Yastrebova (1952) book entitled Union of South Africa 
after World War II. This book in essence brings insights on the extension of relations 
between liberation movement and the USSR during the Cold War period. In this section, I 
recognise that the relations between USSR and apartheid South Africa are best explained by 
saying that the USSR was one of apartheid South Africa‘s strongest critics. The fact that 
USSR criticised apartheid South Africa, relations became poor and fraught (Drew, 1997). 
Apartheid South African government was anti-communist as witnessed by the enactment of 
the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 in South Africa-later changed to the Internal 
Security Act of 1976. The apartheid government in South Africa was seen as a regional 
bulwark to the spread of communism in Southern Africa and ultimately Africa. With this in 
mind, I configure this section to two scenarios in which first, I discuss the relations between 
USSR and South Africa‘s revolutionary parties-ANC, PAC and SACP and secondly, the 
relations between post-apartheid South Africa and Russia after the formalisation of relations 
subject from 1992-2008.  
 
Firstly, the South African revolutionary parties in particular the ANC, PAC and SACP 
adopted a communist driven liberation struggle ideology. However, it should be noted that 
the liberation movement parties ANC, PAC and SACP had different characters, mundus 
operandi, but with a common purpose of liberating South Africa from apartheid (Drew, 
1991). Bunting notes that  
[…] Kotane never regarded the ANC as a rival to the communist Party […] for he understood 
clearly the distinct roles of national organisation and a party of the working class guided by 
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the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, and never allowed the two to get mixed up, either in his 
own mind or in the practical work of organising the people. …it was because they recognised 
the quality of his work that the leaders of the ANC, including the youth league, were always 
able to accept Kotane as one of themselves, and eventually also accept the Communist Party 
as an ally in the struggle (Bunting, 1998:181).  
Such a posture adopted by SACP positioned USSR to be identified as a friend of the 
developing world. For that matter, the USSR financially, militarily and ideologically 
supported liberation fighters such as Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, Chris Hani, Nelson 
Mandela-just to mention a few. USSR-South Africa relations during this period under 
consideration is seen more as a political one, not with the state but with the liberation 
movements. And as such, USSR chose to identify itself with the course of African 
Nationalism-a friend of the colonised. This was heralded by changes in Soviet strategies and 
policies which favoured the Third World (Tikhomirov, 1992). Through codified alliance 
between the ANC and the SACP, USSR played a pivotal role towards the establishment of 
links for South African liberation movements in Africa. ANC and SACP were linked with 
military camps for training services in Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique and Algeria. As noted 
that 
[..] these general changes in Soviet policy towards the Third World, together with the 
increasing struggle between East and West for influence in Africa, from the mid-1950s led to 
a substantial growth of interests, on the part of Soviet decision makers…( Tikhomirov, 
1992:39). […]..Soviet Union sought to constantly increase its influence in in the region […] 
mainly through provision of support to, and strengthening its ties with the national liberation 
movements […] main Soviet allies in southern Africa included FRELIMO in Mozambique, 
the MPLA in Angola, and ZAPU in what was Southern Rhodesia (Tikhomirov, 1992:39). 
Such assistance culminated in the formation of ANC led military wing-the Umkhonto 
weSizwe (MK) in South Africa, 16 December 1961 (Cherry, 2011:14). MK by definition is 
―a guerrilla army of a few thousand soldiers in exile, disciplined and well trained‖ who were 
involved in sabotage action on strategic symbols of the apartheid government between 1961 
and 1993 (Cherry, 2011).  As argued by Egan on a book review entitled, The Hidden Thread: 
Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era‖ written by Irina Filatova and Apollon Davidson,  
On a political level, the Soviet Union through Comintern‘s ‗Native Republic‘ policy directed 
the Communist Party towards strong identification with African nationalism. This decision 
divided the CPSA and led to expulsions of dissident members. The Party itself, the non-racial 
political movement in South Africa for decades, played a key role in cementing the alliance of 
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the African National Congress with its supporters among minorities and the labour 
movement; it would also, in the early 1960s, be central to the formation and leadership of the 
ANC‘s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. In turn, the Soviet Union assisted MK in military 
training – though some within felt that the training was all too often overly focused on 
conventional, as opposed to guerrilla, warfare (Egan, 2013:72).  
Understanding ANC-USSR relations is also explained by Shubin‘s work of 2008 on the 
books titled ANC: A View from Moscow and The Hot „Cold War‟: the USSR in Southern 
Africa. Shubin (2008a) notes that the Soviet Union has been acknowledged as the ANC‘s 
most important benefactor, providing military support in the form of hardware, as well as 
training some 2,000 MK cadres. The Soviets helped the ANC maintain structures that came 
under enormous pressure, especially through the slump in the 1970s (Shubin and Traikova, 
2008). As noted by Shubin (2008b) these same structures were then replenished by new 
recruits fleeing South Africa after the Soweto Uprising in 1976. After that, MK cadres trained 
in the USSR launched devastating attacks that added to the pressure bringing apartheid 
leaders to the negotiating table
29
. One argues that USSR played a role towards the end of 
apartheid in South Africa. As he notes that 
No discussion about South Africa‘s struggle against the tyranny of apartheid can be complete 
without mentioning the role of the Soviet Union (Kamalakaran, 2013:1).  
As a matter of confirmed strong ties between the ANC and SACP with USSR, Oliver Tambo 
the former president of the ANC presented a speech when he met Mikhail Gorbachev in 
1986,  
We emerged from that meeting strengthened by the knowledge that the Soviet Union stands 
firmly with it in the struggle for a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa, an 
independent Namibia and a peaceful region of Southern Africa. We draw immense 
satisfaction and inspiration from the fact that the Soviet Union is resolved to contribute 
everything within its possibilities and, within the context of our own requests, to assist the 
ANC, SWAPO and the peoples of the region to achieve these objectives. The Soviet Union is 
acting neither out of consideration of selfish interest nor with a desire to establish a so-called 
sphere of influence (Tambo, 1986).  
                                                             
29 It should be noted that the MK launched a couple of attacks as recorded by (Cherry 2011) such as Goch Street 
shootout in 1977, the Silverton bank siege in Pretoria 1980 and the South African Air force Headquarters 
bombing in Pretoria in 1983, the Magoo‘s Bar bomb in Durban in 1985, the Ellis Park Rugby bombing in 1988 
amongst many other occasions. For example see Cherry, J. 2011. A Jacana Pocket History of Umkhonto 
weSizwe. Jacana Media 
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Except from the Soviet Union, other countries such as Cuba, also played a role in cracking 
down the apartheid walls. Given the role played by Soviet Union in freeing South Africa 
from the racist regime, it was no surprise that Mandela maintained a soft corner for Russia, 
long after the collapse of the Eastern bloc. South Africa-Russia relations changed complexion 
between1992-2008 by a move from an ideological driven form of cooperation to an economic 
led cooperation. The over throw of Gorbachev by Yeltsin late in 1991 contributed to a 
temporary dwindling of relations between SACP, ANC and USSR.  As noted by Shubin 
(2008b) Yeltsin cut off all the financial assistance to ANC and in 1992, he established 
diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa through an embassy in Pretoria and a 
consulate in Cape Town. Likewise, South Africa also established an embassy in Moscow. 
However, Yeltsin‘s rule was cut short by an election defeat. Even though Yeltsin had decided 
to cut off financial support to ANC and SACP, the Russian federation maintained the Soviet 
policy with regard to the ANC. 1994 marked the end of apartheid in South Africa through 
ANC winning the first democratic elections, and as such relations were formalised back to 
normalcy between the Russian federation and the ruling party in South Africa
30
.  
 
Mandela‘s state visit in 1999 set the tone for greater cooperation between Russia and South 
Africa. During that visit, Mandela and Boris Yeltsin signed a declaration pledging to boost 
political ties and economic relations in areas such as gold and diamond production. Since that 
time, the countries have stepped up bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Moscow being 
the strongest backer for South Africa to join the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China, 
which went from BRIC to BRICS.  
3.4 South Africa-India relations: Changes and continuities  
South Africa and India relations date back to the 1860s during the era of the Mapungubwe 
kingdom, the then largest city in modern day Zimbabwe. Relations were mainly trade related 
in gold, ivory and other commercial products. From the 1840s onwards, many Indians 
crossed the Indian Ocean to South Africa as indentured labourers (Harris, 2010). This as a 
result led South Africa to have the largest descendants of Indian population in Africa. During 
the apartheid era, India heavily criticised South Africa. This came as result of bad treatment 
that was given to Indian natives. Since South Africa had the largest Indian population outside 
                                                             
30 For more details see the South African History online  
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India, it was seen by India as part of its national heritage and national responsibility to protect 
its native citizens
31
.  
 
Indian solidarity and relations with South Africa was based on a political landscape in which 
India identified itself with the actions of ANC. This was seen by Mahatma Gandhi and his 
Satyagraha movement in South Africa in which he campaigned against social injustice and ill 
treatment of human race
32
. As a matter of fact, Gandhi favoured non-violent approach (Guha, 
2013). Understanding the contemporary relations between India and South Africa should be 
conceptualised within a broader framework of ANC-India relations. In 1946, India was the 
first nation to campaign against apartheid South African government. This materialised in 
India cutting economic, political, social, diplomatic and sport ties with apartheid government. 
Ultimately ANC managed to set a diplomatic mission in New Delhi in 1960, as a sign to 
cement relations. The Bandung conference of 1955 in which India participated and ANC 
unofficially participated was an important event which brought contact between India and 
ANC. As I argue in this section that India did not have mutual relations with South Africa, 
rather it had relations with ANC. But these relations were more rhetorical than practical. 
What India simply did was to denounce apartheid on international stage, providing minimal 
material support to the ANC. As noted on the article entitled, “India and South Africa as 
partners for development in Africa?”  
India has historical links with Africa (South Africa). In the postcolonial period these links 
became more overtly political as India supported the national liberation struggles of many 
African states and was instrumental in establishing the Non-Aligned Movement 
(Sidiropoulos, 2011:3).  
India‘s substantial diaspora in eastern and southern Africa, however, was largely disowned by 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and lost some of the connections with India that could 
subsequently have been used to build bridges to Africa. Although a staunch supporter of 
anticolonial struggles, in the post-Cold War period India has been a far more recent suitor in 
the courtship of Africa. Until recently it lacked the high profile diplomacy that has 
characterized China‘s relations with the continent. As such, China and Russia played more 
significant role in campaigning against apartheid and provision of material and military 
                                                             
31 South Africa boasts the largest Indian population with over a million people of Indian origin in South Africa, 
thereby placing greater emphasis on cultural exchanges and cultural diplomacy between the two nations. 
32This implies the India-South Africa Relations, For more details, please see  
http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-SouthAfrica_Relations.pdf  
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support for ANC than India. Thus, India was rhetorically positioned to campaign against 
apartheid (Gahu, 2013).  
 
With the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relation in 1993 between the two countries, economic relations have increased. 
Political solidarity, economic interdependence in the wake of South-South Cooperation had 
increased and this has led to the two governments to promote finance, investment and 
business relations through platforms such as IBSA, G20, G77+China and WTO. As noted 
that India also features among the top ten countries investing in South Africa with current 
investments from companies such as TATA
33
, Nalco
34
, CIPLA
35
, Mahindra and Mahindra
36
 
and Aurobindo Pharmaceuticals
37
 (Srivastava, 2010). In return, South African investment 
into India has been growing steadily with Tiger Brands
38
, Airports Company South Africa 
(Company that deals with construction and maintenance of ports) and  Bidvest (Insurance, 
financial and banking sectors), SAB Miller (Beverages company), FirstRand Bank 
(Insurance, Finance and Banking sectors), Standard Bank (Insurance, Finance and Banking 
sectors), Old Mutual (Insurance, Finance and Banking sectors), Anglo-American (Mining), 
Sasol (Fuel) and Nandos Group Holdings (Fast Foods outlets).  
 
From an international political economy basis, South Africa-India relations are bound to 
materialise hugely as negotiations are at an advanced stage on a preferential trade agreement 
which will accelerate trade flows, and extend the range of traded goods, thereby deepening 
                                                             
33 Established in 1945, TATA Motors Limited is India‘s largest automobile company, with over 25,000 
employees worldwide. TATA Africa Holdings, established in Johannesburg in 1994, as a subsidiary of Tata 
International, serves as the headquarters for Tata operations in Africa. For more details, please see 
http://www.tata.co.za/about-us/   
34 Nalco Africa is a joint venture between Protea Chemicals - a division of the Omnia Group and Nalco 
Company (NYSE: NLC), the world‘s leading water treatment and process improvement company, see more on 
http://www.nalco.com/sa/news-and-events/1399.htm   
35 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd is one of South Africa's fastest growing pharmaceutical companies and currently third 
largest. Cipla is a leading provider of chronic medicines to the public and private sectors, see more on 
http://www.ciplamedpro.co.za/about/profile/   
36 Mahindra and Mahindra Limited is an India-based company but with branches worldwide. The Company 
operates in Automotive Segment, Farm Equipment Segment, Information Technology (IT) Services, Financial 
Services, Steel Trading and Processing, Infrastructure, Hospitality, Systech, Logistics and After-market 
operations. For more see http://in.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=MAHM.BO   
37 Aurobindo Pharma (Pty) Ltd is a company with branches worldwide. The company deals with sells and 
markets to various health care professionals covering the various facets of the private pharmaceutical market 
infrastructure of South Africa. For more see http://www.aurobindopharma.co.za/   
38 Is one of the largest manufacturers and marketers of FMCG products in Southern Africa, and has been for 
several decades. See more on http://www.tigerbrands.co.za/about.php   
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the mutually beneficial trade and investment ties between the two developing economies of 
the Global South. As a result of these increased relations that back dates to the 1840s, India 
and South Africa have a common approach on many global issues, including the future of 
multilateralism, South-South Cooperation and multilateral trade negotiations. This has led to 
fruitful cooperation in the UN, NAM, Commonwealth, IOR-ARC, WTO, G-77, G-20, 
UNCTAD, BASIC and IBSA.   
3.5 South Africa-China relations: Changes and continuities  
South Africa-China relations date back to the early 20
th
 century. Jung and Alden (2013) note 
that relations between South Africa and China predate 1940. As for Jung and Alden (2013) 
formal relations were established in 1949 between the Nationalist of China and the 
Nationalist Party in South Africa. In the subsequent years, Walter Sisulu, one of the 
revolutionaries from ANC visited China in 1953.  
During their six weeks in China, they toured 15 of China‘s 30 provinces, visiting major tourist 
attractions and attending a variety of official functions. Walter was introduced as the 
Secretary General of the ANC, the national movement (Sisulu, 2002:112). 
During the visit, possibilities of ANC-China military ties were discussed  
…when Walter raised the issue with his Chinese hosts, they warned him that revolution was a 
very serious affair, not to be embarked on lightly (Sisulu, 2002:112). 
The 1955 Bandung was very important in bringing the relationship to a closer and personal 
level between the People‘s Republic of China and South African liberation movement 
representatives. As noted by le Pere and Shelton (2007) that China met Moses Kotane of the 
African National Congress. An article published by South African Chamber of Commerce in 
2013 titled ―South Africa and China; Past and Present-Always a Future‖ noted that South 
Africa-China relations were influenced by prominent Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, 
Zhou Enlai and Zhu De.  Even though South Africa‘s path to independence was also 
influenced by China, the relations between apartheid South Africa and People‘s Republic of 
China were minimal and almost non-existent. Remarkably, Ian Taylor (2000) argues that  
There wasn‘t formal Chinese involvement in the liberation struggle in South Africa for most 
of the time as the ANC was aligned to the Soviet Union while the Pan African Congress was 
aligned to the People‘s Republic of China39. 
                                                             
39 For example see: http://www.thesouthafrican.com/business/south-africa-and-china-past-and-present-always-a-
future.htm   
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 However it should be noted that during this time in question, People‘s Republic of China had 
direct relations with the Pan African Congress (PAC)
40
. An archival source if information 
obtained from O‟Malley: The Heart of Hope noted that,  
At one stage during the sixties, after receiving aid from the People's Republic of China, the 
PAC shifted towards Maoism. The PAC leaders who supported the communist programme 
suggested that Chinese communists were also non-white, and that their value system had not 
been tainted by European thought. This view was adopted to rationalize the former strong 
opposition to communism in the Congress Alliance
41
.  
The SACC (2013) document however posit that, during the mid-1970s there was a brief time 
when Pretoria toyed with the idea of establishing ties with China on the basis that South 
Africa‘s main enemy was Moscow, as was China‘s, and so both countries had an interest in 
shutting out the Soviets. Upon identifying the role which the ANC was playing towards the 
independence path for South Africa, it should be noted that 1980‘s was a turning point of the 
relations between modern day South Africa and China. China became more diplomatically 
proactive with the ANC (le Pere, 2006).  
 
Within the framework of international political economy, the late 1990‘s saw China-South 
Africa relations increasingly becoming inclined to a more economic led diplomacy. This was 
necessitated by the political instability in South Africa and how that was paving way for a 
free and democratic South Africa. As such, China increasingly supported the PAC and ANC 
as China identified itself with the greater course of the developing nation and political 
independence. The increasing relations materialised well in 1994 and later in 1998 when the 
democratic South Africa officially established some diplomatic representations in China. 
Since then, the economic relations have increased. As pointed out by He Liu Guijin, the 
Chinese Ambassador to South Africa in 2004 that,  
Looking into the future Sino-South Africa friendly co-operation has broad prospects for 
development. Our two countries are highly complementary in terms of economy and trade. 
We share identical or similar views on many major international issues. I believe that with the 
                                                             
40 For example see: Sino-Africa ties: A Pan-Africanist Perspective 
http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/news_article.php?id=8085and 
title=Sino%20Africa%20ties%20%20A%20Pan%20Africanist%20Perspective#.UwxoM-OSyLh   
41 For example see: Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Online: Available at 
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03214.htm    
56 
 
deepening of mutual understanding between our countries, bilateral cooperation in all fields is 
sure to bear more fruits.  
Naidu (2006) on the State of the Nation series 2005-2006 on her monograph entitled, South 
Africa‟s Relations with the People‟s Republic of China: Mutual Opportunities or Hidden 
Threats claims that the volume of trade between South Africa and China has increased since 
1991. Since the establishment of the diplomatic ties, bilateral trade and investment between 
South Africa and China has increased.  But some critics such as Moeletsi Mbeki on his book, 
Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing argues that China‘s role on 
South Africa is bad. As for Mbeki, he openly notes that, ―China is both a tantalizing and a 
terrifying threat to South Africa‖. Such a position given by Moeletsi Mbeki is further 
supported by Botha (2004), Evaluating Free Trade between South Africa and China: Who 
are the Winners and who are the losers? Botha believes that the available trade agreements 
between China and South Africa heavily favour China at the expense of South Africa. Given 
the historical relations that exist between South Africa and China, relations have dramatically 
increased but solely market driven. Since, South Africa is the exporter of mineral resources to 
China, and China exports manufactured goods to South Africa, this relationship is almost 
identical with the traditional Global North -Africa trade relations (Alden and Alves, 2009). 
This implies that Africa is an important variable towards China‘s industrialization (Alden and 
Davies, 2006).  
 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is one of the key strategic frameworks within which the 
South Africa-China relations have increased over time. South Africa-China relations within 
the framework of FOCAC have been dully based on increasing trade and investment between 
China and Africa. Located within broader trajectories of western sentimental rejection as 
model of development, culture has been a major blueprint for social and economic relations 
between South Africa and China (Anshan and April, 2013). This implies a social 
constructivism theoretical underpinning. China-Africa engagement has been promoted by the 
concept of Global South solidarity. Through the FOCAC platform, China-Africa relations 
have increased as noted by Anshan and April that,  
In an age of global interdependence, international or regional multilateral mechanisms 
constitute a platform for a nation to show its national image. China has established an 
efficient way under FOCAC to establish its country‘s image and promote its international 
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position and influence through actively ensuring that its social and human development 
activities on the continent, become a reality in a very short time (Anshan and April, 2013:7).  
Mbeki in his speech in 2006, At the Heavenly Gate in Beijing hope is born notes that the 
relationship between Africa and China has grown tremendously. Tull (2010) supports 
Mbeki‘s argument noting that China and Africa have great history that is embedded within 
developing countries political, economic and social solidarity spectrums. Mbeki in his speech 
reiterates that  
Both China and Africa are cradles of human civilisation and lands of great promise. Common 
destiny and common goals have brought us together. China will remain a close friend, reliable 
partner and good brother of Africa. Let us join hands and endeavour to promote development 
in both China and Africa, improve the well-being of our peoples and build a harmonious 
world of enduring peace and common prosperity (Mbeki, 2006). 
3.6 Conclusion  
Although South Africa BRICS appears to be a recent development, history tends to portray 
that relations had always existed out of state-craft basis. In this regard, the current state of 
relations between South Africa and other BRIC nations is influenced by history among other 
factors. As explained during the course of the discussion, South Africa-BRICS relations are 
among other considerations located and drawn from the Cold war era, in which countries like 
India, China, Russia and Brazil supported the liberation movements such as ANC, SACP, and 
PAC.  This helps to account for the concept of social constructivism as one of the key 
theories from which the study is premised. It is very important to have a clear analysis of 
these historical realities in order to have a clear picture of how relations have continued and 
changed over time. Having made an attempt to unpack these historical relations, this next 
chapter therefore looks at the prospects of South Africa‘s participation in BRICS.  
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4.0 Chapter 4: Prospects for South Africa’s participation in BRICS 
4.1 Introduction  
Since 1994, South Africa has embraced bilateral and multilateral cooperation as part of a 
strategy for structural transformation towards socio-economic and political development. 
This has become a vision and commitment by the South African leadership to mitigate 
development constraints. South Africa has potential socio-economic and political gains in 
BRICS. These gains relate to trade and market access, foreign direct investments, and above 
all increased bargaining power and voice in international issues. BRICS membership will 
enable South Africa to absorb shocks and threats of globalization. South Africa‘s main 
strategic consideration in BRICS as claimed by Bohler-Muller is to use a diplomatic leverage 
offered by BRICS to champion issues of global governance reform. A reformed international 
political and monetary system offers more soluble advantages to South Africa. Fortunate 
enough, such diplomatic aspirations and considerations are also key priorities of BRICS. As 
such, BRICS intends to establish new and complementary institutions to the existing world 
governing structures so as to ensure reform diplomatically. Such institutions will offer 
parallel development packages which above all targets issues of political and economic 
development disparities among other areas (Bohler-Muller, 2014: 5).   
 
The BRICS platform provides South Africa a stepping stone to champion its economic, 
political and social governance development. This materialises well within South Africa‘s 
interest in promoting a world order that is equitable, balanced and representative regardless of 
geopolitical location and level of economic development. In this regard, this chapter 
specifically looks at the possible opportunities for South Africa in BRICS. By extension, this 
chapter discuss the levels and criteria of analysis in measuring the depth of such social, 
economic and political progress within South Africa. While this study recognises the 
disparities and the diversity of the BRICS nations, I base my argument on the application of 
social constructivist logic, political coalition and the international political economy as 
theoretical approaches that are very useful for studying economic, social and political 
interdependence between nations in general. These approaches do not only pay attention to 
the contemporary legacies of colonialism as a point of departure for increased economic and 
political interdependence within BRICS, but also suggests that underdevelopment, 
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complementarities and synergies help in cultivating strong and beneficial engagements. This 
reflects an alternative to the traditional development path followed by the Global North.  
4.3 Economic prospects  
The Global Competitiveness Index Report (2013) notes that South Africa has quality 
institutions and on-factor allocation,  which is accompanied by quality intellectual property 
protection ranked number (20
th
), property rights ranked number (26
th
), and accountable 
private institutions ranked (2
nd
). Additionally, South Africa has good market efficiency which 
is ranked number (32
nd
). This makes South Africa enjoy considerable economic stability in 
Africa. Such status has been made possible by particularly impressive financial market 
development which is ranked (3
rd), indicating high confidence in South Africa‘s financial 
markets. This is the reverse situation with many other parts of the world. As such, to what 
extent does this beneficial blueprint help South Africa to maximise its potential economic 
prospects in BRICS? The information below attempts to address the above question by 
exploring the economic prospects.   
4.3.1 Trade creation and diversion  
South Africa‘s membership in BRICS has a prospectus of creating and increasing intra-
BRICS trade. Multilateral schemes or arrangements generate fair gains for the participating 
countries. South Africa has already witnessed high trade volume increase with China and 
little progress with the other BRICS nations. There is a huge potential for South Africa to tap 
from the growing opportunities of economic interdependence through trade in BRICS. In 
South Africa the Department of Trade and Industry coordinates trade issues and to a certain 
extent some other government departments are also involved in coordinating, but on a smaller 
scale. In an effort to maximize trade, BRICS has established a Contact Group on Economic 
and Trade Issues (CGETI) and the BRICS Business Council networks as platforms for 
exchange of information, ideas on trade related innovative initiatives. Through these 
networks, there is an opportunity to create and diversify trade. This has a potential for fair 
gains.  Fair gains are accrued in the manner that they reduce barriers (tariffs) among member 
countries. From a comparative basis, this improves a pool of options for citizenry to choose 
from, on goods and services. Schiff and Winters (1998) defines trade creation as the 
displacement of higher cost of domestic production through lower and fewer barriers within 
regional integration arrangements. The process increases socio-economic welfare.  
 
60 
 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Development Report of 2003 defines trade diversion 
as the displacement of lower cost production from non-members by higher cost production 
from partner countries. This occurs because of lower barriers. Thus, BRICS arrangement has 
a potential to generate welfare gains but only when trade creation dominates trade diversion. 
Furthermore, such arrangements also generate two other trade effects, whose importance 
varies among member countries. First, such arrangements reduce government revenue from 
tariffs, directly through tariff cuts among members and directly through a shift away from 
imports from non-members subject to tariffs. Secondly, such arrangements may improve the 
terms of trade for member countries if changes in trade volumes lower world prices. The 
greater the share in the world market, the larger the potential gains (MENA Report, 2003). 
 
 
South Africa clearly stated its economic focus in BRICS. The 2013 BRICS Trade Exchange 
Forum held at Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa rightfully notes that 
South Africa‘s economic motives in BRICS are42: 
1. To promote trade and investment between South Africa and the BRICS nations 
2. To enhance industrialisation through developing key industries and sectors 
3. To promote job creation through supporting sustainable opportunities and developing 
commercial potential 
4. To develop South Africa‘s role as a platform for partnership and investment across 
the continent 
5. To drive cooperation on economic opportunities in infrastructure development 
6. To enhance cooperation on skills development 
7. To identify projects to be financed by the new development bank43.  
 
Before venturing into the above stated economic desires, it is imperative for one to fully 
understand the structure of trade relations in BRICS from a WTO basis. Trade relations in 
BRICS are beginning to assume a collective approach by the establishment of collective 
BRICS Trade Form. However, the forum is not yet fully operation but it offers more hope in 
the near future. In this section, bilateral trade arrangements are very important as mechanism 
of strengthening multilateralism. South Africa‘s bilateral trade engagements with all BRICS 
                                                             
42For more details please see BRICS Trade Exchange Forum Online, at http://www.brics5.co.za/assets/Brics-
Trade-Exchange.pdf  
43 Proposal made in 2012 to establish the BRICS Development Bank 
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in particular India, China and Brazil are very pivotal and significant in contributing towards 
its economic development trajectory (Alden and Vieira, 2006). This acts as a cornerstone to 
improve multilateralism. As such this study is very supportive (though conditional) of the 
establishment of BRICS Trade Protocol in which there will be mutual trade benefits. 
 
BRICS do recognise that their trade negotiations and arrangements comply with the set 
standards by the World Trade Organisation. BRICS are developing nations and as such 
receives a certain preference from a WTO related basis on trade negotiations. The WTO 
points out that: 
…countries can set up a free trade agreement that applies only to goods traded within the 
group — discriminating against goods from outside (WTO, 2014).  
Part IV (Articles. XXXVI-XXXVIII) to the General Agreement recognizes the special 
economic needs of developing countries and asserts the principle of nonreciprocity. Under 
this principle, developed countries forego the receipt of reciprocal benefits for their 
negotiated commitments to reduce or eliminate tariffs and restrictions on trade of less 
developed contracting parties (WTO, 2014).  
 
Brendan Vickers, Chief Director of Policy and Research at South Africa‘s Department of 
Trade and Industry has noted that the structural trade relations within BRICS are based on 
bilateral basis (Vickers, 2014). At the moment, there is no joint intra-BRICS trade 
cooperation framework. He reiterated that South Africa‘s market access in BRICS is based on 
bilateral engagements, except for one Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with Brazil under 
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Bolivia). It was signed 
in 2009 through the SACU platform. However, it has not been ratified yet-which means it is 
not yet operational (Vickers, 2014). Purportedly, there is hope and assurance that the PTA 
will be made operational. If the PTA is made operational, South Africa under (SACU) will 
benefit as 1000 goods (products) will  be freely traded between these two regional bodies-
SACU and MERCOSUR.   
 
South Africa and India are negotiating a PTA under the SACU platform. Such an 
arrangement will also limit the number of goods to be freely traded, and most certainly 1000. 
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At the moment South Africa and India have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
issues of trade, investment and economic development. South Africa and Russia; and South 
Africa and China have neither no PTA nor any in the pipe line (Vickers, 2014). But South 
Africa and China have signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). The CSP offers 
South Africa an elevated position on issues of trade, aid and investment prioritisation. The 
CSP was signed by Chinese President Hu Jintao and South African President Jacob Zuma in 
2010.  The CSP notes that:  
The two countries expressed their desire to further strengthen and deepen exchanges and 
cooperation between the two nations in both political and regional affairs by establishing a 
comprehensive strategic partnership based on equality, mutual benefits and common 
development (CSP, 2014). 
The CSP was accompanied by other seven bilateral cooperation agreements covering visa 
procedures, mining, energy, environment, and transport sectors. Furthermore, South Africa 
and China signed yet another MoU in 2013 to fully strengthen the CSP. This was signed by 
the former South African Public Enterprises Minister Malusi Gigaba and Huang Shuhe, the 
Vice-Chairman of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) of China. On signing the MoU, top of the list was promoting trade, investment and 
collaboration amongst co-operatives in the BRICS countries. 
 
The structures of the Intra-BRICS trade engagements are highly complementary. Brazil and 
Russia have strengths in a large pool of commodity and natural resources endowment. China 
and India are net importers of these commodities and natural resources. Within the same 
trajectory, South Africa has large deposits of natural resources and world standard business 
infrastructure. Therefore, South Africa has a room of increased trade relations with the 
BRICS countries, since their engagements are rather complementary than competition 
(Lemmon, 2013). After having attempted to explain the structural basis of trade in BRICS, 
quantitative data below shows the statistics in intra trade volumes.  
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Figure 1: South Africa shares of Exports and Imports in BRICS, 2000-2011 
 
Source, Quantec Research 2013  
As depicted in figure 1, South Africa export and import shares in BRICS have increased. 
Since 2000, the exports and imports have been experiencing a gradual rise, but China 
dominates the trade relations subject from 2008. This explains well the upgrading of South 
Africa-China relations from mere partnerships to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 
2010.  
 
Data released by the South African Revenue Services (SARS) under the Statistics South 
Africa (StatSA) Joint BRICS publication of 2013, the share of BRICS in South Africa‘s total 
trade has grown from 10 percent in 2005 to 19 percent in 2012. Since 2009, China has been 
South Africa‘s bilateral trading partner, while India ranked fifth in 2012. 
Table 2: Trend in intra-BRICS trade (% of total trade), 2009–11 
 
 2009 2010 2011 
Imports  10.64 
 
11.03 
 
10.19 
Exports  7.61 
 
8.60 
 
8.36 
Total intra-BRICS 
trade 
8.9 
 
9.2 
 
8.5 
Source: ITC Trade Map-computed by Singh and Dube. 2013. BRICS Guide 5: Trends in Intra-BRICS co-
operation 
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Figure 2: Exports and Import in BRICS, 2011 
 
Source, World Bank 2013, NB: Exports and Imports Values for India exclude the value of services due to data 
unavailability  
 
Table 3: Trends in Intra-BRICS Trade 2009-2011 (% of total exports and imports) 
Country  Exports (Percentage of total 
Exports) 
Imports (Percentage of total 
Imports) 
Year Year 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
BRAZIL 18.13 20.11 20.86 15.63 17.97 18.88 
RUSSIA 7.91 7.14 8.73 16.52 18.39 19.62 
INDIA 8.53 11.87 n/a 15.76 15.71 n/a 
CHINA 5.71 6.70 7.09 7.16 7.15 8.50 
SOUTH AFRICA 15.36 16.95 18.20 18.51 19.71 20.12 
Source: ITC Trade Map-computed by Singh and Dube. 2013. BRICS Guide 5: Trends in Intra-BRICS co-
operation44
                                                             
44 For more details please see http://www.gegafrica.org/memory-dube/brics-guide-5-trends-in-intra-brics-co-
operation 
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Table 4: South Africa’s Imports trade profile 2010: The World and BRICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Trade Atlas, 2010
World  Brazil Russia India China 
$80 million $1.354 million $105 million  $2.846 million $11.535 million 
Fuel 19.6% Special 22.7% Fertilizers 19.9% Fuel 29.7% Electrical 22.5% 
Machinery 14.8% Meat 13.2% Copper 17.6% Vehicles 13.5% Machinery 21.3% 
Electrical 10.7% Machinery 9.8% Fats/Oil 10.6% Electrical 8.7% Footwear 4.8% 
Vehicle 8.8% Vehicles 9.0% Fuel 8.9% Pharmaceutical 7.8% Apparel 4.2% 
Special 6.5% Electrical 5.7% Precious 
Stone/Metal 
6.4% Machinery 4.2% Apparel 3.7% 
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Table 5: South Africa’s exports by destination, 2010 
Destination EU 27 China USA Japan India Brazil Russia 
Total 
Percentage 
of exports 
22.1% 12.1% 8.6% 7.9% 3.5% 0.9% 0.3% 
Source: World Trade Atlas, 2010  
 
As shown in table 5, the largest destination of South African exports in 2010 was the 
European Union‘s 27 nations. Using a BRICS perspective, China dominates the exports 
destination of South Africa followed by India, Brazil and Russia. Secondly, South Africa-US 
trade is declining, lagging behind China and EU. This might be an evidence to suggest the 
growing significance of south-south trade relations. South Africa should then tap this 
emerging trading opportunity by its virtual membership in BRICS. However, the concept of 
BRICS in trade issue is challenged since its only China and India that are major destinations 
of South African products as shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3: South Africa’s total trade with BRICS, 2011 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2010, Bar graph data computed by the author.  
 
As depicted in figures (2 and 3) and tables (2, 3, 4 and 5) above, the data presented proves 
that intra-BRICS trade is surprisingly low than projected and articulated by the media. Except 
for China which almost enjoys growing trade relations with all the BRICS nations, it remains 
to be seen how the group will increase its intra-trade engagements. South Africa‘s trade 
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prospects in BRICS are currently low, but there is a room for improvement. Summarily, 
BRICS at a forum level still lacks a jointly coordinated trading agreement. Trade relations are 
however, increasing on bilateral basis. South Africa has the potential to increase its trade 
engagements with BRICS to its benefit, by tirelessly calling for an integrated trade 
framework that is coordinated by all the members of the group and not on a bilateral basis.  
4.3.2 Foreign Direct Investment attraction potential  
South Africa has the potential to attract considerable volumes of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). Throughout history, South Africa has enjoyed greatest privileges on attracting FDI in 
the African continent. With South Africa‘s membership in BRICS, there are high hopes that 
the trend will continue. Within the South Africa context, Sandrey (2013) notes that there are 
three types of investments which have been recorded by the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB). This includes Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio Investment and ‗Other‘ 
Investment. Subject to the current statistics of the BRICS Foreign Direct Investment, there is 
usual a tendency of generalising what FDI means. According to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2014, FDI is category of capital that is 
established to gain interest in an enterprise (OECD, 2014a). Such capital is established and 
resident in an economy other than that of its direct investor. The capital has short, medium 
and long term beneficial opportunities which establish mutual relationship between the direct 
investor and the investment enterprise. Additionally, the investor has a significant degree of 
influence which is not necessarily control on the management of the enterprise. The investor 
has a direct or indirect ownership of the enterprise and has a 10 percent or more voting power 
(OECD, 2014a).   
 
According to the Balance of Payments Manual: Fifth Edition (BPM5) published by IMF in 
1993, FDI is an investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside 
the economy of the investor. FDI may be understood from a directional basis popularly 
known as Outward/Outflows and Inward/Inflows. Outward FDI are thus investment made 
outside the resident enterprise while Inward FDI is investments by non-resident investors to 
an enterprise. This implies cross-border capital transactions within a given period between 
affiliated enterprises that are in a direct investment relationship (OECD, 2014b).  
 
 
 
68 
 
In South Africa, FDI is defined as an:  
[…] Investment by foreigners in South Africa in which they have individual or collective (in 
the case of affiliated organizations or persons) at least 10 per cent of the voting rights 
(UNCTAD, Investment Country Profiles South Africa February, 2012: 1). 
 
Secondly, Portfolio investment has been defined by the South African Reserve Bank (2013) 
as a distinct form of FDI in which it is considered as the purchase of stock, bonds and money 
market instruments by foreigners as a means of capitalising financial returns. This form of 
investment is not direct; hence it is considered portfolio investment (Sandrey, 2013:90-91).  
 
 
Lastly, the South African Reserve Bank has also identified a type of an investment which is 
neither FDI nor Portfolio. As such the SARB considers it as ‗Other‘. By definition, ‗Other‘ 
Investment is loans, trade finance, currency and deposits, and other asserts with unaffiliated 
parties (Sandrey, 2013). The ‗Other‘ investments have no ‗controlling effects‘ on investments 
(Sandrey, 2013:90-91). Within BRICS, South Africa is the largest destination of China‘s FDI. 
This FDI is mainly concentrated in banking and finance sectors. It is until recently that China 
has embarked on investment in other sectors such as mining, manufacturing and industry in 
South Africa. South Africa‘s portfolio investment in Brazil has largely been dominated by the 
so called portfolio investments with recent upgrades to FDI within the banking sectors-in 
particular the Standard Bank Group. Regardless of that, data released by UNECA 2010 
Report notes that South Africa‘s major FDI flows have been centred on resource extractive 
industries and the financial market system. The most attractive companies and business 
entities enclave in this FDI flows has been Sappi Limited; Sanlam; Sasol Limited; MTN 
Group; Anglo Gold; Naspers Limited, Standard Bank Group; Barlowor Id; Nampark Limited 
and other entities. In India, South Africa‘s outward FDI has largely been dominated by the so 
called ‗other‘ investments. However, it is recently that South Africa has also upgraded its 
investments to portfolio scenarios. In Russia, South Africa‘s outward FDI has been unclear 
and difficult to calculate due to in most instances data unavailability.  
 
Overly, the BRICS have rather been absorbers of FDI more than being exudes. This implies 
the growing significance of BRICS.  As noted by the UNCTAD 2012 Report that developing 
and transition economies have absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows, and in 2012 
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FDI flows to developing economies, for the first time ever, exceeded those to developed 
countries with US$130 billion more. 
 
Statistically, FDI inflows to BRICS have tripled to an estimated figure of US$263 Billion in 
2012.  As a percentage the BRICS FDI flows have reached 20 percent in 2012. The 
UNCTAD Report reiterates that Outflows of FDI from BRICS has grown from 1 percent in 
2000 to 9 percent in 2012. This is shown by the increase from US$7 Billion in 2000 to 
US$126 Billion in 2012. Given such an increase of FDI Inflows and Outflows in BRICS, this 
can be seen as a huge potential for South Africa (Draper, 2013). While the emergence of 
BRICS is a recent phenomenon, the available data presented in the tables above has been 
carefully selected over a long period taking into considerations of data availability 
limitations. However it is possible that FDI flows have changed due to current various related 
reasons such as the technological innovations and changes in FDI and Trade patterns towards 
the Global South (Pant, 2013). As tabulated below, China is the dominant player in the FDI 
stock and flows in BRICS.   
Table 6: South Africa’s FDI Annual Changes calculated at R1000 million rate 
Year Total China Russia India Brazil BRICs 
(%) total 
2001 41.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
2002 -106.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
2003 46.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
2004 51.7 0.1 6.9 0.0 0.0 13.6 
2005 136.7 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.1 3.1 
2006 112.1 0.1 -11.1 0.1 0.0 9.7 
2007 140.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 
2008 -119.3 26.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 22.3 
2009 234.0 7.2 5.4 1.5 0.0 6.0 
2010 148.9 3.3 1.7 0.2 0.2 3.6 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, 2010: NB-These figures represent changes in FDI to South Africa from 
the BRICS countries calculated at R1000million  
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Table 5 shows the FDI statistics for BRICS nations in South Africa. The data specifically 
notes the FDI per country level from 2001-2010. In most scenarios data for 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, and 2008 was difficult to obtain from the public domains.   
Table 7: Russian Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa, 2002-2012 (Millions US $) 
Year  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flow 
(Amount) 
- - - - - - - - 15 12 8 9 
Stock 
(Amount) 
- - - - - - - - 34 35 34 35 
Source: ITC Investment Map and UNCTAD (2014)-data computed by Author 
 
Table 8: Brazilian Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa, 2002-2012 (Millions US $) 
Year  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flow 
(Amount) 
8 - - - 1 2  25 -5 - - - 
Stock 
(Amount) 
- - - - 65 - -  65 156 379 422 
 Source: ITC Investment Map and UNCTAD based on data from Banco Central do Brasil (2014)-data computed 
by Author 
Table 9: Chinese FDI flows and stock in South Africa, 2002-2012 (Millions US $) 
Year  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Flow 
(Amount) 
- - 9 18 47 41 454 4808 42 411 -4 -815 
Stock 
(Amount) 
  45 59 112 168 702 3049 2307 4153 4060 4775 
Source: ITC Investment Map and UNCTAD based on data from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
(2014)-data computed by Author  
Between 2006 and 2011 South Africa has managed to invest US$6billion in the other BRICS 
nations (Sandrey, 2013). Additionally, South Africa has managed to attract a considerable 
amount of US$27billion of investment between 2006 and 2011. However, South Africa has 
fewer shares of investments held abroad in BRICS. Even though South Africa has fewer 
shares of FDI stock and flows in BRICS, the case in Africa is different.  In Africa, South 
Africa is the largest investor, which may ultimately imply the significance of Africa as 
compared to BRICS. South Africa‘s failure to have larger share of FDI flows, distribution 
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and stock within the BRICS is its failure to have a clear business policy in these nations. 
Again, countries such as Russia, India and China have closed economies which are difficult 
for South Africa to penetrate.  
 
FDI flows, distribution and trend portrays that FDI goes both ways but, with greater volumes 
to South Africa than the other way around. Subsequently, South Africa does not have a 
business and investment strategy to ensure that it penetrates these so called ‗closed 
economies‘. Mathur and Dasgupta (2013) believe that South Africa is investing less in these 
other economies. Memory Dube has argued that South Africa has the least shares in terms of 
FDI abroad within BRICS which means it has less potential to influence BRICS Policy 
Agenda. This might be seen as ambitious foreign policy by South Africa to join BRICS 
(Dube, 2014). This simply implies that South Africa was simply interested in gaining 
membership only without considerations of the potential implications. Given such uneven 
playing field within BRICS, Tchereni considers South Africa as the ―ball-boy‖. This view 
comes from the assertion that South Africa is concerned with ‗what the BRICS will do for us‘ 
scenario-not the other way around (Tchereni, 2014). There are high hopes though; with the 
creation of the BRICS Business Council, South Africa can tap the opportunities of this 
platform to ensure that it attracts considerable volumes of FDI. This will improve the 
infrastructure and industrial development backlogs. 
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Table 10: Intra-BRICS FDI flows (1995-2010) and the (% to the World) Billion US $ 
Source: UNCTAD 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economy 1995 2000 2007 2010 
Inward Outward Net 
FDI 
Inward Outward Net FDI Inward Outward Net FDI Inward Outward Net FDI 
Brazil 1.3 0.3 3.3 2.3 0.2 30.5 1.8 0.3 27.5 3.9 0.9 36.9 
Russia 0.6 0.2 1.5 0.2 0.3 -0.5 2.8 2.1 9.2 3.3 3.9 -10.5 
India 0.6 0.0 2.0 0.3 0.0 3.1 1.3 0.8 8.1 2.0 1.1 10.0 
China 11 0.6 35.3 2.9 0.1 39.8 4.2 1.0 61.1 8.5 5.1 37.7 
South Africa 0.4 0.7 -1.3 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.1 2.7 0.1 0.0 1.1 
BRICS compared 
to the World 
13.8 1.7 41.1 5.8 0.6 73.5 10.4 4.4 108.6 17.8 11.1 75.3 
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Summarily, in terms of FDI stocks and flows, it is clear that China leads the group. This 
literally implies that China is the major economy in BRICS-without which the group‘s 
significance is questionable. Additional observations from the data given above implies that 
years after 1994 remarked an era in which South Africa‘s FDI flows changed and assumed a 
conservative approach. This was because during this time in question, South Africa was still 
negotiating its entry back to the international community. However, from 1998 onwards, the 
FDI outward trends for South Africa started to increase as already highlighted in the tables 
above.  
4.3.3 Changing dimensions of FDI to Africa: An opportunity for South Africa in BRICS 
The UNCTAD (2014) Report and the ECA (2014) Report both acknowledges the rising 
significance in the flow, trends and distribution of the FDI‘s to Africa. The main reason why 
Africa among other continents has been the prime target is the Africa rise scenario. Africa is 
a development partner for the Global South. This is a direct opportunity for South Africa to 
capitalise on this moment so as to invest in Africa under the BRICS umbrella. As noted 
earlier that South Africa is the leading investor in sub-Sahara Africa, its investments has 
already been made to the non-traditional (minerals or oil) sectors. Additional sectors such as 
services and manufacturing have received huge investments. These are potential sectors for 
South Africa to attract more FDI. South Africa‘s strong and world class banking and finance 
sector, are key areas in which BRICS has already started to invest financially. The ability of 
South Africa to tap capital from the BRICS has positive consequences for job creation and 
industrial growth.  
4.3.4 Internationalisation of South African companies 
South African business entities have embraced the BRICS platform as an opportunity for 
greater investments abroad. With this in mind the BRICS Business Council creates a wide 
pool of great opportunities for South Africa towards the internationalisation drive of its 
business entities.  However, South African companies have been experiencing challenges 
towards their internationalisation drive. Such challenges include insufficient capital. BRICS 
nations have emerged as new donors. While some companies have managed to spread across 
the African continent, they have had very little entry outside Africa. With BRICS, South 
African companies such as (SAB Miller, MTN, Massmart, Shoprite, Tiger Brands, Standard 
Bank Group) among others, have an opportunity to enter the global markets.  
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South Africa is Africa‘s largest trading and investment partner. This is one of the reasons to 
explain South Africa‘s self-given title of the Gateway to Africa in BRICS. This gives room 
for South Africa to articulate the Africa‘s Agenda position on the BRICS forum. These South 
Africa companies have entered the risky terrain of Africa and there is an opportunity for an 
increased trade and investment trajectories from these business entities by the membership 
which South Africa has in BRICS (Holmes, 2013). Internationalisation of South African 
companies via BRICS has been a daunting task given the bureaucratic challenges in other 
BRICS nations. The tables below give a list of South African companies and their sectors of 
operation in Brazil, Russia, India and China. As shown in table 9 below, South African 
companies have not managed to penetrate well in Russia.  
Table 11: South African companies operating in Russia 
Company  Sector of Operation 
Mondi Group Paper and Packages 
Naspers Media 
Barloworld Diversified Holdings  
Source: Labour Research Services/MNC Monitor: May 2014 South African Companies Operating Abroad 
 
Table 12: South African companies operating in Brazil 
Company  Sector of Operation 
AngloGold Ashanti Mining 
Naspers Media 
FirstRand Bank Banking and Financial Sector 
Aspen Holdings Health 
Grindrod Transport 
Standard Bank Group Banking and Financial Sector 
Airports Company South Africa (ACSA) Industrial-Ports 
Source: Labour Research Services/MNC Monitor: May 2014 South African Companies Operating Abroad 
As shown in table 10 above, South African companies are slowly entering the Brazilian 
market. This might be because of less red-tape approach to economy by the Brazilian 
government. Again, Brazil seems to follow a free market economy approach on business 
entities. In 2012, the Airports Company South Africa (ACSA) won the bid to expand and 
maintain operations in one of Brazil‘s busiest airport, Guarulhos in Sao Paolo (Makgale, 
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2012). South African companies have done exceptionally well in banking and finance sectors 
in particular the Standard Bank Group. This is a huge economic prospect for South Africa.  
Table 13: South African companies operating in India 
Company  Sector of Operation 
SAB Miller Food and Beverages  
Naspers Media 
FirstRand Bank Banking and Financial services  
Altron Industrial  
Sanlam Banking and Financial services 
Adcorp Holdings Health 
Airports Company South Africa (ACSA) Industrial-Ports 
Source: Labour Research Services/MNC Monitor: May 2014 South African Companies Operating Abroad 
Besada, Tok ad Winters (2013) notes South Africa has a limited success business story in 
India. The South African companies in India has so far been limited, with investments 
estimated at around US$250 million, spearheaded by the brewer SABMiller, First Rand (the 
first African bank to get an operating licence in India) and Airports Company South Africa 
(ACSA), which won a lucrative contract to rehabilitate the Mumbai airport (ACSA, 2013). 
Table 14: South African companies operating in China 
Company  Sector of Operation 
SAB Miller Food and Beverages  
Naspers Media 
Aveng Construction 
Sanlam Banking and Financial services 
Discovery Banking and Financial services 
Standard Bank Banking and Financial services 
Exxaro Mining 
Sasol Extractive Industry  
Source: Labour Research Services/MNC Monitor: May 2014 South African Companies Operating Abroad 
In China, South Africa is slowly entering the Chinese economy, but with a limited impact. 
The Chinese model of economy development has been so complicated due to the 
governments‘ increased participation and regulatory frameworks in business. However, Gelb 
(2010:21) notes that: 
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SABMiller is the second largest brewer in China, but again the sector is of limited 
significance. Around 10% of foreign mining companies in China are South African, and Sasol 
is likely in future to be the leader in coal to oil processing in China. 
As seen from the tabulated South African business entities operating abroad, there remain a 
lot of hurdles. The 2014 Doing Business Report notes that South Africa within BRICS has 
more favourable business environment than other BRICS nations. The report ranks South 
Africa on number 41, followed by Russia which is 92, followed by China which is 96 and 
lastly Brazil which is 116 out of 189 nations (Doing Business Report, 2014). This is clear 
evidence in understanding how BRICS may not provide the ultimate opportunity for the 
internationalisation of South African business entities. However, Games (2004:29) refutes 
this by arguing that South African banks have managed to attain a competitive advantage in 
Africa and other BRICS nations such as Brazil, India and China as a result of their capital 
strength and technological capabilities. Such a move in motion may be elevated to a higher 
degree due to South Africa‘s membership in BRICS.  
4.3.5 Industrial development and infrastructure financing cooperation 
Industrial development and infrastructure financing cooperation is one of the mostly 
anticipated economic outputs of the BRICS nations. BRICS recognises that to attain 
economic development, industrialisation is the earnest route. As such, industrial and 
infrastructure development around the world tend to differ in detail but share common 
structural and modelling issues. Fundamental to industrialisation is the ability of countries to 
have access to capital and necessary infrastructure. This section as such specifically looks at 
the issues industrialisation and infrastructure financing within BRICS and how this will 
ultimately have a positive bearing on South Africa. Issues of industrialisation and 
infrastructure development in South Africa fall under the recent Industrial Policy Action 
Plan. The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) falls within two phases, the (2013-2014) and 
the (2014-2015). The IPAP aims to coordinate industrialisation so as to raise South African 
products competitiveness on the global platform. As such the IPAP is directly influenced by 
the National Development Plan vision 2030 which subsequently recognise the significance of 
the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) as a blueprint to industrialisation in South 
Africa. The NIPF was adopted by the South African government in 2007. The IPAP‘s main 
reason of existence is to prevent decline of industry in South Africa. In this regard IPAP 
support industrial growth as well as diversification. Given the piece of legislative framework 
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that guides South Africa‘s plan towards industrialisation and infrastructure financing, how 
does its membership in BRICS bring possible opportunities? 
Consequently, IPAP (2013:21) states that: 
South Africa's participation in the BRICS provides important opportunities to build its 
domestic manufacturing base, enhance value-added exports, promote technology sharing, 
support small business development and expand trade and investment opportunities. 
Innovative proposals relating to the establishment of a BRICS-led Development Bank 
contributes to enhanced financial support for domestic and sub-continental infrastructure and 
regional industrial integration.  
Even though BRICS are posing a great threat to the established or developed nations, they 
still require industrial innovation and capital to finance its drive for industrialisation. In this 
regard, South Africa needs to diversify and upgrade its industrial base through increased 
domestic production structures and increase its private sector commitment to innovation. Will 
BRICS play that role for SA? As depicted by Coleman (2013) that BRICS have an 
infrastructure deficit of approximately US$4.5 trillion in a five year period. Fortunately 
BRICS have foreign exchange reserves amounting to the same figure, but the question will be 
whether such reserve will be converted to fund the infrastructure and industrialisation drive. 
This actually brings in the inevitability of the need for the BRICS Development Bank or the 
failure of BRICS.   
 
Drawn from the political coalition approach which notes that coalitions contributes resources 
to be used. BRICS have made provisions to fund infrastructure and industrialisation drive. 
Through the BRICS Development Bank and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement (CRA), 
political coalition and international political economy approaches find relevance here. To 
begin with, the CRA will not directly fund the projects but acts as package of responding to 
shocks on international financial challenges. As rightfully noted by Pimentel (2013:280) that: 
[…] a CRA would be the constitution of a multilateral agreement by which each country 
would commit resources up to a pre-established amount. Such resources, however, would 
make up a ―virtual‖ fund in the sense that the reserves would continue to be under the control 
and management of the respective central banks until the time of an eventual ―withdrawal‖ 
requested by one of the partners to face a liquidity crisis.  
In spite of that, the issues of industrial development and infrastructure financing in BRICS is 
still unknown whether it will have the desired output. There is a predominance of unknown 
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aspects essential to its functioning, including total volume of resources and contributions by 
each country. This is further delayed by issues of structural basis which includes voting 
power, margins for adoption of specific decisions, need of a secretariat or not and working 
currency or currencies. Summarily, one can say that it is rather too early to ascertain whether 
such ‗ambitious‘ ideas will be set in motion. Despite that, it is clear that its eventual success 
will represent an important qualitative change for the group and will signal the achievement 
of a higher level of internal cohesion. 
4.3.6 The BRICS Development Bank: A vision? 
The 2007/8 Global financial crisis and the 2009 Eurozone Crisis exerted some pressure on the 
WB and the IMF. The two monetary institutions did not do well in providing some response 
packages to this. This contributed to rising of concerns in particular from the developing 
nations. With this in mind, the emerging economies –BRICS in particular has taken 
advantage of the situation to stand their ground to call for the need of reform of the IMF and 
WB. As a response strategy, the BRICS made a proposal to establish a southern-led 
development bank. During the 2012 New Delhi BRICS Summit, the proposal was accepted 
and became one of the Summits strongest achievements as noted:  
…We have considered the possibility of setting up a new Development Bank for mobilizing 
resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other 
emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of 
multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development (Article 13 
of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, 2012). 
On 16 July 2014, BRICS launched the New Development Bank
45
. This bank has a huge 
potential for South Africa. From the Fortaleza Summit of 2014, the BRICS Development 
Bank will focus on providing an alternative to the Global North led financial and monetary 
institutions. The operation mundus of the development bank is not clear at the moment, but 
the bank was established to provide financial support for infrastructure development project 
in the Global South (Agreement on the New Development Bank, 2014). Therefore, the bank 
may offer some development packages for BRICS and non-BRICS developing nations on 
areas of trade, industrialisation and information sharing on development trajectories. At the 
moment, the bank will have a US$50 billion capital which is equally contributed by the five 
nations (Agreement on the New Development Bank, 2014). The bank will be permanently 
                                                             
45 For more details, See: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/international-business/BRICS-
Development-Bank-launched-first-president-to-be-from-India/articleshow/38440605.cms  
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headquartered in China. The bank‘s president will be appointed on rotational basis and the 
first president will come from India. The first board chairman will be from Brazil. South 
Africa has BRICS Development Bank regional office. This regional office will serve the 
African continent. For the fact that China has permanent headquarters, this implies that China 
will have the influence in this bank. Except from the BRICS Development Bank, the 
Fortaleza summit led to the operationalization of the CRA. China is expected to contribute 
US$41 billion, while India, Brazil and Russia will each contribute US$18 billion and South 
Africa will contribute US$5 billion respectively. This in itself implies that China will have 
the biggest voice, share and influence followed by a same voice scenario of Russia, India and 
Brazil and the least say scenario of South Africa situation. One conclusion emerges then; the 
Development Bank and CRA may necessarily disburse funds on Russia, China, India and 
Brazil‘s vote (BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, 2014).  
 
Figure 4: BRICS Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Agreement Analysis 
 
Source: Reuters, Online: Available at http://wef.ch/1zQI5O1 (Accessed on 17 July 2014) 
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The Development Bank may offer a huge opportunity for the post-financial crisis 
reconstruction. The financial crisis era created many challenges for these emerging 
economies. These challenges include exchange rates adjustments as already witnessed by the 
growing tension between the US dollar and the Chinese Yuan.  Imperatively, the launched 
development bank has an opportunity to establish new or an alternative funding mechanism 
for short to long term projects. This has an opportunity for South Africa to develop its 
regional integration agenda due to high probabilities of capital investment. This may lead to 
boosting of technology transfer and skills development capacities through research 
coordination within the BRICS nations (Zou, 2013). 
 
Banks from the Global South such as the Asian Development Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank and the African Development Bank have made financial donations to the 
developing nations since the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis  
(Prada, 2012). In the light of dwindling developed nations financial contributions, the Global 
South led regional banks and individual nations such as China, Brazil, Russia, India and 
South Africa acts as alternative donor states to the developing countries (Moore, 2014). The 
Development Bank will likely adopt the same model of operation. It must be noted that the 
BRICS Development Bank will not replace the existing international and regional financial 
and monetary institutions. The bank will add an alternative to the already existing pool of 
financial institutions. This might have a direct bearing on improving the so called South-
South Cooperation (Zou, 2013).  
 
 
The establishment of the development bank has created much hype and hope in particular 
from the Global South. Since the BRICS Development Bank is launched, it might take few 
years to operationalize. Key operating rules are still being finalised, but issues of banks 
currency are not yet been divulged to the public. South Africa as a member may see this as a 
possible opportunity, but there are also possible risks, constraints and uncertainties associated 
with this initiative (BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, 2014).  
4.4 Socio-Cultural prospects   
Using the constructivism approach which makes use of ideas, interest, beliefs and identity as 
key components to shape international relations, South Africa stands to benefit from the 
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socio-cultural experiences drawn from other BRICS nations. The BRICS socio-cultural 
practises are diverse. But there is a lot to learn from that diversity which acts as a strong 
bond. Socio-cultural prospects are envisaged within broader spectrums of ideas, values and 
practises that offers to a certain degree a rejection of western nations models of development. 
This includes a range of social welfare practise to ensure a rise in human development index. 
South Africa has an opportunity to understand such a diversity which can be extended to 
tourism industry. Since South Africa became a BRICS member in late 2010, the Department 
of Home Affairs has received quite a huge number of Chinese, Brazilian, Indian and Russian 
tourists. What is imperative about this is the ability of South Africa to integrate cultural 
exchanges ultimately leading to tourism industry boom.  This involves hotels, national parks, 
games and reserves facilities, and also national monuments. As noted that:  
In area of tourism, joint initiatives by official tourism promotion agencies arouse interest in 
private sector….. These initiatives could also include information and educational exchanges 
with official, wherever required (BRICS Report, 2012:178). 
Additionally, South Africa is already harnessing cooperation in issues of food security in 
particular with Brazil‘s robust agricultural sector. Fortunately, BRICS nations are among the 
major producers, consumers and exporters of agricultural products. This ability to produce 
exportable products is already being shared amongst the countries through research and 
innovative and skills development approaches to agriculture. Furthermore, South Africa is 
already benefiting from increased socio-cultural community based development initiatives 
such as the Bolsa Familia
46
 and Minha Casa, Minha Vida
47
 in Brazil through experiences 
sharing (Webster and Hurt, 2014). Since 1994, South Africa has also designed the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing scheme and the Social Grants 
Scheme which works exactly the same way as the Bolsa Familia and the Minha Casa, Minha 
Vida. In India, the central government has introduced the Indira Aawas Yojna
48
 housing 
scheme and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
49
. Based on 
constructivism, the sharing of socio-cultural experiences on development matters already 
signals the benefits for South Africa in BRICS (Webster, 2014). 
                                                             
46 Minha Casa, Minha Vida is a social housing scheme designed by the Federal Government of Brazil to help 
provide adequate housing needs for urban dwellers.  
47 Minha Casa, Minha Vida is a social housing scheme designed by the Federal Government of Brazil to help 
provide adequate housing needs for urban dwellers.  
48 Indira Aawas Yojna is the flagship rural housing scheme which is being implemented by the Government of 
India with an aim of providing shelter to the poor below poverty line.  
49 A national scheme in India in which people volunteer to work for 100 days of unskilled manual work in rural 
areas to improve the livelihood and security of people staying in rural areas  
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South Africa has learnt a lot in particular from other BRICS nations on issues of transport 
service improvement in urban areas. The current Rea Vaya
50
 transport system in 
Johannesburg has great resemblance from the Brazilian and Chinese urban transport systems. 
Already, BRICS is working on creating institutions to promote educational research and 
development. South Africa is benefiting from the BRICS Bibliographic Catalogue, BRICS 
Think Tank Symposium and the BRICS Business Council which are acting as institutions of 
collaborative approaches to areas of common interest (BRICS Report, 2012).  
4.5 Political prospects  
O‘Neil (2001; 2003) in his predications saw BRICs as an economic bloc. Some authors such 
as Stuenkel (2013) among others see BRICS as more of an economic front than a political 
bloc. Arguably, I consider BRICS as both a political and an economic led bloc but with more 
emphasis on economic considerations. A wave of diplomacy which is knitted within a 
Westphalian state system is a typical political reality in BRICS. But there is a big imagination 
in which the BRICS platform exerts a great deal of reform in the governance echelons. Below 
is a summary of key potential political prospects for South Africa in BRICS.  
4.5.1 South Africa’s global position  
South Africa‘s global position stands to be elevated to a bigger podium than it used to be. 
This is witnessed by South Africa assuming a middle power global player that is actively 
involved in various international organisations such as the SADC, AU, UN and its Agencies, 
IMF, WB and WTO. This is further reinforced by  South Africa‘s activeness and membership 
in regional and multilateral alliances, networks and organisations such as the IBSA, G20, 
BASIC and G77+China to mention a few. BRICS are playing a pivotal role in reshaping 
global governance and financial and trade architecture. This has huge potential diplomatic 
gains for South Africa. South Africa is gaining diplomatic bargaining power in global 
politics. Diplomatic bargaining power comes with a political voice that is in most scenarios 
backed by China, Russia, India and Brazil.  As noted by Dube (2014) 
The political gains of South Africa in BRICS are all centred of the bigger voice bigger 
influence scenario. Imagine a situation where South Africa is speaking to an issue as South 
Africa and a situation where South Africa is speaking to an issue backed by China, Russia, 
Brazil and India. That changes the dynamics completely. South Africa in BRICS has a more 
amplified voice (Dube, 2014).  
                                                             
50 Rea Vaya (which means "we are going" in Scamto) is a bus rapid transit system operating in Johannesburg, 
South Africa  
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Narnia Bohler-Muller from the Human Science Research Council-South Africa noted that: 
South Africa is strategically important to BRICS because it‘s a member of IBSA, with India 
and Brazil, it almost seemed strange to leave South Africa out of the group-(BRICS). And 
politically, South Africa still stands on the high moral ground and can use it amplify its voice 
on global issues (Bohler-Muller, 2014).  
Webster of the Chris Hani Institute notes that some analysts, argues that the entrance into the 
BRIC will allow South Africa to positively contribute to key global governance and 
democracy issues, and to demonstrate its leadership on issues such as conflict resolution, 
security, reconstruction and development (Webster, 2014). To date South Africa has 
participated on various issues of conflict resolution in particular in Africa. Enshrined within 
the diplomacy of Ubuntu, South Africa is believed to spread Ubuntu to other BRICS nations 
as a way of integrating global governance issues. A geopolitical locus notes that South 
Africa‘s membership also generates geographic representations for Africa both within the 
BRICS group and in international forums. This representation of the interests of the African 
continent and BRIC countries, allows the group to speak more widely on behalf of emerging 
economies and arguably on behalf of the developing world (Besada, Tok and Winters, 2013). 
4.5.2 South Africa in BRICS: Continental re-configuration or re-orientation?  
As depicted by the 2011 South African Foreign Policy document entitled, Building a Better 
World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu that: 
The developing world, especially Africa, has a limited voice and participation in the decision 
and policy making processes of the global trade, economic and financial institutions. This 
weakens the world‘s response to the developmental agenda of Africa and the South. A 
continued over-emphasis by the developed world on issues of peace and security undermine 
efforts to deal with the root causes of poverty and underdevelopment. To address this 
imbalance, South Africa will promote the increased alignment between the developmental 
agenda of Africa and the South and that of global organisations. In this regard, South Africa 
will work in partnership with the other African countries to forge a collective vision (South 
Africa‘s Foreign Policy Paper- Final Draft, 2011:24).  
Chapter 7 of the National Development Plan Vision 2030 of South Africa rightful proclaim 
that: 
We are Africans. We are an African country. We are part of our multi-national region. We are 
an essential part of our continent. Being Africans, we are acutely aware of the wider world 
deeply implicated in our past and present (NDP, 2013: 215).  
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Given the above, one can see that South Africa‘s position in BRICS is contributing to a 
certain level of continental re-orientation in which issues of economic development and 
integration have assumed a centre stage (UNECA, 2013). This re-orientation comes from the 
fact that South Africa dominates the region in terms of economic development and the GDP 
Purchasing Power Parity. South Africa has the requisite economic capability and levels of 
diversification that are required to drive economic integration. This will have a direct bearing 
on issues of technology transfer, poverty reduction, social development and the collective 
protection of the environment (Besada, Tok and Winters, 2013). 
 
During the 2013 BRICS Summit, South Africa made a task of driving the theme towards 
fostering of economic partnership as pathways for industrialisation and integration. In this 
regard South Africa‘s economic weight and growth spill-over effect has traditionally 
underpinned its key role in trade and economic integration initiatives within the framework of 
SACU, COMESA, EAC and SADC regions. While some (for example Games, 2012) see 
South Africa as a regional representative, other critics like (Bond, 2013) and Gumede (2013) 
heavily refute that. As Bond (2013) and Gumede (2013) argue that South Africa‘s position in 
BRICS re-orient not re-configure Africa since the assumed benefits are considered to be 
marginal. In-spite of that, South Africa‘s membership may possibly contribute to 
diversification of investment and increased market access for these BRICS nations into 
Africa and the other way around. This has a potential to raise investors other than the 
traditional western countries. However, Besada, Tok and Winters (2013) argues that BRICS 
may reinforce resource extraction. The argument is shared by Bond (2013) who postulates 
that BRICS investors could prove detrimental to African countries as South Africa may 
facilitate further capital encroachment and exploitation. This could possibly impose a new 
threat of neo-colonialism.  This totally changes the dynamics of how Africa should be seen in 
the conduct of international relations.    
4.5.3 Global governance reform agenda: A mirage? 
It is widely acknowledged and claimed by many scholars that main political reason which led 
to the formalisation of relations between BRICS nations was the need to reform UN and other 
global governance organisations such as IMF, WB, and WTO. Reform Agenda has been a 
burning issue in particular from the Global South (Stuenkel, 2013). The burning desire of the 
BRICS is to see the IMF and WTO being reformed. Dailami and Masson, (2011) argue that a 
reformed IMF has better opportunities for Global South. If the reform is to come, definitely 
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to come-South Africa will be among the beneficiaries of a just and equitable world order. In 
light of the above, Bohler-Muller argues that: 
One of the pillars for the establishment of BRICS is the need to champion the reform agenda 
of global governance- IMF, WB, WTO, UNSC….(Bohler-Muller, 2014).  
Naidu also reiterates that: 
South Africa in BRICS has more power than South Africa outside or being alone. Influence 
that come from multilateral actions has a great opportunity for South Africa to influence 
reform more effectively than if it was on its own (Naidu, 2014).  
Global governance reform agenda provides a huge potential for South Africa in BRICS. A 
reformed world order will resemble an architecture of international relations which is based 
on mutual respect for human rights, diplomacy of Ubuntu, realisation of socio-economic 
development amongst other ideas, values and needs of developing countries (Naidu, 2013). 
Within BRICS, a new realm of governance is promising which is enshrined within political 
solidarity spectrums. This implies that BRICS is even ambitious to attain a more political led 
voice. This will influence the power correlations between economics and politics.  
4.6 Conclusion 
As a serving member of BRICS, South Africa relations have been dominated by issues of 
trade and investment. However, South Africa‘s investment and trade with other BRIC nations 
(except for China and India) are still conservative. In fact, South Africa seems to enjoy more 
trade growth with Africa than BRICS. This is a reality check which has often been painted 
white by the BRICS‘s media powerhouses. Such difficulties in contributing to growth in 
intra-trade within BRICS may be attributed to the bureaucratic hurdles. It is difficult for other 
BRICS members to penetrate the economies of Russia and China due to their closed 
economic set-ups. The situation is made worse by high red-tape practise in these two 
countries.  Even though there is high hope for an increase in trade between South Africa and 
other BRICS, available trade data as presented above, depict rather the unlikelihood of seeing 
the so called Preferential Trade Agreement anytime soon. This has only one end: which is 
increased parallel bilateral trade and investment agreements which may contribute to the 
development of trade related conflict of interest.  
 
Lastly, South Africa has the potential to increase its trade engagements with BRICS to its 
benefit, but at the moment, the gains are marginal. While the media has to a certain extent 
articulated that South Africa is vehemently benefiting from the BRICS forum, the chapter 
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shows that South Africa‘s benefits are moderate. This actually calls for South Africa to have 
a clear and well-articulated policy position in BRICS. Otherwise it will be just a bandwagon-
with no real tangible benefits, this might even be a risk that South Africa will be exploited. 
The chapter also noted that there is direct correlation between an increase of wealth on trade 
and investment with an increase of power, influence, values and ideas. This is a typical 
scenario occurring in BRICS. After having unpacked the possible opportunities for South 
Africa in BRICS on basis of trade, aid, investment and political influence, the next chapter 
turns to the constraints that already confront South Africa as a BRICS member.  
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5.0 Chapter 5: The Constraints for South Africa’s participation in BRICS 
5.1 Introduction 
While there has been hype and celebration by South Africa for its inclusion in BRICS, there 
has been little engagement with the actual constraints that South Africa is already facing or 
will face in future. South Africa‘s position in BRICS has tremendous constraints, challenges 
and risks which have been partly neglected. Such constraints as this chapter shows have been 
minutely expressed by Jim O‘Neil. This chapter attempts to unpack such risks, challenges 
and constraints. From a geopolitical perspective, South Africa suits well in BRICS, but it is 
punching above its weight (Draper, 2011). As noted earlier in the preceding chapters, the 
country has the smallest GDP and population amongst other weaknesses, which could 
threaten its competitiveness
51
. Its economic development progress has been lagging behind 
the other members which could possibly constraints South Africa‘s ability to exploit 
opportunities in other BRICS nations. The current labour force instability in the mining 
industry has a great setback in positioning South Africa‘s BRICS membership. While China 
is the backbone to BRICS, its labour practises and goods dumping practises are areas of great 
concern for South Africa.  
 
On a short and long term scenario projection, South Africa has a possibility for high returns 
in particular within trade and investment circles. It is imperative to unpack the political, 
economic and social constraints for South Africa in BRICS. This raises questions why China 
and Russia in particular chose South Africa other than nations such as Indonesia, Turkey, 
Vietnam or Nigeria which fits well within O‘Neil next 11 trajectories (O‘Neil and 
Stupnytska, 2009). By extension, this chapter looks at potential risks and uncertainties for 
South Africa which are often unstated. Based on issues of governance mechanism and 
approaches, BRICS do not have enough in common to sustain a shared institution. BRICS 
have different political systems in which Brazil has a thriving model democracy approach. 
Russia deeply entrenched in an oligarchical model (Urban, Igrunov and Mitrokhin, 1997). 
China entrenched in a communist undemocratic and dictatorial model, while India has a 
thriving model democracy with South Africa having a model democracy as well. This might 
be an area of friction. Since local systems have a direct bearing on the international stage, 
                                                             
51 Conceptually speaking, economic variables are not the only factors that may limit South Africa‘s 
competitiveness, internally labour instability, and socio-economic inequality and the broader global economic 
recession all contributes to South Africa to be less competitive as compared to other BRICS nations. 
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frictions arise in particular on foreign policy orientations. This chapter explores the possible 
areas of frictions within BRICS and how that ultimately affects South Africa. This should 
ring alarm bells for South Africa as there might be some elements of future conflict on 
political and economic priorities. South Africa‘s domestic handicaps and lack of ‗dearth‘ 
diplomatic resources in comparison to other BRICS nations may prove to be a major 
constraint towards effective participation in tapping opportunities available in the group. 
Additionally, South Africa‘s membership in BRICS may render the ineffectiveness and loss 
of touch for the IBSA platform. However, this is a bone of contention as some critics tend to 
see the forums serving different agendas and ideals altogether in comparison to the so called 
‗unfocused BRICS‘ (Besada, Tok and Winters, 2013). In order for one to realise the possible 
areas of conflict in BRICS, there is need to first explore the  governance systems (economic, 
political or social) of each country and how that will affect their capacity to operate as a unit. 
Given the limitations which have been faced by South-South Cooperation frameworks such 
as IBSA, BASIC, NAM and others, will BRICS not fall in the same trap or pit? And what 
implications will this have for South Africa. 
5.2 Political risks and uncertainties 
Political risks and uncertainties are often common problems associated with membership in 
forums and international organisations. Even though it is too early to judge the extent of the 
political implications and ramifications for South Africa in BRICS, this section specifically 
addresses issues of governance and accountability, which manifest well within foreign policy 
identity considerations.  
5.2.1 Incompatible governance structures  
BRICS tend to see the for a world order that is de-linked from western institutional 
orientations, but they seem not to agree on how that world order should be built on, rather 
how it should look like. As noted by Memory Dube that: 
BRICS have had a couple of misses in the past. The issues of leadership of the IMF, WB, and 
the resolution of Syrian and Libyan crisis are a couple of misses recorded to date. They did 
not put a united stand which is contrary to what the G7 does. Yes the G7 have their internal 
problems and disagreements, but they put a united stand on issues of global concern, of which 
the BRICS have failed to do. This actually resembles an area of incongruence on what they 
really want (Dube, 2014).  
As noted by Shleifer and Treisman (2005) that Russia‘s economic and political systems 
remain far from perfect.  Shleifer and Treisman (2005) argue that those in power are accused 
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of manipulating elections through control of the state media, harassment or censorship of the 
independent press and use of judicial and administrative levers to intimidate or incapacitate 
rivals. It has remained difficult to really assert the democracy of Russia, but Colton and 
McFaul (2003) have named Russia a ‗managed democracy‘. Such a tittle ‗managed 
democracy‘ emerges from the view that the prolonged economic growth would be conducive 
for democracy, for it will grow a middle class that will demand freedoms, accountability and 
transparency government in the near future.  
 
Moving to China, the considered red-tape administration has challenged the world economic 
superpower, the United States by its recent economic boom. Though China might be termed a 
Communist led nation, Fewsmith (2008) has proved otherwise. China is a nation that has 
undergone serious economic reforms that has been shaped by the Washington Consensus 
(Ban and Blyth, 2013). What China under Deng Xiaoping did was to follow a state led 
neoliberalism approach (Vogel, 2011). This is a scenario of a state capital monopoly 
enshrined within the so called State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In 2004, China published the 
Beijing Consensus as a combination of Washington Consensus mixed with state monopoly 
(Fewsmith, 2008).  
 
But is China democratic? No. China is considered undemocratic due to its one party system 
enshrined within the Chinese Communist Party. China tends to supress people in particular in 
labour issues through its state led capitalism. As noted by Ziyang (2009); Teiwes and Warren 
(2004) that the Tiananmen Square Massacre, which crushed a student led democratic 
movement in 1989, is a clear example of the authoritarianism. There is no freedom of press 
and expression in China which altogether limits the concept of democracy. In China the CCP 
has always assumed an authoritarian status in issues of public participation for an ordinary 
Chinese (Saich, 2004). The question of China being democratic or not is very important in 
bringing contextual comprehension of liberal economy and managed democracy analysis. 
This is a typical scenario in BRICS in which there are contradictory development frameworks 
between Russia and China on one side and South Africa, India and Brazil on the other side 
(Lukyanov, 2011). Such contradictions in economic development frameworks have provided 
limitations for other Global South institutions such as NAM, G77+China amongst others. 
This brings limitations for the BRICS forum to clearly articulate a common position in 
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addressing global economic inequality ratios. For China, state and party control of the 
economy matters a great deal. China thus develops an industrial policy that targets economic 
development. China as a nation has maintained firm grip over the economy to ensure that 
such industrial policies developed are meet and realised (Fukuyama, 2012). Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens and Stephens (1992) make some attempts to explain this as portrayed in their book; 
Capitalist Development and Democracy. What is imperative about the book is the ability of 
the trio to delineate economic development trajectories from political ideology positions. The 
case has been altogether different for Brazil, India and South Africa.  
Democracy helps development through the accountability mechanisms it installs for limiting 
the abuse of executive power, and provides a system of periodic punishments for undesirable 
government interventions in the economy and rewards for desirable interventions (Bardhan, 
1990:13). 
This has been a typical scenario occurring in Brazil, India and South Africa. Bardhan further 
pose that accountability in its actual essence is very important as failure to do so results in 
economic disasters as witnessed in Soviet Union during the late 1980s. India, Brazil and 
South Africa have proved that democracy is really a variable for economic development. 
Economic independence and freedom ensure property rights. This is a huge incentive that 
ensures production and exchange of goods and services. As witnessed in India, Brazil and 
South Africa that political democracy has enormous indirect effects on growth through 
human capital accumulation, income distribution, and political stability (Baum and Lake 
2003). Alesina et al (1996) argue that the presence of democratic institutions in a country 
positively affects the level of economic freedom. Bhagwati (1995) and Rodrick (2000) note 
that India, Brazil and South Africa provide higher quality growth through predictability and 
stability forecast of the economy in the long run basis. This was the prime reason why Jim 
O‘Neil managed to give a long term forecast of BRIC.  
 
This view is further supported by Heller who did a comparative study on South Africa; India 
and Brazil. Heller (2001) argues that the prevalence of democracy and development in India 
(Kerala), South Africa and Brazil (Porto Aligre) has been the presence of a central state 
capacity. Availability of central state capacity has contributed to the development and 
coordination of various levels of governance from local to national government. Presence of a 
central command structure has the ability to help China and Russia to strengthen their 
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economic development policies. This might be a positive note for China and Russia to 
capitalise on. 
 
Given the governance structures between South Africa and Russia and China in particular, 
what are the possible future political risks and uncertainties in governance issues? Will South 
Africa adopt governance models of China and Russia? And will South Africa also export its 
human rights promotion agenda as a principle on foreign policy architecture for the broader 
BRICS group? As such, responding to the above questions, there is potential that South 
Africa will lose its governance structures identity adopting pro-Chinese and Russian models 
(Kurlantzick, 2006). On basis of human rights promotion agenda, it is difficult for South 
Africa to influence BRICS policy agenda in particular to traditional and powerful hegemonies 
such as China and Russia. These are established nations that value state sovereignty and 
undermine intervention as evident in Syrian and Libyan crisis.  
 
Recent evidence has already highlighted that South Africa is slowly eroding its governance 
mechanism adopting the Chinese and Russian models. China and Russia have ministry of 
communications which are used as instruments of state propaganda. The 2014 cabinet 
portfolios have seen South Africa appointing a new ministry of Communications (De Wet, 
2014).  This ministry in its entirety is influenced by the Chinese and Russian models.  
Additionally, ANC continues to run the affairs of the nation. Though a multi-party nation, 
ANC dominates and enjoys monopoly of power in South Africa-a typical scenario of the 
Chinese Communist Party (Brooks, 2004).  
 
On economic governance issues, South Africa continues to import models of economic 
development for adoption and implementation in its domestic set-up (Fakir, 2007). A typical 
example is of China‘s Industrial Development Zones (IDZ) or Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) in which South Africa has adopted the same model. China introduced industrial 
development strategy through the SEZ or IDZ approach. SEZ can be defined as a  
Geographical region that has economic and other laws that are more free market oriented than 
a country‘s typical or national laws (April, 2012:107). 
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South Africa introduced the so called SEZ. As explained above, SEZ are economic zones that 
are considered more productive and as such require special economic preferential treatments. 
South Africa adopted this from China as a development strategy that was aimed at boosting 
economic development within the identified zones. April notes that,  
South Africa currently has four IDZs: in Port Elizabeth (Coega), East London (ELIDZ), 
Richards Bay (RBIDZ) and Gauteng (OR Tambo International Airport). Almost 10 years after 
they were introduced by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) with billions of rand 
invested, in January 2012 the DTI established that IDZs have been underperforming (April, 
2012:108).  
Another striking political risk and uncertainty on South Africa‘s membership in BRICS is the 
potential of dilution on moral obligations that governs South Africa‘s foreign policy 
objectives and interests. As stated by the 2011 White Paper on Foreign Policy, South Africa‘s 
foreign policy is based on a commitment for the protection and promotion of human rights. 
However, such a position has been jeopardized by its membership in BRICS in particular 
from China and Russia‘s influence. This has led to the development of incongruences and 
ambiguities in South Africa‘s foreign policy (Landsberg and Moore, 2013). South Africa‘s 
membership in BRICS is to a certain extent challenged by the inconsistence and ambiguous 
foreign policy principles and ideals. On one hand you see South Africa prioritising the 
African Agenda position which has now been considered rhetorical, while on the other hand 
you see South Africa prioritising China, India, and Brazil strategic bilateral relations
52
. This 
is further confused by the fact that South Africa promotes collaborations between the Global 
South and North. This totally gives no direction and identity for South Africa‘s foreign 
policy.  
 
 
South Africa uses a pragmatic foreign policy approach (Tsipanyane, 2011). Besides, the 
complexity of the world and the challenges of globalisation require more than one policy 
approach (Grant and Draper, 2012). Evidence presents that South Africa‘s commitment to 
human right continues to be challenged in particular by its posture in responding to issues of 
human rights on a global scale. Picking from among many scenarios, South Africa proved its 
inconsistency in its foreign policy approach as witnessed during the 2011 Libyan crisis. As a 
                                                             
52 I note that perhaps there is tension in South Africa‘s attempt to promote at once an African Agenda and a 
more narrow set of specific interest, informed by its membership in BRICS. As such, this tension is a problem 
and is currently incompatible in South Africa due to absence of enough capacity. This also contributes to 
conflict of ideological, economic, and political orientations and interest  
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bloc-BRICS, agreed a peace process to ensure peace restoration in Libya. But on the UNSC 
platform, South Africa chose to vote in favour of the so called Resolution 1973 in Libya-a 
military intervention which was hugely criticised by China and Russia. Additionally, the 
Zuma administration denied the Human Rights activist Dalai Lama a travelling Visa to South 
Africa (Aljazeera News Africa, 2014). Critics argue that China lobbied South Africa not to 
grant the visa. To concretise this, Bohler-Muller notes that 
The current President, Jacob Zuma, is a pragmatist who is focused on developing close 
economic relations with emerging global powers, including those that do not have strong 
human rights records like China and Russia (2013:372).  
Such a trend has continued to grow and was evidently identified when South Africa chose to 
align itself with China and Russia to veto against the imposition of UN sanctions on 
Zimbabwe (Bohler-Muller, 2013). South Africa also abstained from voting on a resolution on 
Syrian crisis (Bohler-Muller, 2013). South Africa refused to recognise the legitimacy of the 
Libyan National Transitional Council (TNC) as interim government (Bohler-Muller, 2013). 
South Africa granted King Mswati III of Swaziland an economic recovery loan to a 
government that was alleged of serious human rights violations (Bohler-Muller, 2013). To 
date, South Africa chooses to denounce the legitimacy of International Criminal Court (ICC) 
siting allegations of double standards applications towards Africa (Bohler-Muller, 2013). ICC 
has embraced the responsibility to ensure that those responsible at human rights violations are 
brought to justice and surprisingly, South Africa denounces it
53
. This is clear that South 
Africa is losing its touch on its foreign policy ideals and principles of human rights protection 
and promotion. China and Russia have to a greater extent influenced South Africa‘s position 
in responding to human rights issues globally. So what does this imply for South Africa?  
 
Looking at how situations are unfolding (both internally
54
 and externally), the above 
backdrop shows that South Africa‘s participation in multilateral frameworks such as BRICS 
does not necessarily mean the ability to play a constructive and effective role in them. Rather, 
China and Russia within BRICS have polluted the moral fabric of South Africa‘s human 
rights record. This in most scenarios is seen by determinations which repeatedly surpass 
                                                             
53 Not so surprising given global controversy that has surrounded the ICC since its inception. It has never been 
that clear that the ICC promotes human rights in a fair manner. This brings the issue of double standards in 
particular towards Africa 
54 For example the Marikana massacre and labour rights, which have been diminished in favour of economic 
growth 
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actual aptitude. To date, such exercises have proven devastating and tantamount to 
turbulence. 
5.3 Socio-Economic constraints  
Since South Africa is the smallest economy in BRICS, common sense point out that it may 
suffer the dire economic catastrophes, risks and uncertainties. Metaphorically, China, Russia, 
India and Brazil are in the same premier league, and South Africa is in division league.  So 
what does this imply? First and foremost the industrial and manufacturing base for South 
Africa is weak in comparison to other BRICS partners. Secondly, South Africa is 
experiencing serious slow economic growth which is to a certain extent caused by the current 
Global Financial Crisis. Lastly, South Africa in BRICS has the highest unemployment rate. 
Then, is South Africa in the wrong club? The following section specifically addresses the 
economic ramifications for South Africa in BRICS. 
5.3.1 Industrial and manufacturing incompetency   
South Africa has industrial and manufacturing base that may not be competitive enough to 
face the fellow BRICS nations. Its membership in BRICS may lead to these sectors to be 
usurped by the established Chinese, Indian, Russian and Brazilian companies. South African 
manufacturing sector cannot face the competition of China, India, Brazil and Russia. This is a 
big economic constraint for South Africa in BRICS. South Africa‘s industrial and 
manufacturing sectors are small, weaker and less competitive as comparable to the other 
BRICS nations. In spite of the above, South Africa has the old industrial base equivalent to 
that of Brazil and China. South Africa has an open economy set up in which it promotes 
competition. But this has a potential implication for the domestic industrial and 
manufacturing bases which are old, but under rejuvenation. Consequently, the footwear and 
clothing industries among other industries cannot at the moment match the Chinese and the 
Indian conglomerates. This implies that domestic industries are going to cede their shares to 
the marauding giants from the BRICS partners thereby affecting South Africa‘s domestic 
industrial and manufacturing base.   
 
South Africa‘s industrial and manufacturing base runs a risk of vulnerability in commodity 
and goods development capacities given the fierce nature of competition it faces from the 
BRICS nations. Situations are made worse by the shortage of innovative and technology in 
South Africa. Furthermore, South Africa has to date experienced a couple of problems with 
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its membership in BRICS. Firstly, China has been accused of dumping cheap, poor quality 
products in the South African market. This has contributed to the local producers lowering 
their market price of the commodities produced regardless of the production cost. Secondly, 
South Africa has had serious problems with the Brazilian poultry industry. The so called 
‗Samba‘ chickens are dumped in South Africa of which in most cases they are of poor quality 
and grade. It is until recently that South Africa has introduced the anti-dumping laws (Brink, 
2012; Tao, 2006). But, this has to a greater extent affected South Africa altogether.  This is a 
potential risk to the rainbow nation economy. Additionally, there are several dilemmas in 
which South Africa finds itself in as a member of BRICS for the fact that it is an equal 
competitor to the fellow BRICS partners. For example, South Africa clearly states that the 
other BRICS partners should tape Africa‘s resources via South Africa (Stuenkel, 2012). 
However, China and India together with Brazil often counter such a position by operating on 
a bilateral basis with African nations.  
5.3.2 The slow economic growth scenario 
From late 2012 to early 2014, South Africa has experienced serious slow economic 
development (World Bank Report on South Africa, 2012). This trend has been projected to 
continue. Unless drastic efforts are put in place, the projected 11 million jobs to be created by 
2030 will die a dream (National Development Plan, 2013). This is a serious economic 
challenge which may render South Africa‘s membership in BRICS useless. Bohler-Muller 
made it explicitly clear that  
I don‘t see South Africa returning its membership in BRICS if it continues to underperform 
(Bohler-Muller, 2014).  
While it is true that all the BRICS nations are experiencing economic retard, it appears to be 
worse for South Africa. Twala (2012) argues that the Marikana incident (of 16 August 2012) 
in which the miners rose against the Lonmin Plant management over allegations of poor 
working and living conditions resulted in serious economic catastrophes for South Africa‘s 
trade
55
. Mining is a very important and key sector within South African economic 
considerations. As portrayed by Van der Schyff (2012:131) that in 2009, mining contributed 
approximately 8.8 percent towards the total GDP, provided approximately 1 million jobs and 
created tax revenue of approximately 10.5 billion rand in South Africa.  Furthermore, South 
                                                             
55 Lonmill is one of the largest mining Plants in South Africa responsible at mining exportable products. The 
Marikana incident resulted in a stop of mining for quite a long time resulting in South Africa not exporting the 
mineral products.   
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Africa‘s slow economic growth can also be accounted to the issues related to the Dutch 
Diseases Scenario. A Dutch Disease Scenario is a situation in which the economy is mainly 
centred on one commodity as a tradable good with high return values as compared to other 
products. Brahmbhat, Canuto and Vostroknutova (2010:1) notes that Dutch Disease as a  
term refers to changes in the structure of production that are predicted to occur in the wake of 
a favorable shock, such as discovery of a large natural resource or a rise in the international 
price of an exportable commodity that is perceived to be permanent. 
South African Dutch Disease scenario occurs within concentrated circles of the mining sector 
in which gold, platinum and other mineral products have been the dominant exportable 
products over the past decades. The current economic crisis has to a greater extent affected 
the market price and production cost of these minerals to an extent that South Africa‘s 
economic growth has been stagnant. Bearing in mind that South Africa‘s comparative 
advantage in BRICS comes from minerals (mining), the Global Financial Crisis and the 
Marikana incidents have affected South Africa. Regardless of that, South Africa‘s 
manufacturing and agriculture industry though partially strong, has been dully attached to 
mining and as such mining commands a measureable size of influence in the economic 
development circles. Slow economic growth coupled with other factors has resulted in many 
ills for the socio-economic development of South Africa as a nation.  
 
This is to a certain extent blamed on the legacies of apartheid in which the economy has been 
focused mainly on exports of primary products which have low value. Such an economy 
driven by export of primary products of low value has resulted in high unemployment rate. 
Situations have been made worse by the 2008 to 2009 Global Financial Crisis in which it is 
estimated that South Africa lost approximately 870,000 jobs (Department of Treasury, South 
Africa, 2013). To date statistics of unemployment are so high and it is a real ticking time 
bomb. This alarms the possibilities of a youth ‗spring‘. According to Statistics South Africa 
in conjunction with the Department of Labour, it is estimated that by 2012, 4.47 million 
people were unemployed (StatSA, 2013). Of these 4.47 million people, 49.8 percent of them 
are women; 59.3 percent did not complete grade 12 and 6.3 percent have tertiary education. 
From a race perspective analysis of unemployment, statistics notes that 52.7 percent are 
African and Coloureds; 9.5 percent are Indians and about 5.7 percent are Whites. Situations 
are made worse considering that youth comprises an approximation of 50 percent of total 
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unemployment in South Africa (StatSA, 2013). Youth unemployment in itself is a barometer 
for crisis. In BRICS, South Africa stands way above the rest in terms of high unemployment 
rate estimated to be at 20 percent, while India, Brazil Russia stand at 8 percent and China 
stand at 4.5 percent (BRICS Joint Statistics Report, 2013).  
 
Situations are made worse in particular by the Chinese labour policies. China is accused of 
bringing its own pool of labour for industrial and other construction purpose in Africa and 
South Africa. China does this as a mechanism to reduce labour cost. This has many problems 
as South Africa loses tax revenue from these employs. However, such a practise may to a 
certain extent be blamed on unavailability of skilled labour force to suit the Chinese 
demands. As a result of this, South Africa has developed high levels of unemployment and 
socio-economic inequalities. Though to a certain extent can be blamed on apartheid, the crux 
of the matter remains on the post 1994 government failure to address the concentration of 
capital flows and diversification of the economy. The Mandela, Mbeki and partly Mohlante 
era shelved this problem. Issues of this nature are difficult to suppress, a reason why they are 
emerging during Zuma‘s era.  
 
The situation is made worse by the current financial liquidity crisis affecting the world. 
Unfortunately, China continues to make it worse by its currency devaluation practises. By 
definition currency devaluation is a process within which a nation‘s central bank implement a 
monetary policy which makes its currency to lose value relative to other currencies on the 
foreign exchange market (Zhao and Xing, 2006).  
It is presumed that the devaluation initially tends to reduce the foreign prices of the country's 
exports in proportion to the devaluation. At these reduced prices, foreign demand for the 
country's exports will be increased, thus tending to bid up the foreign prices of these exports 
part-way back toward their pre-devaluation levels (Alexander, 2009:263).  
Besada, Tok and Winters (2013) raise a very critical observation that South Africa is 
experiencing negative implications on its trade with China due to current devaluation 
practises (Alexander, 2009).  This will have far reaching consequences for South Africa and 
to a certain extent the effects are being felt-throughout Africa.  As noted somewhere else that 
the economy of South Africa has been dominated by finance capital and owners of mineral-
energy resources who are not prepared to share their resource to redress issues of inequality. 
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Changes in quantity of export from gold to platinum have to a certain extent exacerbated the 
situation of high inequality. To a certain extent, this can be blamed on globalisation which 
has torn apart tariffs and trade barriers that protected manufacturing, and the influx of cheap 
manufactured goods. This in itself has contributed to local industries to decline in production. 
Already the over-reliance on export led economy has proved detrimental for South Africa as 
it cannot balance between economic growth and issues of equity. Things seem to be falling 
apart for the former biggest economy in Africa
56
-slow economic growth coupled with high 
unemployment, poverty and growing inequality which all in all is a recipe for disaster
57
. So 
what picture does this read for South Africa in BRICS? China, India, Brazil and Russia are 
big economies in which the so called economic engagements have high return risks for South 
Africa. This proves that South Africa‘s membership in BRICS was entirely based on the 
brotherhood solidarity and the need to bring legitimacy from the Global South with an 
African nation included. Situations are made worse by the domestic ills facing South Africa 
which equally challenges the sustainability of South Africa in BRICS for the next decades to 
come. Maybe we should start considering and preparing for an exit of South Africa in 
BRICS. With this in mind, South Africa is faced with a great pool of limitations. Instead of 
South Africa being an ‗equal player‘ it assumes an unwanted ‗observer status‘ in BRICS. 
South Africa has assumed the position- ‗what will BRICS offer us‘. Such a position brings 
limitations for South Africa. This will pose a great threat to the renewal agenda of South-
South Cooperation.  
5.3.3 Trade barriers and closed economy set-ups systems  
To date South Africa does not have PTA with China, Russia, India-except for Brazil, though 
not operational as presented in chapter 3. Joint BRICS and WTO study on BRICS trade show 
that there are lot of bureaucratic barriers to trade in BRICS. The situation is made worse by 
the closed economy set-ups of India, China and Russia. Though South Africa has adopted an 
open economy set-up premised within neo-liberal orientations, its industrial base is still weak 
and cannot match the competition of other BRICS partners. Liberal approach to trade 
includes lowering trade barriers and reduced capital control. These practises are good but 
South Africa runs a risk since its economy though diversified, is mainly based on one 
                                                             
56 As of May 2014, Nigeria had surpassed South Africa as the largest economy in the Africa 
57
 This situation cannot be assigned solely to conditions in the world economy; the South Africa government has 
been slow to redistribute wealth. Internal problems such as unemployment, limitations in wealth distribution 
among others are also responsible at preparing this recipe for disaster. The limitation with which the government 
is facing in dealing with issues of wealth distribution is another factor which is not attached to the external 
factors as explained above.  
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commodity export-minerals. This has a potential implication for South Africa running the 
risk of so called entrenched ‗asymmetrical patterns of trade‘ which reflects well within the so 
called trade deficit scenarios. Unfortunately, scenarios in other BRICS nations have been 
different. Consider Russia, China and India-they have adopted the so called protectionist 
approaches. The practise is still prevalent today, and by so doing, this limits South Africa‘s 
opportunities in this grouping to mere fanfare trajectories
58
. It is considered very difficult for 
a nation to penetrate the Russian and Chines economy on basis of trade since the central 
government always acts as the regulatory framework that often hinders foreign entities. 
However, this does not wholly dismiss that South Africa is trading and penetrating the 
Chinese and the Russian economies. Given the statistics, one is forced to recognise that the 
quantitative figure speaks volume in unpacking the bureaucratic hurdles South Africa faces as 
depicted in chapter 3. 
 
Besada, Tok ad Winters (2013) argue that if the free trade arrangements which are expected 
to be signed and ratified are operationalized, South Africa will have the greatest 
disadvantages. South Africa is bound to have to concede better access to its market for BRIC 
manufactured exports, and there is a danger that it will be induced to yield more than it gains. 
Already in Africa, South Africa is facing fierce competition. Surprisingly, Africa is the major 
economic backbone for South Africa‘s trade. Dailami and Masson (2011) posit that if the 
BRICS manages to establish the planned development bank, South Africa will suffer 
currency volatility. This comes with the notion that as part of the developing nations, South 
Africa will continue to use foreign currency to carry transactions with the rest of the world. 
However, globalisation has brought with it issues and fluctuations in multicurrency monetary 
systems (Dailami and Masson 2011).Currency fluctuations and Chinese currency devaluation 
practises will affect South Africa‘s share in the world trade and foreign exchange reserves. 
This is a negative connotation.  
5.3.4 Language diversity as a barrier  
Language is a barrier to international trade, business and relations in particular when the 
countries involved share different languages. Globalization has to a certain extent 
exacerbated the situation (Lauring, 2008). Thus, language affects almost all aspects of 
                                                             
58 Please note that protectionism is not an exclusive practice the BRICS, it is also widely used by developed 
countries, however one would expect that since they belong to the same forum with reformation agenda , trade 
was supposed to be free-specifically in BRICS. 
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everyday life in international relations. The issue of language barriers is particularly critical 
during intercultural service encounters (Henderson, 2005). Even though South Africa may tap 
from the cultural diversity in BRICS, the issue of language is really an arduous process. From 
the Brazilian Portuguese, to the Russian-Russian language, to the Indian English, to the 
Chinese Mandarin and South Africa English-all proves to be a difficult barrier. One of the 
officials at the South African Department of Trade and Industry remarkable noted that 
translating documents from China, Russia and Brazil is really a process. This takes time in 
most cases to de-construct policy documents written either in Russia, Chinese or Portuguese. 
Situations are even made worse in terms of Visa requirements and applications since they 
will need to be translated in most scenarios to domestic languages of these nations. These are 
some of the bureaucratic hurdles which constraints South Africa to fully tap and embrace 
available opportunities in other BRICS nations.     
5.4 Conclusion  
The chapter examined the political and socio-economic constraints for South Africa in 
BRICS, specifically on issues of political, economic and social echelons. The chapter also 
traced the domestic challenges which South Africa is facing and how that can possible 
contribute to increased constraints for South Africa in BRICS. This will have detrimental 
results as issues of high unemployment, socio-economic inequality and crack-down in labour 
supply will ultimately affect the total economic output of South Africa. After having assessed 
the available constraints for South Africa in BRICS, the next chapter gives a concluding 
overview of the research by examining the key research findings. 
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6.0 Chapter 6: Summary and conclusions   
This work started with an appraisal of South Africa‘s participation in BRICS. This appraisal 
was made possible by exploring the prospects and constraints for South Africa‘s participation 
in BRICS. Broadly, I have joined the BRICS-Global South debate by attempting to 
conceptual link the two. Such an attempt thus, locates BRICS within an operation framework 
of South-South Cooperation. This was made possible by use of different entry points-or 
angles of analysis such as the international political economy approach, the social 
constructivist approach and the political coalition approach. These theoretical cornerstones 
lend support to a thorough analysis in understanding South Africa‘s opportunities and 
challenges in BRICS. Specifically, the study explored the potential prospects and constraints 
for South Africa in BRICS on issues of trade, FDI, investment, global governance and also 
socio-cultural aspects. This chapter thus presents a summary of the key research findings. 
 
This dissertation has traced the emergence of BRICS from three main angles of analysis. 
These include the role of Jim O‘Neil projections, the role of diplomatic negotiations of 
BRICS nations and the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis. By mapping the rise of 
BRICS from these three contours, the study also restored the significance of history in the 
current global political order. Thus, South Africa‘s present standing in international relations 
is greatly shaped and enhanced by history. This history has enabled South Africa to have 
membership in various international organisations, multilateral forums and regional political 
and economic development frameworks among other factors.  
6.1 Key research findings  
An analytic approach was used as an attempt to establish the extent of South Africa‘s benefits 
and risks in BRICS. The study of South Africa in BRICS proved relevant since it was a 
nation that is currently deemed unworthy and unfit to be in BRICS (O‘Neil, 2001; O‘Neil, 
2003; Stuenkel, 2013). Many of these narratives about South Africa being unfit to be in 
BRICS have been written out of discourse of the Global South, or have been written from a 
Global North perspective that is resentful of the possibility and potential of BRICS. 
Regardless of that, the research outcomes are useful and can be further developed to assess 
case based thematic considerations for South Africa in BRICS. Multiple realities were found 
with regard to South Africa‘s position, membership, participation and potential prospects and 
constraints in BRICS.   
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By appraising South Africa‘s participation in BRICS from a historical trajectory merged with 
current realities, the study has indicated that though South Africa is a junior member in 
BRICS, it is much stronger than actually portrayed by the Global North based literatures. 
South Africa in any case is not a weak power in BRICS and this has been a key flaw 
presented in most available literature on South Africa and BRICS. Actually, South Africa is 
contextually in a position of strength in particular from an Afrocentric perspective.  
 
The main research question was: What are the economic, political and social prospects and 
constraints for South Africa‟s participation in BRICS? And the aim of the study was: To 
explore the available political, economic and social prospects and constraints for South 
Africa in BRICS. Below is a summary of the research findings.  
6.1.1 Economic size does not matter 
Within BRICS, the study confirms that South Africa‘s membership, participation and 
integration was not entirely based on its economic size, but rather the political, economic and 
social solidarity. The establishment of BRICS then resembles the institutionalisation of 
South-South-Cooperation. South Africa‘s inclusion in BRICS was a calculated move framed 
within the realities of rejection of westernization within development trajectories. By the 
virtue that South Africa was the largest economy in Africa by 2010, with relatively political 
stable environment, the political solidarity variable drawn from South-South Cooperation, 
find relevance and reinforcement in this regard.  
6.1.2 More prospects than constraints 
The study made an attempt to explore the extent of the opportunities and challenges for South 
Africa in BRICS. As such, the study found that South Africa stands to benefit from its 
membership in BRICS. Given the fact that China, India and Brazil are gradually becoming 
the largest trading partners for South Africa replacing the traditional European Union and the 
United States of America, this suggests that BRICS has huge potential opportunities for 
South Africa. As portrayed in chapter 3 that South Africa has an opportunity to attract 
financial capital from the BRICS nations in particular China, this goes a long way in 
promoting the much desired economic growth through massive industrialisation. This has 
high potential towards diversification of the economy to ensure economic development. 
Furthermore, the study confirms that through BRICS support for massive industrialisation, 
South Africa may benefit in terms of economic growth which may in turn reduce the soaring 
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high unemployment rate. Even though trade in intra-BRICS is slow as shown by the 
quantitative data presented in chapter 3, South Africa has a potential to harness more in the 
sense that these are all developing nations who tend to have favourable trading agreements as 
already witnessed through the signing of the PTA between South Africa and Brazil via the 
MERCOUSER and the SACU platforms. To date, South Africa is negotiating a PTA with 
India which may in turn contribute to South Africa benefiting more. Therefore, the study 
firmly ascertains that there are more benefits for South Africa in BRICS. In spite of a number 
of opportunities for South Africa in BRICS, the study also found that there are also possible 
constraints, risks and uncertainties. Chapter 4 specifically examines the extent of these 
detrimental consequences. Firstly, the study assessed the implications of South Africa‘s lack 
of competitiveness within BRICS. This has a potential negative implication for South 
Africa‘s drive towards industrialization. Furthermore, South Africa is experiencing domestic 
challenges such as high unemployment and slow economic growth coupled by over-reliance 
on the export of minerals; this in turn makes South Africa less competitive in tapping the 
available opportunities in other BRICS nations.  
6.1.3 South Africa-Africa-BRICS trilateral dimensions  
The study found that South Africa is caught in a dilemma of balancing its national interests, 
African agenda and the promotion of South-South cooperation in BRICS. South Africa is 
creating hostile situations for its business interests in Africa with the other BRICS nations 
which are potential competitors, way far than Pretoria. Regardless of that, South Africa‘s 
membership in BRICS provides an optimal time for South Africa to strategically locate and 
prioritise its key interest in Africa through the BRICS platform. The study also found that 
though South Africa positions itself as the gateway for Africa, to a greater extent BRICS 
engage Africa bilaterally. Thus, the study therefore found that South Africa‘s position in 
BRICS is contributing to a minor continental re-orientation for Africa‘s position in global 
politics. In other words the study sees it as a re-orientation not a shift per se.  
6.1.4 Alternative paths to development 
With the formal establishment of the BRICS Development Bank, headquartered in China and 
regionally located in South Africa, BRICS has a potential development blueprint in the 
Global South. This comes with the view that the emerging economies such as India, China 
and Brazil are acting as possible and alternative donors who are slowly contributing to the 
global FDI configurations. This may be an opportunity for South Africa as portrayed during 
the course of the study. Additionally, the study contends that South Africa‘s trade relations 
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are increasingly growing with BRICS. As shown in chapter three, though South Africa-
BRICS trade is increasing, the EU, USA, Japan, Germany and UK still occupy an important 
place in South Africa‘s trade exchange. Except from trade issues, China has defied odds by 
recording high rates of economic growth trends globally over the past decade.  
 
Arbitrating between imagination and reality, BRICS path to economic development is 
confusing and difficult to ascertain. This comes with the view that on one hand, BRICS is a 
South-South Cooperation institution that is detached from colonialism/imperialism and its 
legacies; while on the other hand it resembles neo-liberalism with Southern characteristics. 
Such an alternative development stance becomes overloaded by the mere fact that BRICS is 
not concerned with replacing the Global North, but joining them.  
6.1.5 A new era of multilateralism and diplomacy with southern characteristics  
While every nation from the Global South sees BRICS as a group to influence the next 
coming decades of international relations, the group has not yet fully established itself in a 
way that allows it to claim that space. Broadly, the study found that a new era of 
multilateralism and diplomacy with southern characteristics is emerging. This implies that a 
multilateral world order in which architecture of global politics is no longer dictated by the 
USA and the West, but pluralism, is emerging. There are some experiences of shift in the 
architecture of international relations in particular on development assistance. BRICS has 
assumed a global donor status especially in Africa. This shift in distribution of development 
assistance from the North to the South is not always in accord with the goals of the 
established donors.  
 
This suggests a shift in ideological underpinnings on economic development questions and 
debates. This shift confirms the need to advance the interest of equality, freedom, and 
mutuality which are free from Western orientations and free of institutional legacies of 
colonialism. However, such a shift is contested, as espoused in the study. China and Russia 
are not democracies. Therefore, the study found that the rise of BRICS resembles a new elite 
class of ―stronger south‖. Unlike the Bandung, NAM, G77 and other Global South forums, 
BRICS are concerned with their regional and global hegemonic tendencies to amass wealth, 
power and influence in global politics. This might suggest the rise of ‗global oligarchies‘ with 
southern characteristics.  
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BRICS preaches an equitable, just and balanced world order. The opposite however is true 
with Russia and China. China and Russia are not prepared to domesticate reform first. China 
and Russia are non-democracies but preach about freedom, equality and reform on world 
stage. This is a serious challenge that may render the irrelevance or uselessness of BRICS to 
represent the Global South. Global North is not prepared to lose its touch in global politics, 
and one should be careful not to think that BRICS will replace the North in global politics. 
Rather, BRICS represents a polemic entity and an established authority of multilateralism, 
which however is not ready to assume a stronger global political status. 
 
 
Another observation that emerged in this study is that BRICS belongs to a longstanding 
tradition of multilateralism in the developing world, or Third World, or non-Western world. 
This tradition points to successes and failures, constraints and opportunities. Like IBSA, 
BASIC and other forms of South-South Cooperation frameworks, BRICS at the moment is 
more of an economic solidarity with little political ambitions. Given the above, the study 
assessed that like IBSA or BASIC, BRICS main objective at the moment is to champion 
global governance reform and a rhetorical rejection of institutions of colonialism and 
westernization. As such, BRICS falls into the same trap that has befallen IBSA and BASIC 
among other platforms of Global South. Regardless of the limitations that BRICS is facing 
such as resentment of Global South idea by the established Global North institutions towards 
the reform agenda, the study found that within the BRICS platform, China and Russia are not 
prepared to take the lead in advocating for that reform, in particular within the UNSC circles. 
This is because BRICS is still deeply entrenched in the Westphalian state centric perspectives 
in which power, sovereignty are the key currencies in global politics. BRICS at the moment 
do not have a conflict or dispute resolution board such as the one present in organisations like 
UN, WTO and IMF (Christian and Papa, 2012). This poses a huge potential risk. Presently, 
China and India and Russia and China are entrenched in a border conflict which may limit the 
strength of BRICS (Christian and Papa, 2012). Secondly, China and India are all resource 
hungry nations that at one point prove to be at loggerheads in Africa (Baracuhy, 2012). This 
also poses a great threat to the traditional domain of South Africa‘s market terrain in Africa. 
Overall, BRICS nations may be simply contributing to a possible shift which does not 
necessarily imply that the shift is unfolding; perhaps it is preparing to unfold.  
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6.1.6 Looking to the future  
South Africa‘s position and participation in BRICS is a tricky one. Even though it is too early 
to judge, unfolding circumstances and scenarios predict tough times ahead for South Africa. 
Concerns revolve around increasing labour strikes and break down in labour alliance coupled 
with high unemployment and growing socio-economic inequality, together with slow 
economic growth worsened by the Global Financial Crisis; South Africa may not see its 
membership in BRICS from a long term projection. New powers are emerging in Africa and 
to date; Nigeria has surpassed South Africa as the largest economy in Africa. This has a huge 
potential implication for South Africa. This comes from some of the findings of the research 
that points out that BRICS policy orientations are inconsistent, uncoordinated and lacks 
vision. Missed chances on IMF leadership appointment and lack of political resolution to the 
Libyan, Syrian and now the Ukraine crisis show that BRICS are (were) not ready to take the 
lead.  
 
 
Presently, it is too early to judge the successes and weakness of BRICS. Who knows, perhaps 
BRICS may resemble one of the short lived over-ambitious forums that are created as a 
means to an end, not an end to the means. As a result of this study, different questions and 
debates have emerged. Firstly, what ideals, principles, orientations and configurations should 
South Africa export to BRICS? Secondly, what would be the institutional conditions for 
BRICS to assume a political face? And lastly, what should be, and could be the role of civil 
society and non-governmental organisations in the attempt to domesticate reform agenda in 
BRICS-China and Russia respectively? 
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Addendum 2 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
 
I am a research student in the Department of International Relations at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. I am undertaking a research entitled: “South Africa in 
BRICS: Prospects and Constraints”. This research explores the economic and political 
prospects and constrains for South Africa in BRICS. The larger question pursued is the 
sustainability of such a move in relation to economic and political processes attached to 
South Africa‘s membership in BRICS.  I am working under the supervision of Dr. 
Christopher Lee and Dr. Amy Niang. 
 
 
I am hereby seeking your consent for an interview. I have provided you with a copy of the 
consent and assent forms to be used in the research process, as well as a copy of the approval 
letter which I received from the Ethics Department of the University of the Witwatersrand.  
 
 
Upon completion of the study, I undertake to provide a finished copy of the full research 
report. If you require any more information about the study, please e-mail me at 
frangtonchiyemura@gmail.com contact me at my mobile number: +27 83 871 9011. Thank 
you for your time and consideration in this matter.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Frangton Chiyemura 
MA International Relations Student                       
Department of International Relations |University of the Witwatersrand     
36 Jorissen Street | Private Bag 3 | Wits 2050 | Johannesburg | RSA 
+27 83 871 9011 | frangtonchiyemura@gmail.com  |830691@students.wits.ac.za 
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Addendum 3 
 
Participant     Information      Sheet  
 
Title of the Study 
South Africa in BRICS: Prospects and Constraints 
 
 
Good day,  
My name is Frangton Chiyemura a MA International Relations student in the Department of 
International Relations at University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. This 
research explores the economic and political prospects and constraints for South Africa in 
BRICS. The larger question pursued is the sustainability of such a move in relation to 
economic and political processes attached to South Africa‘s membership in BRICS. 
 
In this regard, I am inviting you to be part of my research specifically because you have been 
doing work on BRICS. I am going to ask you questions in relation to South Africa in BRICS. 
The interview will be tape-recorded and the responses will also be anonymised. In this 
regard, all the information you will give will be treated with confidentiality. There are no 
wrong answers; all I need to know is your opinions, experiences and projections related to 
BRICS. The conversation should take about 1 Hour at the longest. This participation is 
voluntary and as a participant you can withdraw from the interview at any time.  
 
If you agree to take part in this study, sign the consent form. Should you have any queries or 
need for further clarity about participation in this study, please feel free to contact me on my 
mobile: +27 83 871 9011; Email Address: 830691@students.wits.ac.za ; 
frangtonchiyemura@gmail.com or my supervisor Dr Chris Lee on 
christopher.lee@wits.ac.za.   
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Addendum 4 
 
Consent Form 
 
I…………………………………………………………………………………………………
agree to participate in South Africa in BRICS: Prospects and Constraints research study. 
The purpose and nature of the study has been explained to me in writing. 
I am participating voluntarily. 
I give permission for my interview with Frangton Chiyemura to be tape-recorded. 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study, without repercussions, at any time, whether 
before it starts or while I am participating. 
I understand that I can withdraw permission to use the data of the interview, in which case the 
material will be deleted. 
I understand that anonymity will be ensured in the write-up by disguising my identity. 
I understand that disguised extracts from my interview may be quoted in the thesis and any 
subsequent publications if I give permission below: 
(Please tick chosen option on the boxes below) 
I agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my interview     
I do not agree to quotation/publication of extracts from my interview      
I consent to be tape recorded          
I do not consent to be tape recorded        
 
Signed…………………………...   Date…………………………………… 
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Addendum 5 
 
Interview Questions  
1. What motives and historical trajectories contributed to the establishment of BRICS? 
2. In most cases BRICS is seen as a form of South-South Cooperation, and, is such 
cooperation contributing to shift on the architecture of global politics- from the Global 
North to the Global South? 
3. BRICS does not have an institutional model of engagement (such as protocol on trade, 
infrastructure development, FDI etc.)  And is membership in BRICS a ―win-win‖ 
situation or a zero-sum game?   
4. Quite often South Africa is criticised for having joined a group it does not fit, what 
was the rationale for South Africa‘s inclusion in BRICS? 
5. Does South Africa has a strategy in BRICS, if yes explain which one? 
6. What does South Africa benefit in BRICS?  
7. What challenges is South Africa facing or likely to face by being a BRICS member? 
8. Notably, South Africa‘s Africa Agenda has been seen as a move in which South 
Africa positions its self as a gateway to Africa, does other BRICS need South Africa 
to access Africa? 
9. Will South Africa‘s position in BRICS contribute to the continental re-configuration 
or re-orientation in global politics? 
10. What is South Africa and other BRICS countries doing to reform international 
institutions? 
11. Will South Africa‘s participation in BRICS enhance its world position and How? 
12. How does South Africa influence policy Agenda in BRICS looking at its junior 
member status?  
13. South Africa, Brazil, India and China are characterised by high inequality, poverty 
and unemployment issues. To what extent does the BRICS contribute to the 
alleviation and eradication of such societal challenges? 
14. In the light of South Africa‘s economy down turn, is South Africa‘s position in 
BRICS sustainable in the short to medium term basis? 
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Addendum 6 
 
Source: investphilippines.org June 2014  
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